Results matching “thomas”

A Disappointing Sequel in Moore v. Texas

In 1980, Bobby James Moore literally blew the head off James McCarble, 72, while robbing the supermarket where Mr. McCarble worked. Today the U.S. Supreme Court overturned Moore's death sentence for the second time.

The opinion relies on criteria for defining intellectual disability (formerly called mental retardation) established by two private organizations with agendas, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities and the American Psychiatric Association. For the reasons why this is a bad idea, see our brief in the first case. Science has little or nothing to do with it.

The first case was decided 5-3, with Justice Scalia's chair vacant and Chief Justice Roberts dissenting, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito. This time, the Chief concurs because he believes the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals did not properly apply the previous decision. It is binding precedent, even if he does not agree with it. Justice Alito writes the dissent joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch.

There is no express indication of Justice Kavanaugh's position. "Per curiam" opinions are not expressly joined, though they express the position of a majority of the Court. It is disappointing not to see him join the dissent. Hopefully he merely has a position like Justice Roberts's, that he does not think the state court followed the precedent, without revisiting the issues decided there. He seems to be generally lying low after his brutal confirmation battle.

There are many bad ideas in constitutional law, but delegating to private, unaccountable, agenda-driven organizations the power to amend the Eighth Amendment and decide who can be executed for murder is among the worst. I had hoped that this case would be taken for full briefing and argument to reconsider that question, but the Court should take it up in another one soon.

News Scan

SCOTUS to Review NY Gun Law:  The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to review a unanimous Second Circuit ruling which held that New York City's harsh gun restrictions comply with the high court's 2008 Heller v. District of Columbia decision.  Adam Liptak of the New York Times reports that the Second Circuit ruling rejected claims made in a lawsuit by the New York Rifle and Pistol Association, that by prohibiting lawful gun owners from taking their unloaded and locked firearms to second homes, out of city shooting ranges, competitions or anywhere else, the law violates Heller and the Second Amendment.  The article suggests that by agreeing to hear the appeal after denying review of gun cases for nearly a decade, the Court, with the recent confirmation of a new more conservative justice, may be poised to expand Heller.  Last year, Justice Clarence Thomas noted in a dissent to denial of a Second Amendment case that "The right to keep and bear arms is apparently this court's constitutional orphan."  On Tuesday, NY Mayor Bill de Blasio told reporters that his city would vigorously defend the gun restrictions.    
The U.S. Supreme Court took a step back from the brink of irrationality in sentencing today in Stokeling v. United States, No. 17-5554. The vote was a surprisingly close 5-4, and not strictly on the "usual" lines.

Convicted criminals should be sentenced primarily according to the crime they committed and the crimes they have committed before. Other relevant factors should have minor weight, and irrelevant factors should have no weight. That is the essence of fairness in sentencing.

Among the irrelevant factors that should have no weight are the minor quirks in the law of the jurisdiction where the prior offense was committed. Yet when it comes to sentencing federal convicts with prior state convictions, deciding what constitutes a "violent felony" for the purpose of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) has proven to be a surprisingly difficult problem. Sometimes the distinctions threaten the fairness and even the rationality of federal sentencing. Defendants who committed similar crimes in different states can be sentenced very differently because one state defines the crime in a slightly broader way so that a person could theoretically be convicted under the statute for an act that is not actually violent, even though the actual defendant's actual act was very violent.

Is robbery a violent felony? Of course. As originally enacted, the ACCA's "three strikes" provision included robbery by name, with a definition mirroring the common-law definition, "any felony consisting of the taking of the property of another from the person or presence of another by force or violence."  "Force" in this definition must necessarily be broader than force that causes personal injury because otherwise it would be redundant with "violence," and the common law did define robbery in a broader sense.

In 1986, Congress amended the statute in an amendment titled "Expansion of Predicate Offenses for Armed Career Criminal Penalties." Did this "expansion" amendment actually contract the definition so severely that robbery convictions from most states would no longer be included? It is remarkable that such a question would even reach the Supreme Court and even more remarkable that the Court was narrowly divided on it.

The Attorney General

The U.S. Supreme Court today brushed aside Thomas Goldstein's clever move to place the legitimacy of Matthew Whitaker as Acting Attorney General before the court through a normally routine motion to substitute a successor for a party appearing in his official capacity. In Michaels v. United States, No. 18-496, a petition challenging the federal ban on possession of firearms by convicted felons, Goldstein moved to substitute Rod Rosenstein, rather than Matthew Whitaker, for departed Attorney General Jeff Sessions, the nominal lead defendant.

