Recently in Constitution Category

California, like many states, has a mandatory reporting law that requires various people to report child abuse or neglect when it comes to their attention. The Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act stems from a law enacted in 1980. It was amended and renamed in 1987.

Among the mandatory reporters are mental health professionals. In 2014, the law was amended again to include, among others, persons who download or stream videos "in which a child is engaged in an act of obscene sexual conduct."
    On a late January night in 2018, Joel Villela was pulled over for speeding.  The officer smelled alcohol on Villela's breath.  When Villela refused a roadside field sobriety test, the officer arrested him on suspicion of DUI.  Under Washington state law (RCW 46.55.360), Villela's car was impounded.  A subsequent inventory search of the vehicle revealed digital scales, sandwich bags, pipes, and a large amount of cash.  Cocaine was discovered on Villela after a search incident to arrest.  Villela was charged with DUI and possession with intent to deliver controlled substances.

    Villela filed a motion to suppress the "fruits" (drug evidence) of the inventory search of his car claiming that the mandatory impoundment was an unlawful seizure under Washington Constitution Article I, section 7.  That section provides that "no person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."  Under Washington law, "authority of law" means a warrant or a long-standing exception to the warrant requirement. 


The U.S. Supreme Court opens its new term on Monday.  This morning it released a short list of five cases in which it granted review.  That list can be found here.  Of the five cases, only one is criminal.  

In United States v. Sineneng-Smith, No.19-67, the justices agreed to review a Ninth Circuit decision that struck down as unconstitutional a federal law (8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i)) that makes it a crime to encourage or induce illegal immigration for financial gain.

On Monday the Court will release a much longer list of cases it reviewed at the long conference that was held earlier this week.


Rep. Green's Impeachment Resolution

Which is worse, a statement that is at best intemperate and at worst intolerant or a governmental act that violates the Constitution? I would think the latter is far worse, and quite obviously so.

CNN has the text of Rep. Al Green's impeachment resolution here, making the remarkable claim that the President's recent controversial tweet is an impeachable offense.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit today announced its decision in United States v. California, No. 18-16496. The federal government sued California over a package of bills designed to hamper efforts to enforce federal immigration laws. CJLF supported a portion of the argument, and the United States prevailed in the district court as to that part. See this post last July. California did not appeal that portion.

The district court ruled in favor of California on the remainder, and the United States appealed. The court of appeals reversed as to one portion. AB 103 provides for inspection of state, local, and private facilities used to house immigration detainees (i.e., all except the federal government's own facilities). Inspecting for health and safety on the same basis as other detention facilities is okay, but requirements that apply only to federal operations and authorize looking into "due process" and "the circumstances around their apprehension" crosses the line on intergovernmental immunity. The panel relies on a Supreme Court decision two months ago, Dawson v. Steager, for the proposition that there is no de minimis exception to the anti-discrimination aspect of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine.
The U.S. Supreme Court held this morning in Timbs v. Indiana that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, originally applicable only to the federal government, applies to the states as well through the Fourteenth. The court held in a federal case in 1993 that "excessive fines" includes excessive forfeitures. Not surprisingly, there is no dissent as to the result. The case goes back to the Indiana Supreme Court for application to the facts of the case -- forfeiting a Land Rover for transporting drugs where the vehicle is worth four times the maximum fine for the offense.

This is likely the last provision of the Bill of Rights to be "incorporated."  The Court decided well over a century ago that the already-obsolete grand jury clause of the Fifth Amendment would not be incorporated, and it is unlikely to revisit that decision. Incorporating the Seventh Amendment and requiring jury trials in state-court civil cases for $21 is also not going to happen. The Third Amendment, quartering troops in private homes in peacetime, is unlikely to arise, to put it mildly.

Justices Thomas and Gorsuch write separately on the question of whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than the Due Process Clause should be the mechanism of incorporation. Justice Thomas says yes, and Justice Gorsuch says maybe. That would be a better fit to the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Gorsuch notes that nothing in this case turns on that question, though.

Jess Bravin has this article in the WSJ noting that the ruling "potentially jeopardizi[es] asset-forfeiture programs that help fund police operations with property seized from criminal suspects." True, some worthy projects may need to find other funding sources or may go unfunded, but using punishment as a targeted revenue source is a fundamentally flawed idea. Punishments should be imposed according to what is just, and the money should go into the general fund so that no decision-maker has a specific incentive to punish more harshly to get the money.

Party Like It's 1935?

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Matthew Cavedon and Jonathan Skrmetti have this article in the Federalist Society Review on Gundy v. United States, being argued today. They note that it is remarkable that the Supreme Court has taken a case on the delegation doctrine. That is a doctrine of constitutional law that was front and center in the epic battle between FDR and the Supreme Court during the Great Depression but has barely shown its face since.

