A victim of the Aurora theater massacre said he believes defense lawyers and anti-death penalty groups have tried to use him like a pawn.
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On page 27 counsel for the petitioner (i.e., the prisoner) seeks to refute an argument that I made initially and the state picked up on. If the petitioner prevails in district court and there is no filter at all, then a petitioner who filed a potload of arguments, most of them frivolous, can argue them all on appeal as long as he prevails on one. See pages 9 and 14 of CJLF's brief. He seeks to assure the Supreme Court this scenario would be rare. I don't know about Texas, but it is certainly not rare in capital cases in California. Burying the courts in a mass of arguments, most patently meritless, defaulted, or both, is standard procedure here, as the California Supreme Court described in In re Reno. It's all part of the strategy to throw as much sand in the gears as possible.
Much of the discussion in this case involves the effect of a decision granting habeas relief in U.S. District Court when the case goes back to the state court. The state's position is that the district court decision settles every issue decided between the parties for the purpose of retrial, so if that court says the prisoner is right on claim A but wrong on B, C, D, E, and F, he has to appeal a decision he won if he doesn't want what he believes to be errors on B through F repeated at the retrial. The whole idea of prisoner who won his new trial in the federal district court's decision appealing that decision strikes me as very strange.
The general rule in litigation is that a decision of a court on an issue settles that issue between the parties unless that decision is appealed and reversed on appeal. This is called issue preclusion or collateral estoppel. A better answer to the problem the state poses in this case is to simply to say that this rule does not apply in habeas corpus. In olden times, a decision on habeas corpus did not have res judicata effect, so a prisoner could go from one judge to another asking relief, and none would be bound by the denial of relief by the others. The Supreme Court could, and in my view should, partially revive this rule for federal habeas for state prisoners and say that the federal district court's authority in issuing a conditional release order is limited to saying "either release him or give him a new trial," period. Whether the state courts want to respect the federal judge's conclusions in the opinion that went into that order should be up to them. Whether the federal courts would overturn the judgment on habeas again if they do not would be a new case, with the AEDPA deference standard playing a large role.
Another big issue is whether ineffective assistance of counsel is one claim or a separate claim for each alleged error of counsel. I think there is one legal right to have an effective attorney, and a claimed violation of that right is one claim, at least as to each phase of the case. That would simplify things considerably, and Justice Breyer notes our brief to that effect at pages 48-49.
Update, 10/17: Rory Little has this analysis of the argument at SCOTUSblog.
The rich and famous Phil Spector is also a permanent guest of California taxpayers. In Delaware, big time political mover and shaker Thomas Capano was sentenced to death. He got off death row the same way thousands of others have -- the Supreme Court changed the rules after the trial was over.
What about O.J. Simpson? His acquittal was mainly the result of racial dynamics in the wake of the Rodney King riots. The dream team wasn't all that dreamy. The prosecution proved his guilt sufficiently to convince an unbiased jury beyond a reasonable doubt; the problem was the jury.
That is not to say that a better lawyer will never make the difference in a close case. But most cases are not close. The difference is at the margins.
In today's orders list, we find this gem from Ballard v. Pennsylvania, No. 13-9364: "The letters of June 2, July 8, July 14, and July 16, 2014, received in this case, are referred to the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for any investigation or action it finds appropriate." Hmmm. What's that about?
This is a capital case. Ballard is a so-called "volunteer," a death-sentenced inmate who doesn't want his sentenced reversed or even delayed. Marc Bookman of the Atlantic Center for Capital Representation, claiming to be Ballard's lawyer, filed a certiorari petition asking the U.S. Supreme Court to review the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirming the judgment. Ballard himself had a thing or two to say about that.
PHOENIX (AP) -- A judge ruled Monday that Jodi Arias can represent herself in the upcoming penalty phase of her murder trial, where jurors will decide whether she is put to death for killing her ex-boyfriend.
Arias, 34, was convicted of first-degree murder last year in the 2008 killing of Travis Alexander, but jurors couldn't reach a decision on sentencing. Under Arizona law, while Arias' murder conviction stands, prosecutors have the option of putting on a second penalty phase with a new jury in an effort to secure the death penalty.
Arias, who has long clashed with her defense lawyers and tried to fire them previously, asked Judge Sherry Stephens to let her serve as her own lawyer during the second penalty phase set for Sept. 8. Stephens granted the request but said there would be no delays.
"I do not believe it is in your best interest ... I strongly urge you to reconsider," Stephens told Arias before granting the motion.
As a criminal defense attorney with four capital cases, I agree with Skelton that the death penalty system is broken. Here's a radical idea: Fix it.
Skelton is right that Gov. Jerry Brown and Atty. Gen. Kamala Harris, both lifelong death penalty foes, will do nothing to fix the system. It is unethical for them not to zealously enforce the law just because they don't like it. Unable to win at the ballot box, the opponents win by obstruction and refusing to do the job they are obligated to do.
Someday a governor may be in office who does not like certain environmental protections or civil rights statutes. If that happens, I hope it is remembered where the precedent arose that the executive need not do the public's bidding.
We need more with attitudes like Goodwin's. Specifically, we need capital defense lawyers who will do their duty as advocates to make the best case for their assigned client but who will not delay, obstruct, or bury the courts with patently meritless pleadings. (See In re Reno, 55 Cal. 4th 428 (2012).) Capital cases should be just like noncapital cases in this regard. A lawyer assigned an appeal for a rapist sentenced to prison is not on a crusade to abolish imprisonment. He just makes the case that his particular client shouldn't have been convicted or shouldn't have been sentenced to as much time as he got.
