Recently in Counsel Category

Jacob Gershman reports in the WSJ:

A federal judge ruled Wednesday that David Boies' law firm can't represent an alleged victim of Jeffrey Epstein in her defamation suit against Alan Dershowitz, escalating a feud between two of the country's most prominent attorneys.
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The Court House News Service recently released a story on Death Row inmates in Arizona along with the state's office of the federal public defender stating that they are suing the U.S. Department of Justice because they believe that they are not receiving proper post-conviction representation and that the DOJ's process for certifying a state representation system is inadequate. The lawsuit specifically attacks the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1966, alleging that "the U.S. attorney general has far too much discretion" under the law as amended in 2006. "Once the Justice Department approves the states' processes" for appointing counsel for state post-conviction review of capital cases, "the timeline for habeas corpus proceedings is shortened and judicial review of state judgments is curtailed ...."

The inmates filed a 37-page complaint highlighting that DOJ's implementing regulation impose restrictions on timelines for filings, along with other complaints supporting their argument. The Arizona Attorney General's application for certification of that State's process is three pages, "stating the process there is adequate, despite numerous public comments decrying the process, including from the plaintiffs". They complain that the rules put the burden on the defendants to prove that system is insufficient rather than on the state to prove it is sufficient.

Not mentioned in the article is the fact that the Ninth Circuit decided in 2016 that (1) defense organizations do not have standing to challenge the regulations; and (2) a challenge by death-row inmates is not "ripe" for review until DOJ has actually applied the regulations in making a certification decision. See Habeas Corpus Resource Center v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 816 F.3d 1241, 1244 (2016), cert. denied 197 L.Ed.2d 519 (2017). This ruling is binding precedent in the Arizona District Court. CJLF's amicus brief in that case is here.
On December 29, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the conviction of double murderer/rapist Francis Hernandez in a split decision. "Joining" Judge Reinhardt's opinion to form a majority was Judge Harry Pregerson, who had died a month earlier. See this post. Judge Jacqueline Nguyen dissented.

Judge Reinhardt died a few months later.

The case was reheard by a reconstituted panel, with Judges Kim Wardlaw and Milan Smith drawn to replace the departed judges. A new opinion was filed today upholding the district court's denial of habeas relief. Although the trial attorney was deemed ineffective for not pursuing a diminished capacity defense, that omission was not prejudicial because the case against the defendant was so overwhelming that there is no reasonable probability it would have succeeded.

So to avoid being labeled ineffective, the defense lawyer has to make the patently meritless mental defense. You have to throw the "Hail Mary pass" when it's the only play you have.

Judge Reinhardt's theory was that the standard for prejudice in the guilt phase of a trial (as opposed to the penalty phase of a capital case in a state with a single-juror-veto system) is whether there is a reasonable probability that a single juror would have bought the argument. That theory is conspicuously absent from today's opinion. That was the principal point of CJLF's amicus brief in the case.
The U.S. Supreme Court declined to take up two cases over written dissents. Hester v. United States involves a question of whether the right to jury trial extends to the facts needed to impose a restitution fine. Lance v. Sellers involves a Georgia Supreme Court decision in a capital case on the "prejudice" prong of Strickland v. Washington, i.e., that no relief is available because the case was so overwhelming that there is no reasonable probability that it would have come out differently if the jury had been presented with the omitted evidence.

Amy Howe describes these two cases further in her report on the day's SCOTUS activities.

Clients, Lawyers, and Appeals

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The U.S. Supreme Court today took up Garza v. Idaho, No. 17-1026, involving the intersection of two recurring themes: lawyer decisions v. client decisions in the conduct of a case and how to apply rules developed for trials to the context of plea-bargained cases, which most cases are now.

In the course of a criminal trial, the lawyer makes most of the decisions, but a few are reserved for the client personally.  Whether to appeal is a client decision.  In Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), the Court dealt with the issue of ineffective assistance claims for a lawyer's failure to appeal, with or without consulting the client.  If the lawyer is found to have performed deficiently, the "prejudice" question is only whether there is a reasonable probability the client would have appealed, not that he would have prevailed on appeal.

The wrinkle in the Garza case is that the defendant pleaded guilty and waived his right to appeal as part of the bargain.  From the Brief in Opposition:

Garza pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver pursuant to plea agreements with the State of Idaho. Pet. App. 2a. As part of those plea agreements the district court bound itself to follow certain "bargained for" sentencing recommendations. Pet. App. 28a-29a. Garza also waived his right to appeal and his right to seek a reduction of his sentences under Idaho Criminal Rule 35. Pet. App. 2a-3a. The district court imposed the agreed-upon sentences. Pet. App. 29a. Garza requested his trial counsel to file a notice of appeal but, in light of the waiver, his counsel declined. Pet. App. 29a.