No dice. In today's order list, the Court denied the motion and the certiorari petition without comment or noted dissent.

The question will likely be moot very soon. William Barr's confirmation hearing is tomorrow. His prepared remarks have been released. Sadie Gurman has this story in the WSJ. The part about the Mueller probe will be the main topic of conversation amongst the chattering classes. I am more interested in his priorities for DoJ generally.

First, we must continue the progress we have made on violent crime while, at the same time, recognizing the changes that have occurred since I last served as Attorney General. Then, the Nation was suffering from the highest violent crime rate in our history. My priority was to protect the public and attack those soaring crime rates by targeting chronic violent offenders and gangs. The crime rate has substantially fallen since 1992. The recently passed First Step Act, which I intend to diligently implement if confirmed, recognizes the progress we have made over the past three decades. Like Attorney General Sessions, I believe we must keep up the pressure on chronic, violent criminals. We cannot allow the progress we have made to be reversed. As Attorney General, I will continue to give priority to the joint efforts with our state and local partners to combat violent crime.
That sounds like the "law-and-order President" has indeed given us another law-and-order Attorney General. While he tips his hat to the Faux Pas Act, the main point is a determination to continue the progress against crime that the get-tough policy of his prior tenure helped bring about. "We cannot allow the progress we have made to be reversed." Bull's-eye. The acknowledgement to departed AG Sessions, a man unfairly tarred and largely right on the main issues, is a classy touch and a good sign.

It's a good thing former Majority Leader Harry Reid nuked the filibuster for executive nominations.

News Scan

Murderer Seeks to End Appeals:  A Mississippi man sentenced to death for the murder of his estranged wife has asked that his appeals be halted and his execution carried out.  Jeff Amy of the Associated Press reports that the state supreme court has ordered a judge to hold a hearing to determine if the murderer, David Cox, is mentally competent to waive his appeals.  Courthouse News Service reported that Kim Cox left her husband after he was arrested for raping her 12-year-old daughter.  He spent nine months in jail before being released on bail.  Once free, Cox located his wife at her sister's house and shot her in the abdomen, then repeatedly raped the daughter as her critically wounded mother watched, maintaining a standoff with police until Kim died.  Cox plead guilty to the murder and rape and a jury sentenced him to death.  In a letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Cox requested that his lawyers be fired and his execution date set.  In another letter Cox told the District Attorney that he would happily dig up his dead wife so he could kill her again.  Cox's defense attorneys have petitioned to have his sentence overturned, arguing that his difficult childhood, drug use and mental condition make his ineligible for execution.

Taking On Black Lives Matter:  The former member of a black street gang in Brooklyn has authored a piece today's American Thinker disputing the claims of racist police made by Black Lives Matter as well as the group's goals.  Mental health specialist Thomas Maynard writes that the BLM movement has "lost its legitimacy and deteriorated into an excuse for unacceptable behavior."  He notes that black and Hispanic criminals shot by police are depicted as heroes although their own behavior was the cause of their deaths.  While "most shootings by police involving blacks and Hispanic males are justified....most African Americans do not come together until it involves an incident with a white police officer."      

How Common Are Wrongful Convictions?

How often does it happen in America that innocent people are convicted of crimes they did not commit? Is it really as common as the estimates we so often see cited, or is the real frequency different?

The Arizona Law Review has published new estimates by two authors giving different answers to this question: a lot lower and drastically lower.

Paul Cassell of the University of Utah gives us the "drastically lower" answer in the lead article. His estimate of the frequency of wrongful convictions is a range of 0.016% to 0.062%, in contrast to the commonly cited estimates ranging from 1% to 4%. George Thomas of Rutgers gives us the "a lot lower" answer in his "partial response" article, with a range of 0.125% to 0.5%. Prof. Cassell also has a reply article and a post at the Volokh Conspiracy.

We should not, of course, minimize the problem of wrongful convictions. A single one is a miscarriage of justice and devastating to the people involved. That is why, even as we limit repeated reviews of convictions on innocence-irrelevant grounds, we should maintain or widen avenues of review for cases of genuine "got the wrong guy" innocence. I insisted on that in the drafting of what became California's Proposition 66.

We also should not uncritically accept dubious estimates from notorious exaggerators. See Ward Campbell, Exoneration Inflation (2008). I welcome these new contributions to the field and look forward to reading them more closely.