I would add that it is even more remarkable that this doctrine comes up in a criminal case. Historically it has come up in commercial regulation cases. It seems that when Congress passed the Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act (SORNA) it completely punted the thorny retroactivity issues to the Attorney General. Can they do that?

Why did the Court take it up? Does it really want to breathe new life into this musty doctrine? One factor that may have motivated the Court is the same one that weighed in the balance here at CJLF in our decision not to file in this case: Gundy really got shafted here.

However bad Gundy's prior offenses might have been, he has served his time for them. Now he gets a new conviction for failure to register under circumstances where a regular Joe would have believed he was doing everything the law required. See the article for details. Fortunately, he is not facing additional prison time; he was sentenced to time served and supervised release, but even so it does not seem right.
California's package of state "sanctuary" legislation is a three-legged stool. We at CJLF believed that one of the three violated the federal constitution and supported the federal government's suit to have it enjoined. That injunction was granted July 5. See this post the following day.

Yesterday, Orange County Superior Court Judge James Crandall knocked out a second leg. He enjoined enforcement of SB 54 against objecting charter cities on state constitutional grounds, Priscilla Vega reports for the LA Times.

Senate Bill 54, authored by state Senate leader Kevin de León (D-Los Angeles), in many cases prohibits state and local police agencies from notifying federal officials about the impending release of immigrants in custody who may be deported.
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Crandall said SB54 infringes on local governments' authority to practice policies they know are appropriate for themselves. Cities have a "better view and better ability" to oversee their needs in certain areas, he added.

Though the state may have had good intentions, Crandall said, there are "constitutional protections" for cities from the "ever-extending tentacles" of state rule.

I have not yet been able to get the text of the decision.

Of course, the ruling of one superior court is not the last word. I expect this issue is headed for the California Supreme Court.

In the federal case, Judge Mendez found that the same provision does not violate the federal constitution, which could set up a circuit split on the subject. See the previous post. However, if the provision is shot down on state law grounds, that would moot the federal question.

Constitution Day

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On this day 231 years ago, the Constitutional Convention wrapped up its work and submitted it to Congress, to be forwarded to ratifying conventions in the states. The proposal was far from perfect. Politics is the art of the possible, and many compromises were necessary.

Even so, the proposed Constitution was a huge step forward. It provided a framework for government that would allow the new nation to grow and improve. It provided a mechanism for its own improvement, allowing amendment by the concurrence of 3/4 of the states rather than the nearly impossible unanimity required under the Articles of Confederation.

In Professor Amar's recent testimony, noted here with a link to the video, he explained that when we speak of "original understanding" of the Constitution we are not speaking of only the understanding at the time of the ratification in 1787-1788 or the Bill of Rights in 1791. We are also speaking of the original understanding of the later amendments at the time of each one, most importantly the Reconstruction Amendments.

When we look back on historical figures, we should consider not so much what condition they left the country in but whether they left it better than they found it. In my view, the Founding Fathers deserve the admiration they have traditionally received. The subsequent history of the United States is a long drive toward the ideals set down in the Declaration of Independence. There was some backsliding, to be sure, but compared to the history of other countries relatively little. The remarkable work of statesmanship proposed 231 years ago has a lot to do with that progress.

Amar Testimony at Kavanaugh Hearing

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Prof. Akhil Amar of Yale testified this morning at the Kavanaugh confirmation hearing. His prepared statement is here and the video is here.  The full statement is well worth reading or watching. Prof. Amar notes that he voted for Hillary Clinton and supported every Democratic nominee to the Supreme Court, and he endorses the nomination of Judge Kavanaugh. He makes 10 points, and I will quote the second one here, endnotes and all:

2. Originalism is wise and nonpartisan.

Studying the Constitution requires diligence and intelligence--especially for those, like Kavanaugh, who are "originalists," paying special heed to what the Constitution's words originally meant when adopted. I too am an originalist. In prioritizing the Constitution's text, history, and structure to discern its principles and to distill its wisdom, we originalists are following in the footsteps of George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Marshall, Joseph Story, and Abraham Lincoln, among others.

Originalism is neither partisan nor outlandish.4. The most important originalist of the last century was a towering liberal Democratic Senator-turned-Justice, Hugo Black, the driving intellectual force of the Warren Court, who insisted on taking seriously the Constitution's words and spirit guaranteeing free speech, racial equality, religious equality, the right to vote, the right to counsel, and much more. Among today's scholars, the originalist cited most often by the Supreme Court is also a self-described liberal and a registered Democrat--yours truly.5

The best originalists heed not just the Founders' vision but also the vision underlying its amendments--especially the transformative Reconstruction Amendments and Woman Suffrage Amendment. I believe that Justice Kavanaugh will be in this tradition.6 On various vital issues--voting rights, governmental immunities, congressional power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments--Justice Kavanaugh's constitutional views may well be better for liberals than were Justice Kennedy's.