It seems to me that the situation here is quite different from Flores-Ortega.  In that case, the lawyer's allegedly ineffective failure to file an appeal denied the client an entire judicial proceeding that he was entitled to.  The Court relied heavily on the distinction between a claim that a proceeding was conducted unfairly and a claim that a proceeding did not happen at all.  In this case, the proceeding was one that the client voluntarily gave up in return for a reduced sentence.  The proceeding not happening at all was precisely what he agreed to, and a finding that he had no right to it is quite different from a finding that he would not have prevailed in it.

Crim Cases on Cake Monday

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The big news out of SCOTUS today is on wedding cakes, but there is some criminal law action, too.  There are two sentencing cases and a follow-up to a capital case from five years ago.

Justice Kennedy takes the Understatement of the Day Award in Hughes v. United States, No. 17-155:  "The proper construction of federal sentencing statutes and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure can present close questions of statutory and textual interpretation when implementing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines."  Yup.  The case has to do with reducing sentences when the Guidelines are lowered retroactively.  Congress has authorized such a reduction if the sentence was "based on a sentencing range that has been subsequently lowered ...."  18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(2).  In the case of plea/sentence bargains, the "based on" may not be clear.  The bottom line is that the more lenient interpretation prevails, 6-3.  Opinion by Justice Kennedy; dissent by Chief Justice Roberts.

Those of us who were hoping for further guidance on the rule that lower courts should follow when the Supreme Court fails to render a majority opinion (the Marks rule) were handed a fallen cake.

Justice Alito takes the Brevity Prize today for an opinion of only seven 6 1/8 x 9 1/4 inch pages in Koons v. United States, No. 17-5716.  A sentence isn't "based on" the Guidelines when it is determined by a statutory mandatory minimum and the "substantial assistance" reduction.  Unanimous.  It's easier to be brief when you don't have those pesky dissents to deal with.

SCOTUS Criminal Law Decisions

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There are four criminal law decisions from the United States Supreme Court this morning:

In McCoy v. Louisiana, No. 16-8255, the Court held that defense counsel cannot admit that defendant committed the criminal act over his objection, even if counsel's best judgment as to strategy is to admit the act and argue mental state for a lower degree of crime.  In this case, counsel wanted to go for second-degree rather than first-degree murder, while McCoy wanted to claim he was out of the state at the time.  6-3 opinion by Justice Ginsburg, with Justices Alito, Thomas, and Gorsuch dissenting.

I agree with the defendant on this one, at least as the facts are framed by the Court.  The goals of representation are for the client to decide, and if the client wants to double down rather than go for a lesser included, that is his choice.  Also, enabling the client's choice in this manner may well reduce the number of defendants who exercise their constitutional right to be a fool* and represent themselves.

In United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, No. 17-312, the Court dismissed as moot a case involving routine shackling of defendants during non-jury proceedings.

Two Fourth Amendment cases were decided today:

To End the Death Penalty: Lie More

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Except for punishment for outright perjury or planning to kill government witnesses, there is no penalty known to me against the defense side's engaging in perverse or deceitful behavior in order to advance the ball.  Indeed, such behavior is not merely condoned but commended:  The client is presumed innocent; actual innocence (or guilt) is all but irrelevant; the state employs politically ambitious and morally tone-deaf prosecutors; the cops cheat; and criminal punishment is per se the outcropping of a backward, racist American culture that needs stiff blowback in order even to start to straighten out.  So if this particular client is guilty or even worse than guilty, hey, look, this is not my problem.  The state has all the resources, and we need to wake up  --  have a "national conversation" about justice, that is.

Ever heard that one before? 

I mention it here because of an entry Doug Berman has up today titled, "Could poor health help save the life of Ohio's 'poster child for the death penalty'?"  It's about an Ohio killer fighting off his scheduled execution because he is, so his lawyer claims, very ill.  You have to read all the way to the end to get the punchline:

Campbell argues that poor health is one reason he shouldn't be put to death, but he used an earlier, false health claim to commit the crime that put him on death row. Campbell feigned paralysis from a glancing bullet wound suffered during a robbery arrest. As Campbell was being taken to the Franklin County Courthouse for a hearing on April 2, 1997, he sprang from his wheelchair, overpowered a deputy sheriff, took her gun and fled. He then carjacked Dials, who was at the courthouse to pay a traffic ticket. After driving Dials around for hours, Campbell ordered him onto the floor of his truck and shot him twice.

Want to frustrate the death penalty?  Just keep lying.  I must ruefully admit, it works much of the time.

First Monday in October

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The U.S. Supreme Court opens its new term on a particularly somber First Monday, with a horrific crime in Las Vegas in everyone's thoughts.  The long orders list from the Long Conference is here with few surprises.  The Court turned down Florida murderer Cary Lambrix, who should have been executed many years ago, on his request to review the Eleventh Circuit's decision in his case.  He has another petition to review a Florida Supreme Court decision pending. 

