Recently in Civil Suits Category

Manner v. Method of Execution

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Last week, Federal District Judge Tanya Chutkan issued a preliminary injunction preventing the U. S. Attorney General from carrying out executions for federal capital crimes. DOJ promptly appealed. See this story in the WSJ by Jess Bravin and Sadie Gurman.

The slender reed on which this injunction rests is Congress's use of the word "manner" rather than "method" in adopting the way executions are carried out in states.

Supreme Court Orders

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Update: See end of post.
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The U.S. Supreme Court held a conference Friday. As usual, the Court issued a very short orders list later the same day, taking up a single case, and a long list today turning down many cases.

The case taken up Friday wasTanzin v. Tanvir, No. 19-71, regarding a civil suit against federal employees for putting the plaintiffs on the "do not fly" list, allegedly in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

Among the cases turned down today was Johnson v. City of Ferguson, No. 19-345 a suit by the perpetrator of the massively destructive "hands up" lie, claiming that he was the injured party in the notorious incident. See this post.
This morning, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument for the second time in the case of Hernandez v. Mesa, numbered 17-1678 on its second trip to 1 First Street.

A USDOJ investigation of the incident found that Sergio Hernandez and his companions were human smugglers attempting an illegal border crossing. When Agent Jesus Mesa detained one of the group, the others pelted him with rocks. Agent Mesa fired from the U.S. side of the border, and Hernandez was killed on the Mexico side. DOJ determined that Agent Mesa acted in accordance with policy.

Hernandez's parents have pursued a suit for years, alleging that he was just an innocent boy playing an innocent game when a "rogue" officer gunned him down for no reason. Because Agent Mesa and the Government are moving for judgment without a trial, these allegations are assumed to be true solely for the limited purpose of ruling on that motion. Some reports of the case mislead the public into thinking that the parents' improbable allegations are the actual facts of the case.

CJLF's amicus brief is here. Kimberly Robinson has this report on the argument for Bloomberg Law. Brent Kendall has this report for the WSJ.
Jacob Gershman reports in the WSJ:

A federal judge ruled Wednesday that David Boies' law firm can't represent an alleged victim of Jeffrey Epstein in her defamation suit against Alan Dershowitz, escalating a feud between two of the country's most prominent attorneys.
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The on-again, off-again nationwide stay in the asylum regulation case is off again. The Supreme Court issued this order in Barr v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 19A230:

Application (19A230) granted by the Court. The application for stay presented to JUSTICE KAGAN and by her referred to the Court is granted. The district court's July 24, 2019 order granting a preliminary injunction and September 9, 2019 order restoring the nationwide scope of the injunction are stayed in full pending disposition of the Government's appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and disposition of the Government's petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is sought. If a writ of certiorari is sought and the Court denies the petition, this order shall terminate automatically. If the Court grants the petition for a writ of certiorari, this order shall terminate when the Court enters its judgment. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins, dissenting from grant of stay.
At the end of this post, I suggest a solution to the nationwide stay problem.

End Nationwide Injunctions

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U.S. Attorney General William Barr has this op-ed in the WSJ with the above title. The subhead is "The Dreamers case shows how willful courts can ruin the chance for political compromise."

Discrimination Via Non-Enforcement

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And now, for something completely different.

Most civil rights complaints against law enforcement are complaints that the police did too much in their pursuit of suspects. However, this decision from the NInth Circuit involves a civil complaint by USDoJ against two towns for discriminatory enforcement where most of the complaints are for non-enforcement or, in one case, actively helping a fugitive.
Nationwide injunctions against government action, once unusual, have become common in recent years, and they are increasingly controversial. Several other rules combine with nationwide injunctions to make them particularly noxious. First, the rules on venue in suits against the government are quite lax. One can file a suit nearly anywhere. Second, broad "related case" rules sometimes allow evasion of the requirement for random assignment of judges, sometimes allowing plaintiffs to steer a suit to a particular judge, not just a particular court. Third, there is the "heads I win, tails we take it over" effect. If 99 district courts deny preliminary injunctions and 1 grants a nationwide injunction, the 1 has effectively overruled the 99. With all this, plaintiffs can gain a temporary nationwide victory even if their legal position is well outside the mainstream. Given how long litigation takes, a "preliminary" injunction may be the whole ball game in reality. As John Maynard Keynes famously said, "In the long run we are all dead."

