When state executive officers settle a federal civil rights suit by agreeing to more than federal law really requires, are the people of the state stuck with that agreement forever? They should not be. After all, the state is not a party to the suit; it is immune under the Eleventh Amendment.
State officials cannot agree to do something forbidden by state law unless the state law is invalid because it conflicts with federal law. What if they agree to something neither forbidden by state law nor required by federal law at the time of the consent decree, but a later state law makes the agreement illegal? Does the consent decree trump a constitutional state law, so that the people of the state are forever deprived of a policy decision that the constitution and laws of the United States leave to them? Federal Judge Lawrence Karlton (ED Cal) thinks so. We at CJLF do not.
In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), the U.S. Supreme Court flatly rejected the claim that the Constitution requires appointed counsel in all parole revocation proceedings. In 2003, then-new Gov. Schwarzenegger made a rookie mistake and entered into a consent decree providing for appointments in every case anyway. Last November, the people of California enacted Proposition 9. Among other things, that initiative provided for appointment of revocation counsel if and only if criteria tracking Gagnon are met. On March 26, Judge Karlton informed the Great Unwashed of California that they had a lot of nerve purporting to overturn his order, refused to modify the consent decree, and enjoined the Governator et al. from enforcing the portions of the initiative which are inconsistent with the decree. See 603 F.Supp.2d 1275.
Yesterday, CJLF on behalf of itself, Crime Victims United of California, and State Senator George Runner filed a motion for leave to file this brief amicus curiae in support of the administration's appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
State officials cannot agree to do something forbidden by state law unless the state law is invalid because it conflicts with federal law. What if they agree to something neither forbidden by state law nor required by federal law at the time of the consent decree, but a later state law makes the agreement illegal? Does the consent decree trump a constitutional state law, so that the people of the state are forever deprived of a policy decision that the constitution and laws of the United States leave to them? Federal Judge Lawrence Karlton (ED Cal) thinks so. We at CJLF do not.
In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), the U.S. Supreme Court flatly rejected the claim that the Constitution requires appointed counsel in all parole revocation proceedings. In 2003, then-new Gov. Schwarzenegger made a rookie mistake and entered into a consent decree providing for appointments in every case anyway. Last November, the people of California enacted Proposition 9. Among other things, that initiative provided for appointment of revocation counsel if and only if criteria tracking Gagnon are met. On March 26, Judge Karlton informed the Great Unwashed of California that they had a lot of nerve purporting to overturn his order, refused to modify the consent decree, and enjoined the Governator et al. from enforcing the portions of the initiative which are inconsistent with the decree. See 603 F.Supp.2d 1275.
Yesterday, CJLF on behalf of itself, Crime Victims United of California, and State Senator George Runner filed a motion for leave to file this brief amicus curiae in support of the administration's appeal to the Ninth Circuit.