Retired prosecutors might be good candidates to step up and take capital appeals and state habeas petitions. Any takers?
Some capital defense lawyers seem to think that there is a "death is different" exception for capital cases. There is not. If the client directs his attorney not to offer mitigating evidence in the penalty phase, he has no ineffective assistance claim if the attorney follows his direction. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 475 (2007). (See also CJLF's brief in that case.)
Yet they never give up. As noted in today's News Scan, the California Supreme Court today affirmed the conviction and death sentence of Steven Brown for the sodomy and murder of 11-year-old April Holley. Brown decided he would rather be sentenced to death than life in prison and instructed his lawyer to present no mitigating evidence. His lawyer and the trial judge made sure this was a competent decision. No, that is not ineffective assistance. Quoting earlier decisions, "an attorney‟s duty of loyalty to the client means the attorney should always remember that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client . . . ."
Now, California Supreme Court, it is high time to recognize that what is true at trial is equally true on appeal. Sometimes death row clients say, "Get my appeal done promptly; don't stall" or "Only challenge the guilt verdict, not penalty; 'give me liberty or give me death' " or "Don't challenge the judgment at all; I'm good with it." If the client is mentally competent, the lawyer can advise against these decisions, but if push comes to shove, it is the client's decision to make. And, no, the lawyer cannot decide on his own that the client is incompetent to make the decision. Only a judge can appoint a conservator to make these decisions for an incompetent client.
I have letters from death row inmates whose lawyers have ignored their instructions, and the California Supreme Court ignores their protests. That's not right, for the reasons you just said.
In his opening statement, defense attorney Ryan Moriarty told the jurors their task is to decide "what form of homicide applies to this defendant...."We're not asking you to presume Arthur Morgan innocent of responsibility," he said. "It is our contention that he did not act knowingly and purposefully on that day but, rather, recklessly.
OK, fair enough. Unfortunately, Mr. Moriarty added:
"Was Tierra thrown off a bridge, or was she placed there, still alive, for God to determine the outcome?"
Yes, well, when you throw a two year-old in icy water weighted down, you can take a pretty good guess how "God is going to determine the outcome." But we appreciate counsel's insight.
A federal statute, 21 U. S. C. §853(e), authorizes a court to freeze an indicted defendant's assets prior to trial if they would be subject to forfeiture upon conviction. In United States v. Monsanto, 491 U. S. 600, 615 (1989), we approved the constitutionality of such an order so long as it is "based on a finding of probable cause to believe that the property will ultimately be proved forfeitable." And we held that standard to apply even when a defendant seeks to use the disputed property to pay for a lawyer.Unusual lineup on this one. Opinion by Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Alito. Dissent by Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor.
In this case, two indicted defendants wishing to hire an attorney challenged a pre-trial restraint on their property.The trial court convened a hearing to consider the seizure's legality under Monsanto. The question presented is whether criminal defendants are constitutionally entitled at such a hearing to contest a grand jury's prior determination of probable cause to believe they committed the crimes charged. We hold that they have no right to relitigate that finding.
This case is highly unusual for a capital case in that the disputed question actually involves who committed the crime. The trial lawyer hired a forensic expert he knew was unqualified because he mistakenly believed that state law capped the fee he could offer. In fact, the statute had been amended to give more leeway. The prosecutor sliced and diced the unqualified expert. The state courts failed to correctly apply the "prejudice" prong of Strickland v. Washington, holding that there was no prejudice because the experts in the postconviction proceeding testified the same as the trial expert. That's not the point. A qualified expert would not have been so easily attacked by the prosecutor, and there is a reasonable probability the jury would have believed him.
The high court took this case on direct review of the state courts, rather than letting it go to federal habeas first, probably to avoid the complications of the AEDPA deference standard.
So is it open season for federal courts to second-guess the qualifications of experts in the guise of ineffective assistance claims? No, the Court makes clear:
A Wisconsin father convicted of abuse for starving his teenage daughter down to 68 pounds was sentenced Wednesday to five years in prison.
Before being sentenced by Dane County Circuit Judge Julie Genovese, the 42-year-old man read a statement insisting his daughter suffered from severe emotional and behavioral problems that he couldn't handle, that his job as a trucker kept him away from home and that he didn't notice how thin she had become.
Hard to disagree with that. Kids who get starved can indeed develop "emotional and behavioral problems." And how could a man be expected to notice that a 68 pound teenager was thin? Gads, our society is sooo judgmental.
But it was this part that caught my eye:
The man's attorney, Jessa Nicholson, countered he deserved probation. He already has lost his family and his job, his wife is in prison and his reputation has been destroyed, she said.
"Apparently we are still a society that favors punishment," she told reporters after the hearing.
It's all true. When a father starves his daughter nearly to death, "we are still a society that favors punishment."
Honestly, is there something these people won't say?
The allegation is that McGuire told prison guards about this, but then said he would not do it.
State prison records released Monday say McGuire told guards that Lowe counseled him to make a show of his death that would, perhaps, lead to abolition of the death penalty. But three accounts from prison officials indicate McGuire refused to put on a display.
"He wants me to put on this big show in front of my kids, all right when I'm dying!" McGuire is reported as having told one guard. "I ain't gonna do this. It's about me and my kids, not him and his cause!"
I don't believe there was any actual faking. In addition to McGuire's statement, there is a more basic reason. He couldn't fake for the same reason he couldn't feel pain. The procedure began with a massive dose of sedative.
The Office of the Public Defender lifted the attorney's suspension after "an internal review failed to substantiate the allegation." I don't think the public should settle for that. Public defender's offices in many places have developed a fanatical anti-death-penalty culture. We should not trust an internal review.