--------------------------

Erwin Chemerinsky has this article in the ABA Journal identifying areas where Justice "Kennedy was the fifth vote for a liberal result, and where it is uncertain, or even unlikely, that Kavanaugh would decide the same way" as Justice Kennedy did.

Much of the discussion involves issues outside our scope and that CJLF takes no position on, so I won't comment on those. On the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, Dean Chemerinsky writes:

Exclusionary rule: In Hudson v. Michigan (2006), Justice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion--joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito--that called for the elimination of the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment cases. He argued that the costs of excluding evidence when police officers violate the Fourth Amendment outweigh the benefits of doing so. Justice Kennedy agreed to the result in that case, but declared that the continued operation of the exclusionary rule was not in doubt. But with Kennedy being replaced by Kavanaugh, there could be five votes to overrule a doctrine that conservatives have opposed for decades.
Really?  I have been arguing to limit Mapp for many years. I think I would remember if the Supreme Court came within a single vote of overruling it completely, especially in a case where my organization filed a brief.
Law enforcement contends that the new bail law is a "public safety disaster" because it is giving too many dangerous people "get out of jail free" cards.  The bail bond industry has already launched an attack to stop the implementation of the new law that poses to destroy businesses and put thousands of people out of work.  The ACLU and other civil rights groups contend that the new law does not "adequately protect against racial biases and disparities that permeate our justice system."  Law enforcement, the entire bail industry, civil rights groups, and defense attorneys all oppose SB 10 for very different reasons.  As noted in my post yesterday, all groups contend that the law goes too far, albeit in opposite directions.

Is there a compromise that can be reached that will not eviscerate the bail bond industry, will keep dangerous people locked up, ensure their appearance at trial, and take into account a person's ability to afford pretrial release so that poor defendants who pose a low risk of pretrial misconduct are not being preventatively detained at higher rates? 

Open Carry on the Big Island

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The Ninth Circuit today decided Young v. Hawaii, No. 12-17808:

We must decide whether the Second Amendment encompasses the right of a responsible law-abiding citizen to carry a firearm openly for self-defense outside of the home.
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As was the case in Peruta II, we find ourselves navigating waters uncharted by Heller and McDonald: the degree to which the Second Amendment protects, or does not protect, the carrying of firearms outside of the home.
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We do not take lightly the problem of gun violence, which the State of Hawaii "has understandably sought to fight . . . with every legal tool at its disposal." Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 667. We see nothing in our opinion that would prevent the State from regulating the right to bear arms, for the Second Amendment leaves the State "a variety of tools for combatting [the problem of gun violence], including some measures regulating handguns." Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.

But, for better or for worse, the Second Amendment does protect a right to carry a firearm in public for self-defense. We would thus flout the Constitution if we were to hold that, "in regulating the manner of bearing arms, the authority of [the State] has no other limit than its own discretion." Reid, 1 Ala. at 616. While many respectable scholars and activists might find virtue in a firearms-carry regime that restricts the right to a privileged few, "the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table." Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.
From my favorite political cartoonist, Michael Ramirez:
Constitution Restoration Project
Yesterday, Federal District Judge John Mendez in Sacramento issued his decision  on the federal government's motion for a preliminary injunction in the California "sanctuary state" case, United States v. California.  The suit involves a package of three bills enacted by the California Legislature.  CJLF's amicus brief in the case focuses on the bill restricting private employers' voluntary cooperation with federal immigration authorities, AB 450.  Judge Mendez enjoined enforcement of the bulk of AB 450 pending final resolution of the litigation.  Here are the key holdings on this portion of the suit.

The Court finds that a law which imposes monetary penalties on an employer solely because that employer voluntarily consents to federal immigration enforcement's entry into nonpublic areas of their place of business or access to their employment records impermissibly discriminates against those who choose to deal with the Federal Government.
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Prohibiting employers from reverifying employment eligibility complicates the subjective element of the crime; e.g., could an employer who might otherwise be found to "know" that one of its employees lacks authorization find shelter behind the state law because it could not confirm its suspicion? The law frustrates the system of accountability that Congress designed.
The provision of AB 450 requiring employers to give employees notice of inspections as well as the other bills in the package, which were not challenged in our brief, were not enjoined.  Much of this legislation may well fall into the category famously described by Justice Scalia as "stupid but constitutional." 

The most doubtful part of the decision is the portion upholding the ability of the state to forbid local governments from voluntarily cooperating with federal immigration authorities.  The court notes a decision of the Second Circuit going the other way, City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 35 (1999), but says it has been undercut by Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018).

No doubt both parties will appeal.  Stay tuned.

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