"A brick is not a wall," evidence guru Dean Charles McCormick famously wrote long ago. The evidence that meets the required burden of proof for a particular proceeding, whether it be probable cause, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or something in between, need not be a single item that carries the weight by itself.
In Fourth Amendment cases, the U.S. Supreme Court since 1983 (Illinois v. Gates) has rejected rigid criteria for probable cause. All the facts must be considered, and the question is whether they add up to a "substantial chance of criminal activity." This "is not a high bar."
Back in 2008, there was a raucous party in a vacant house in D.C. Did the police have probable cause to believe this was an unlawful entry? Today's opinion in District of Columbia v. Wesby describes the lots of little things that add up to the modest level of evidence needed for probable cause.
The partygoers were released soon after arrest and no charges were filed against them. Instead of being glad of their good fortune, they decided to sue the cops. The District Court allowed this case to go to trial, and a jury awarded $680,000 for their comparatively minor inconvenience. With attorneys' fees, it came to over a million dollars. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court today reversed without dissent. See page 11 for the Court's disapproval of looking at each brick rather than the wall.
In Fourth Amendment cases, the U.S. Supreme Court since 1983 (Illinois v. Gates) has rejected rigid criteria for probable cause. All the facts must be considered, and the question is whether they add up to a "substantial chance of criminal activity." This "is not a high bar."
Back in 2008, there was a raucous party in a vacant house in D.C. Did the police have probable cause to believe this was an unlawful entry? Today's opinion in District of Columbia v. Wesby describes the lots of little things that add up to the modest level of evidence needed for probable cause.
The partygoers were released soon after arrest and no charges were filed against them. Instead of being glad of their good fortune, they decided to sue the cops. The District Court allowed this case to go to trial, and a jury awarded $680,000 for their comparatively minor inconvenience. With attorneys' fees, it came to over a million dollars. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court today reversed without dissent. See page 11 for the Court's disapproval of looking at each brick rather than the wall.
The Court did not need to address qualified immunity. After all, a correct assessment of probable cause is necessarily a reasonable one, and reasonable is all the cops need for immunity.
Today's decision is a win for cops and for looking at evidence as a wall and not a collection of bricks. And if you attend a raucous party at a vacant house at the invitation of person with dubious authority to invite you in, don't be surprised if you have to make a trip downtown.
Our conclusion that the officers had probable cause to arrest the partygoers is sufficient to resolve this case. But where, as here, the Court of Appeals erred on both the merits of the constitutional claim and the question of qualified immunity, "we have discretion to correct its errors at each step." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. 731, 735 (2011); see, e.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U. S. ___ (2014). We exercise that discretion here because the D. C. Circuit's analysis, if followed elsewhere, would "undermine the values qualified immunity seeks to promote." al-Kidd, supra, at 735.The high court is seriously put out with the D.C. Circuit. They remind the courts of appeals yet again that "clearly established law" is judged at the specific level, not on sweeping generalities. How many times have they said that? A lot.
Tellingly, neither the panel majority nor the party-goers have identified a single precedent--much less a controlling case or robust consensus of cases--finding a Fourth Amendment violation "under similar circumstances." Pauly, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 6). And it should go without saying that this is not an "obvious case" where "a body of relevant case law" is not needed. Brosseau, supra, at 199. The officers were thus entitled to qualified immunity.Which court's precedents can satisfy the "controlling authority" requirement? The question is still open. See footnote 8.
Today's decision is a win for cops and for looking at evidence as a wall and not a collection of bricks. And if you attend a raucous party at a vacant house at the invitation of person with dubious authority to invite you in, don't be surprised if you have to make a trip downtown.
There is some interesting caselaw about cops exercising a caretaking function when they see things like a residence door wide open etc. I think the law is mixed on whether they have the right to enter.
Regarding the "don't be surprised"--if you put vegetable matter in your trash, don't be surprised if cops show up with a shaky warrant, pointing guns at you and accuse your child of doing drugs.
Or to borrow a particularly heinous example, if you work for a company that has a president that donated to Republicans and that uses wood legally exported from another country, don't be surprised if government agents pull guns on you.
Qualified immunity often covers up for some injustice and bad cop behavior, and we shouldn't lose sight of that.
It should be noted that the judge authoring the opinion below was Obama appointee Judge Pillard. Another stellar jurist appointed by Obama.
I should have finished up my comment saying that the cops here were clearly in the right. But I hope my point is well-taken that QI does cover up for some bad police conduct, like the Kansas marijuana raid, which should offend any sense of justice.