Lawyers and law professors have a tendency, I have found over the years, to become entranced by the nuances of the latest Supreme Court decision while overlooking the elephant in front of their eyes.
Last night, a young man named Dylann Roof shot dead nine defenseless people at a prayer and Bible study meeting at the Emanuel AME Church in Charelston, SC. The shooter was white and his victims black; apparently he was motivated by racial hate. The WSJ has the story.
The racial angle is going to get a great deal of coverage, but we need to keep our eye on the ball. The specific nature of Roof's motive is irrelevant. As long as he knew right from wrong and could control his actions in light of the difference, this is yet another example of why South Carolina is wise to keep the death penalty (and why states like Nebraska would be wise to bring it back).
The idea that a jail term could be just or proportionate punishment for gunning down nine people at a prayer meeting is not just mistaken. It's preposterous. This morning, the Supreme Court parsed through the legal tangles in a couple of capital cases, and those will be the stuff of some entries here, including (probably) by me. But what happened last night in Charleston was -- let's say it out loud -- an atrocity. In the end, the Supreme Court's main job is to facilitate the Framers' understanding that, for some cases, imposing the death penalty is a sober society's right and power.
It's interesting that in this explicitly racially-motivated mass killing, in a state with a history of racial tension and violence, the killer's motive is "irrelevant," whereas when a killer shoots two cops after specifically targeting police, his motive is highly relevant. Why is motive irrelevant here and relevant in that case?
- Victor
As to the appropriateness of the death penalty specifically, so long as criminal intent is shown, the nature of the intent is irrelevant in both cases. And the jury in this case should be allowed to consider the death penalty, no?
I should add that the question of the appropriate punishment for the police assassin, Ismaaiyl Abdullah Brinsley, never presented itself, because Brinsley committed suicide in a subway station shortly after the murders.
I would not say that motive is irrelevant. California's death penalty law (Penal Code ยง190.2(a)) has several "special circumstances" where the reason for the killing is an element. Along with the "hate crime" provision (16), there is a circumstance for the killing of police officers to prevent or in retaliation for performance of duty (7), and other similar ones for other public servants.
I didn't realize you were referring only to punishment and not to the general issue of motivation. Since I'm not familiar with South Carolina law, I couldn't say whether motive might play a role in a death penalty decision, although it might. In my jurisdiction, the death penalty can be imposed if, among other circumstances, the murder was committed for the benefit of a gang, or because of the victim's race, religion, or national origin, both of which involve intent. It's my understanding that South Carolina doesn't have a hate crime statute but it's possible motive may play some role in a death penalty determination.
-V
1. You remark: "I didn't realize you were referring only to punishment and not to the general issue of motivation."
How could that be? The whole entry is about the appropriateness of the death penalty in the Charleston case. Thus I said, "The specific nature of Roof's motive is irrelevant. As long as he knew right from wrong and could control his actions in light of the difference, this is yet another example of why South Carolina is wise to keep the death penalty..."
2. Whether or not, as a matter of standing law, South Carolina makes racial hatred an aggravator in a capital case, is it your view that, if Roof is found legally sane, a jury SHOULD be able to at least consider the death penalty?
Curious as to whether C&C folks think this case would be better handled by state or federal authorities for criminal prosecution.
I agree that killing a police officer or other public servant because, or in the performance, of duty, is properly an aggravator, since that goes to FUNCTION rather than IDENTITY.
To the extent that California law makes the identity of the victim a potential aggravator, I do not agree with it. We have already gone too far down the path of racializing law. It's a poisonous business.
That's a great question.
Completely off the seat of my pants, I tend to prefer the state, because (unlike Massachusetts) state law permits the only punishment that both satisfies the Eighth Amendment and is vaguely proportionate to the crime. In addition, the prosecution and punishment of murder is traditionally a state matter.
There is a decent case to be made, however, that the feds should also prosecute. An attack on that particular church, with its history and symbolism, can easily be seen as an attack on the nation as a whole, in somewhat the same way as the Boston Marathon bombing -- an attack on a national icon -- was an attack on the nation as a whole.
"How could that be?" You don't mention anything about punishment in the heading of the post, the first paragraph, or the second paragraph. Even the third paragraph doesn't explicitly say you're limiting the consideration of motive only to punishment. I'm willing to accept that was your aim, but it was hardly obvious.
South Carolina has a death penalty law, and I'm certain prosecutors will seek the death penalty. I'm on the fence generally about the death penalty, but if you're going to have a death penalty, this is certainly the kind of case where you'd use it.
-V
State. No question in my mind.
Unlike the Boston Marathon, this was not a national and international event but rather a local church. Also, there is no reason, at this point, to believe this murderer's attack was any kind of terrorist attack on the United States as a nation, as Tsarnaev's was.
There is no state action here, and any effect on interstate commerce is very tenuous. There was a time, half a century ago, when federal criminal law needed to be stretched to cover local cases of violence by individuals with no state action involved because state and local government was unable or unwilling to deliver justice and thus people were denied equal protection of the laws. Those days are long behind us.
Interesting comments on the state/federal debate, but I sincerely wonder if Kent's views are (unduly?) influenced by the fact that SC has the death penalty.
Kent, if this exact same evil horrible crime took place in the exact same way in, say, southern Maryland, would you still say without question that the feds should stay out and be content with only the LWOP term that Maryland has for its most extreme crimes? In addition, especially given (1) the (well-established?) evidence that white killers of black victims tend not to get the death penalty as frequently as others in many states, and (2) the long history of racial issues in southern justice, is it fair for at least some people to wonder and be concerned about whether, even today, certain "state and local governments [are] unable or unwilling to deliver justice and thus people [may be] denied equal protection of the laws"?
(I am going to blog about this question at SL&P, and I am hopeful some of you might be willing to engage the question over there if I pledge to remove any comments you think are improper.)
Yes, I would answer the question the same way. For what it's worth, I originally got into this fight primarily to defend the people's right of self-government from the judicial imperialism of Empress Rose et al., with the death penalty itself being secondary. If the people of Maryland choose to elect bozos, that is their right.
I have addressed at length the supposedly "well-established" evidence on racial bias in capital sentencing in a certain law journal you might be familiar with. I didn't go into this particular quirk in the statistics, but I think I did show quite convincingly (if I do say so myself) that the consensus of a body of literature nearly all of which is written by people with an anti-death-penalty agenda cannot be taken as a "fact."