Musical Circuit Justice Chairs

As usual when a new Justice joins the Supreme Court, the Court has issued a new order assigning Circuit Justices. Circuits D.C.* and 1-5 are unchanged, as are 8, 10, 11, and Fed.

Justice Kagan previously had the Sixth and Seventh, from Tennessee to Wisconsin. Now she gets the massive Ninth, which the Chief had taken temporarily while Justice Kennedy's chair was vacant.

Justice Sotomayor gets the Sixth in addition to her previously assigned Tenth. Justice Gorsuch keeps the Eighth, but I wouldn't be surprised to see him reassigned to his home Tenth a few years down the road, when all the cases he participated in have flushed out of the system.

Justice Kavanaugh is assigned the Seventh: Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin.

So why does any of this matter?

News Scan

SF a Sanctuary City for Drug Dealers:  An article in today's New York Times by Thomas Fuller describes the squalor on the streets of the once beautiful City by the Bay; "The heroin needles, the pile of excrement between parked cars, the yellow soup oozing out of a large plastic bag by the curb...For many who live here it is difficult to reconcile San Francisco's liberal politics wiht the misery that surrounds them."  One of the policies contributing to this is the fact that there are no longer any consequences for drug dealers or drug users in the city.  As reported by Heather Knight of the San Francisco Chronicle, the city has become a sanctuary for dealers, and cannot afford anything close to the resources necessary to treat addicts.  "It's almost impossible to get convicted in this city,"  noted one officer in the narcotics division.  Dealers routinely sit in chairs in front of one non-profit for the homeless near the city library and sell drugs while nobody bothers them. The Mayor's answer is to offer the dealer's jobs, which sounds really nice.  The problem according to police is that most dealers don't live in the city...they commute on BART from Oakland and Richmond to sell drugs in a protected environment.  This is the logical result of California's Proposition 47, which turned most street dealers into misdemeanants, and San Francisco's apparent willingness to tolerate virtually anything.    

Reopened Kavanaugh Hearing Next Monday

Kristina Peterson and Peter Nicholas report for the WSJ:

The Senate Judiciary Committee will hold a hearing next Monday with the woman who has accused Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh of sexual misconduct, according to lawmakers and aides.

The hearing would give the public an chance to hear more about the three-decades-old accusations against Judge Kavanaugh that now threaten to derail his nomination to the high court. The Senate is expected to announce details of the hearing shortly.

One Vote Short of Overruling Mapp v. Ohio?

Erwin Chemerinsky has this article in the ABA Journal identifying areas where Justice "Kennedy was the fifth vote for a liberal result, and where it is uncertain, or even unlikely, that Kavanaugh would decide the same way" as Justice Kennedy did.

Much of the discussion involves issues outside our scope and that CJLF takes no position on, so I won't comment on those. On the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, Dean Chemerinsky writes:

Exclusionary rule: In Hudson v. Michigan (2006), Justice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion--joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito--that called for the elimination of the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment cases. He argued that the costs of excluding evidence when police officers violate the Fourth Amendment outweigh the benefits of doing so. Justice Kennedy agreed to the result in that case, but declared that the continued operation of the exclusionary rule was not in doubt. But with Kennedy being replaced by Kavanaugh, there could be five votes to overrule a doctrine that conservatives have opposed for decades.
Really?  I have been arguing to limit Mapp for many years. I think I would remember if the Supreme Court came within a single vote of overruling it completely, especially in a case where my organization filed a brief.

The Chief Takes the Ninth

The U.S. Supreme Court is officially one justice short today, and the Court has issued a new order assigning circuit justices to the various federal circuits.  Chief Justice Roberts has taken on the Ninth Circuit, formerly assigned to Justice Kennedy (Ret.), on top of his D.C., Fourth, and Federal Circuit assignments.

The circuit justice alone typically decides on certain extension requests, and their strictness or laxity varies.  The late Justice Scalia was the strictest.

Requests to stay a lower court decision are formally addressed to the circuit justice, although absent an emergency the circuit justice generally refers the application to the full court.  Justice Thomas, assigned to the Eleventh Circuit, grants short-term, single-justice stays in capital cases more often than the others, to give the Court time to consider the petition without an execution clock ticking.

Summer SCOTUS Nomination Timelines

Andrew Hamm at SCOTUSblog has this post on the timelines for recent Supreme Court nominations for vacancies occurring in the summer.  He lists the numbers for the last seven such cases (Bork, Souter, Thomas, Roberts, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch). 

