The U.S. Supreme Court summarily reversed a Louisiana state court's denial of habeas corpus relief to Michael Wearry, an inmate on that state's death row.
Generally, if one has prevailed in a lower court and wants the U.S. Supreme Court to deny review, arguing that the case is "fact-bound" is a good bet. The Supreme Court's "reason for being" is to settle broad questions of law on which other courts disagree, not to police case-specific application of settled law to particular fact patterns.
In this case, Wearry claims he actually didn't do it, and he is one of the rare death row inmates with a "colorable claim" to that effect, to use Judge Friendly's famous term. The specific constitutional violation claimed is that the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. The "application of law to fact" question is whether that evidence is "material," defined "new evidence [that] is sufficient to 'undermine confidence' in the verdict." (See p. 7 of the slip opinion.)
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, finds summary disposition "highly inappropriate" and calls for the case to be given full briefing and argument instead.
This is the kind of case that should not have been capital in the first place. In my opinion, trial prosecutors should not seek the death penalty in any case where the evidence of identity of the perpetrator is such that a jury would have any difficulty at all finding that the proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. More discretion here would avoid a host of problems, and most prosecutors' offices do, in fact, screen out cases on that basis.
Generally, if one has prevailed in a lower court and wants the U.S. Supreme Court to deny review, arguing that the case is "fact-bound" is a good bet. The Supreme Court's "reason for being" is to settle broad questions of law on which other courts disagree, not to police case-specific application of settled law to particular fact patterns.
In this case, Wearry claims he actually didn't do it, and he is one of the rare death row inmates with a "colorable claim" to that effect, to use Judge Friendly's famous term. The specific constitutional violation claimed is that the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. The "application of law to fact" question is whether that evidence is "material," defined "new evidence [that] is sufficient to 'undermine confidence' in the verdict." (See p. 7 of the slip opinion.)
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, finds summary disposition "highly inappropriate" and calls for the case to be given full briefing and argument instead.
This is the kind of case that should not have been capital in the first place. In my opinion, trial prosecutors should not seek the death penalty in any case where the evidence of identity of the perpetrator is such that a jury would have any difficulty at all finding that the proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. More discretion here would avoid a host of problems, and most prosecutors' offices do, in fact, screen out cases on that basis.
Sloppy writing?
The Court defines "material" by reference to the defendant-friendly standard of review that applies to Napue violations, i.e., the knowing presentation of false evidence. (See p. 7 of the slip opinion.) But the case involves only Brady violations (i.e., failure-to-disclose exculpatory/impeachment evidence regardless of good or bad faith) that involve the reasonable probability of undermining confidence in the verdict standard of review. And as we know from Agurs, Napue and Brady violations are different types of due process violations, with the former requiring bad faith (vis-a-vis the knowledge element).
So why the reference to the Napue "any reasonable likelihood" definition of "material"?
The dissent, in my view, has the better of this--at least from a legal standpoint. This case offended the Supreme Court's sense of propriety--so it wasn't going to bother wasting its time. Ok. Whatever.