In a suit against an immigration regulation on asylum eligibility and procedure, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit has denied the government's motion for a stay as it applies to the Ninth Circuit but granted it as to the rest of the country.
The U.S. Supreme Court released an orders list and decisions today. There are no criminal cases of note, but there is action in two civil suits against law enforcement officers.

On the orders list, the El Paso cross-border shooting case of Hernandez v. Mesa is back for a sequel. "Once more into the breach, dear friends ..." Update: Brent Kendall has this story on the case in the WSJ.

Nieves v. Bartlett, No. 17-1174, involves a claim of retaliatory arrest when the police did, in fact, have probable cause to make the arrest. The presence of probable cause generally defeats a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim. However, for a warrantless misdemeanor arrest, the "no-probable-cause requirement should not apply when a plaintiff presents objective evidence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been."

The opinion of the Court is by Chief Justice Roberts, joined in full by Justices Breyer, Alito, Kagan, and Kavanaugh. Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Ginsburg concur in varying parts. Only Justice Sotomayor dissents entirely. The line-up analyzers will have fun with that one.

Standing and Gerrymandering

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Amy Howe has this report on yesterday's U.S. Supreme Court oral argument in Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, No. 18-281.

The substantive issue in the case has to do with gerrymandering. CJLF takes no position on this issue, as it is outside of our interest area.

The issue that got most of the argument is the House of Delegates' legal standing to appeal after the Virginia Attorney General declined to do so. On this point CJLF is very interested and filed a "friend of the court" brief. Narrow views of standing have been used to block victims of crime from seeking redress when executive officers are derelict in their duty, and we have faced that issue in several cases when representing victims.

It looks like we might get a 6-3 on standing. Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan were skeptical of the House's standing, but Justice Breyer raised a point very similar to the concerns expressed in our brief.  From Amy's report:

Justice Stephen Breyer was concerned that, if the House of Delegates were not allowed to appeal in a case like this one, partisan divisions in government might lead to inertia in redistricting challenges. Here, for example, the Republican-controlled legislature drew the challenged map, but the state's Democratic attorney general decided not to appeal the district court's decision striking it down. If you have a Democratic legislature and a Republican governor, or vice versa, Breyer posited, "nobody's going to be able to attack it." "It's the House's plan," Breyer emphasized, and the governor won't attack it "because he likes it politically."
The U.S. Supreme Court issued two summary reversals today. These are cases where the decision of a lower court is so clearly wrong that no merits briefing or oral argument is needed. No dissent is indicated in either case.

Both cases involve rules limiting the ability of federal courts to second-guess actions of state officials based on rules that were not established at the time of the action. Both are decisions of circuits divisible by three. This movie has played on the Supreme Court Channel more times than the Harry Potter movies have played on cable TV.

In Shoop v. Hill, No. 18-56, the Sixth Circuit accepted a collateral attack on a 1993 decision of the Ohio Supreme Court because it was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's 2017 decision in Moore v. Texas. That was "plainly improper" under an Act of Congress that limits such collateral attacks to decisions that were, at the time, "contrary to ... clearly established Federal law."

In City of Escondido v. Emmons, No. 17-1660, the Ninth Circuit denied qualified immunity to two police officers who responded to a domestic violence call and required them to go to trial. It was uncontested on appeal that the officers had probable cause to arrest Marty Emmons, but the claim was that one of them used excessive force when he tackled Emmons after Emmons "brushed past them," although there was no apparent injury.