Doing a little calculation with these numbers, the average time from nomination to vote was 84 days with a standard deviation of 17.6.

If the timeline for Judge Kavanaugh meets the average, that would be October 1, the First Monday in October and the beginning of the Supreme Court's new term.

If the timeline is one standard deviation above average, that would be October 19, missing the October arguments but before the congressional election.
President Trump is expected to announce his eagerly awaited nomination for the Supreme Court at 9:00 ET / 6:00 PT tonight.  He was widely reported to have shortened his short list to four.  This morning Peter Nicholas and Louise Radnofsky report for the WSJ, "President Donald Trump's search for a Supreme Court nominee was narrowing in the hours before the announcement, with Judge Amy Coney Barrett's prospects fading, people close to the search said."

Mr. Trump's advisers said she might have more difficulty than her rivals in winning confirmation because of her outspoken conservative views. In academic articles, she has expressed unease with Roe v. Wade--the 1973 Supreme Court ruling that recognized abortion as a woman's constitutional right. She also has supported the idea of high court justices overturning past precedent when they fundamentally disagree with it.

CJLF takes no position on Roe.  We are more concerned with her 1998 law review article, which says:

To anticipate our conclusions just briefly, we believe that Catholic judges (if they are faithful to the teaching of their church) are morally precluded from enforcing the death penalty. This means that they can neither themselves sentence criminals to death nor enforce jury recommendations of death. Whether they may affirm lower court orders of either kind is a question we have the most difficulty in resolving. There are parts of capital cases in which we think orthodox Catholic judges may participate - these include trial on the issue of guilt and collateral review of capital convictions. The moral impossibility of enforcing capital punishment in the first two or three cases (sentencing, enforcing jury recommendations, affirming) is a sufficient reason for recusal under federal law. But mere identification of a judge as Catholic is not a sufficient reason. Indeed, it is constitutionally insufficient.
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito didn't/don't seem to have a problem "enforc[ing] jury recommendations of death," but if Judge Barrett does and would feel compelled to recuse herself from a large and important chunk of the high court's workload, that would be a huge problem.  When a federal court of appeals judge recuses, the court simply names another judge to the panel.  But when a Supreme Court justice recuses, that leaves an 8-member court with the possibility of deadlock, not resolving the question and failing in the Court's mission to resolve questions on which lower courts are divided.
Some Supreme Court successions produce major changes in the ideological makeup of the Court, and some do not.  Justice Gorsuch is different from Justice Scalia, of course, but overall his votes on the results of criminal cases do not seem too much different from where Justice Scalia would have voted.  In contrast, Justice Thomas succeeding Justice Marshall in 1991 was a jurisprudential earthquake.  Two years later, we had a shift back in the other direction, though not as great, when Justice Ginsburg succeeded Justice White.

In all likelihood, President Trump will nominate someone more conservative to succeed Justice Kennedy, who has occupied the Court's middle in recent years.  To take a peek at the future, let's take a stroll down What If Road in the recent past.  How would criminal cases have come out differently in recent terms if someone more conservative had been in Justice Kennedy's chair?
As expected, the reason the Supreme Court "relisted" Jordan v. Mississippi and Evans v. Mississippi so many times before turning them down was that Justice Breyer was writing a dissent from denial of certiorari.  As expected, he engages in the usual wholesale acceptance of contentions that are hotly disputed at best and discredited at worst.  He cites the DPIC's so-called "innocence list" as if it actually were a list of actual innocents.  If the major premise of a syllogism is "given that the moon is made of green cheese" do you really need to hear the conclusion?

Perhaps the most galling aspect of the opinion is Justice Breyer's lamenting of the long delay in this case without any acknowledgement of just how much the federal courts and especially the Supreme Court itself have caused the delay.

The Biden Rule, Again

This is 2018.  For those of us who can do elementary mathematics, that is a year divisible by 2 and not by 4.  In American politics, that means it is a year for election of the House of Representatives and 1/3 of the Senate, but not the President.

Yet with Justice Kennedy's retirement, people are talking once again about "the Biden Rule," a custom that Senator Biden discussed on the floor of the Senate in 1992 (a year divisible by 4) and said he was prepared to invoke in the Democratic-controlled Senate in the event of a Supreme Court vacancy (there wasn't one).  The Republican-controlled Senate actually did invoke that rule in 2016 (a year divisible by 4).