Why did the Ninth rule against the officer who used no force at all? Remarkably, it didn't say. Isn't some explanation in order before reversing a judgment as to one party? The Supreme Court thinks so and finds the absence "quite puzzling." As to the tackling officer, the Ninth committed the very frequent error of defining the "clearly established law" at too high a level of generality. How many times does the Supreme Court have to reverse on this basis before the courts of appeals clean up their acts?
The California Supreme Court decided today in People v. Superior Court (Smith), No. S225562 that the District Attorney may obtain otherwise confidential treatment records in a case of civil commitment of a "sexually violent predator."

Public Interest Litigation

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Senator Sheldon Whitehouse was on a roll yesterday, denouncing public interest litigation by conservative groups such as Pacific Legal Foundation in which test cases are initiated to advance a general point of law rather than being initiated by a client for his own interest. That's funny. Public interest litigation long predates PLF. Conservatives were already very late to the party when PLF was formed in 1973. Judge Kavanaugh's understated response was that this kind of litigation is conducted on both sides of the aisle. Actually, it is done much, much more on the left side.

Senator Whitehouse appeared to be disturbed by advertising for prospective clients for impact litigation. Shouldn't there be a law against that? Actually, there was, and the decision declaring it unconstitutional as applied to exactly this situation is one of the landmark cases in the history of the First Amendment.  See NAACP v. Button (1963); see also In re Primus (1978).

Senator Whitehouse also spoke of "hiring" clients and said they were typically "fired" after the litigation was completed. If he means the litigants are being paid to be litigants, that's a new one to me. I have not heard of such a practice. I would be curious to know if it actually goes on at any conservative legal foundation.

CJLF has only initiated litigation a few times. The nature of our work and our mission rarely makes initiating a suit appropriate. We have done so a few times, though. We do not often have individual clients. We generally appear in our own name. Still, there are a few cases where we have both initiated the litigation and represented a client.

For the record, CJLF has never "hired" a client. We have never paid anyone a penny to be a party or an amicus to litigation. The victims of crime whom we have represented have fully understood that the goal was to establish a rule of law for the benefit of all victims in similar circumstances. And we have never "fired" a client.

A Head-Shaker of an Argument

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There is no argument so absurd that some lawyer somewhere will not sign his name to it and file it.  Today's confirmation of that fact comes from Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA, maker of fentanyl.  This powerful opiod drug is a major drug of abuse and responsible for a big chunk of the opiod abuse problem today.  One would be hard pressed to think of any drug in the pharmacopeia with a worse reputation.

Even so, Hikma is evidently shocked, shocked to learn that Nevada plans to use its drug in executions.  Ken Ritter reports for AP that Hikma has joined a suit by the manufacturer of one of the other drugs claiming that use in executions tarnishes a drug's reputation.

"It's ironic that the maker of fentanyl, which is at the center of the nation's opioid crisis and is responsible for illegal overdoses every day is going to ... claim reputational injury from being associated with a lawful execution," Deputy Nevada state Solicitor General Jordan T. Smith protested.

An emergency appeal is already pending in the Nevada Supreme Court.

Nationwide Injunctions

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Jason Riley has this column in the WSJ.

When a federal district court in Texas issued a nationwide injunction in 2015 that halted the implementation of President Obama's amnesty program for illegal-alien parents of U.S. citizens, many on the political right cheered. Two years later, when a federal district court in Maryland issued a nationwide injunction that blocked President Trump's efforts to place restrictions on transgender people serving in the military, it was the left's turn to celebrate.

In recent years national injunctions have somehow become all the rage, even though it's not clear they are constitutional. Traditionally, an injunction requires the parties in a case--and only those individuals--to continue or cease particular actions. What makes national injunctions distinct and controversial is that they apply to people who are not parties in the case. And state attorneys general now regularly use them as political cudgels to thwart the implementation of federal policy not just in their respective states, but everywhere.

Sooner or later, I expect, either Congress or the Supreme Court will put the brakes on this practice.  Hopefully sooner.

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