I have linked to the Congressional Record page on this in a previous post.  This time I will quote it at length after the break, with emphasis added.

Cell Phone Data Case Decided

This morning the U.S. Supreme Court decided the long-awaited case on police access to cell-phone location records, Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402.  Chief Justice Roberts' opinion for the bare majority trims back the "third party" doctrine that one has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information belonging to and in the custody of a third party such as a telephone company.  As a result, police will need a warrant supported by probable cause to obtain cell phone location records.  The dissenting opinions have a variety of interesting perspectives, including questioning whether "reasonable expectation of privacy" is a valid basis for deciding the reach of the Fourth Amendment at all.

As important as all this is, none of it has anything whatever to do with the justice of the criminal case actually before the Court.  Was Timothy Carpenter or was he not the mastermind of a series of robberies in which his henchmen "entered the store, brandished their guns, herded customers and employees to the back, and ordered the employees to fill the robbers' bags with new smartphones"?  If he was, justice for the employees terrorized in these crimes requires that he go to prison for a long, long time.  If he gets off because of today's decision that is a miscarriage of justice, and nothing in the text or history of the Fourth Amendment requires it.

Oops

Occasionally Supreme Court Justices admit they got it wrong in a previous opinion.  In the interstate sales tax case today, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Justice Thomas gives us a nice little variation on this theme.  He admits that 26 years ago he was wrong for not joining Justice White's admission that he had been wrong 25 years before that.  Here is Justice Thomas's concurrence in its entirety.

Justice Byron White joined the majority opinion in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U. S. 753 (1967). Twenty-five years later, we had the opportunity to overrule Bellas Hess in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298 (1992). Only Justice White voted to do so. See id., at 322 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). I should have joined his opinion. Today, I am slightly further removed from Quill than Justice White was from Bellas Hess. And like Justice White, a quarter century of experience has convinced me that Bellas Hess and Quill "can no longer be rationally justified." 504 U. S., at 333. The same is true for this Court's entire negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence.See Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1). Although I adhered to that jurisprudence in Quill, it is never too late to "surrende[r] former views to a better considered position." McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U. S. 162, 178 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring). I therefore join the Court's opinion.
Is an error in applying the notoriously complex Federal Sentencing Guidelines appealable if nobody notices the error in the trial court?  Generally yes, the U.S. Supreme Court decided today in Rosales-Mireles v. United States, No. 16-9493.

The general rule in litigation is that you have to raise an objection at the proper time or else you lose it, the "speak now or forever hold your peace" rule.  There are exceptions to the general rule, and criminal defendants get more breaks than other litigants, in part because the consequences of an attorney error in a criminal case are typically not remedied by going after the lawyer and insurer in a malpractice action.  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) provides, "A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court's attention."  There is a large body of case law putting meat on that bone.  The word "may" implies discretion, but the case law puts boundaries on that discretion.  Here is today's holding in a nutshell:

This case concerns the bounds of that discretion, and whether a miscalculation of the United States Sentencing Guidelines range, that has been determined to be plain and to affect a defendant's substantial rights, calls for a court of appeals to exercise its discretion under Rule 52(b) to vacate the defendant's sentence. The Court holds that such an error will in the ordinary case, as here, seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, and thus will warrant relief.
The opinion is by Justice Sotomayor (7-2).  Justice Thomas dissents, joined by Justice Alito.

The Court also decided another very technical federal sentencing case, Chavez-Meza v. United States, No. 17-5639.

Defining "Violent"

Syndicated columnist Thomas Elias has this column on California's grievously wrong definition of "violent."

There isn't a woman alive who was ever raped while either intoxicated or unconscious who doesn't consider the entire experience violent.

But that's not how these crimes are defined legally in California. The same for human trafficking of a child, abducting a minor for prostitution, drive-by shootings at inhabited homes or cars, felony domestic violence, solicitation to commit murder, among others.
*      *      *
But a series of bills aiming to expand the list of crimes defined as violent died in legislative financial committees. Too expensive, was the verdict. That was the reason given when the Assembly Appropriations Committee just about one year ago killed a bipartisan measure aiming to classify all rapes and all human trafficking as violent.

An initiative to address the problem is presently awaiting signature verification.  Whether it will make it in time for the 2018 ballot is in doubt.  An initiative should never have been necessary.  California's legislators have a lot to answer for.
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