Regrettably, the Court also turned down Florida's petition in Florida v. Franklin, No. 16-1170, the state's latest attempt to get the high court to review the Florida Supreme Court's excessively expansive interpretation of Hurst v. Florida.  The split with neighboring Alabama remains unresolved.

Sheriff Joe's now-moot mandamus petition is denied, of course.

Anthony Elonis, who tried to excuse his blood-curdling threats on Facebook as merely imitating his favorite rap "artist," was denied a second trip to SCOTUS.  The primary post on the earlier decision is here.  Type "Elonis" in the search box for many others.

Short List from the Long Conference

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Today the U.S. Supreme Court announced the short list of cases it decided to take up during its end-of-summer Long Conference on Monday.  The long list of cases not taken up (meaning the lower court decision stands) will be announced when the Court opens its new term on the First Monday in October.

Criminal cases include several Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims, one on the "plain error" standard of review on appeal, and one on military commissions.

Retaining Counsel With Dirty Money

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Nicole Hong reports for the WSJ, "Joaquín 'El Chapo' Guzmán, the Mexican drug lord awaiting trial in New York, wants to hire private lawyers. But they may have to join the case without any assurance of getting paid."

Guzmán is presently represented by the federal defender.  His potential private lawyers want "blanket, prospective assurance" from the government that the money he uses to pay them won't be forfeited.  The government, unsurprisingly, said "fuggedaboudit," or something to that effect.

See this post from last year on the Supreme Court's fractured decision in Luis v. United States and Dean Mazzone's article that I linked to yesterday.  Continuing with the WSJ article:

Mr. Guzmán wants to hire a team led by Jeffrey Lichtman, most well-known for securing an acquittal for John A. Gotti, son of the notorious mob boss. The team also includes A. Eduardo Balarezo, William Purpura and Marc Fernich, all of whom have had experience defending mobsters or drug traffickers.
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"This is still America. The man deserves not only his choice of counsel, but he deserves a fair trial," Mr. Lichtman said.
Um, yes, this is still America, but a defendant does not have, and never has had in this country, a choice of counsel he does not have the money to pay for.  Indigent defendants get the counsel they are appointed.  Is the rule any different for a defendant who has money obtained illegally and forfeitable to the government?  No, but tracing the money can get complicated.

As for the right to a fair trial, is every trial in which the defendant is represented by a public defender inherently unfair?  I don't think so.
The U.S. Supreme Court this morning went back into the area of criminal defense lawyers giving bad advice on the immigration consequences of a conviction, a can of worms it opened in its 2010 decision of Padilla v. Kentucky.  Today's case is Lee v. United States, No. 16-327.

Jae Lee was a legal permanent resident who was caught dealing ecstasy.  When offered a plea deal, he asked his retained attorney about immigration consequences and was assured he would not be deported.  "According to Lee, the lawyer assured him that if deportation was not in the plea agreement, 'the government cannot deport you.' "  Wow.  What an idiot, if that was really the basis of his advice.  Dealing drugs is an "aggravated felony" under immigration law.  As such it results in mandatory deportation, and no, Bozo, it doesn't have to be in the plea agreement.

The two prongs of an ineffective assistance claim are deficient performance and resulting prejudice.  Here we have deficient performance in spades.  How about prejudice?  Is a defendant prejudiced by a plea deal when the prosecution has a slam-dunk case for guilt that almost certainly would have resulted in a higher sentence plus deportation anyway?  The majority, per C.J. Roberts, says yes.  Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, dissents.  Justice Gorsuch did not participate.

Materiality

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Today's theme out of the United States Supreme Court is materiality.  If you describe what happened in a case and people look puzzled and ask "So what?" you have a materiality issue.

Maslenjak v. United States, No. 16-309, involves the crime of lying in the naturalization process.  It is error to instruct the jury that they can convict on finding a false statement without also finding that the falsity somehow contributed to the decision.

Turner v. United States, 15-1503, involves the rule of Brady v. Maryland that prosecutors must turn over to the defense any material exculpatory evidence in their possession.  "Material" in this context means a reasonable probability it would have made a difference in the result.  The Court holds 6-2 that the evidence in this case was not material.

Weaver v. Massachusetts, No. 16-240, involves a claim that the defendant's trial lawyer was ineffective for failure to object to the exclusion of the public (including the defendant's mother) from an overcrowded courtroom during jury selection.  Violation of the public trial right is a "structural error," reversible without any showing that it mattered, but that claim was forfeited by failure to object.  Ineffective assistance of counsel is reversible only upon a showing of "prejudice" which means the same thing as "materiality" in the Brady context, i.e., a reasonable probability it made a difference.  The Court held that the prejudice requirement continues to apply even when the underlying error is "structural," or at least this particular subspecies of structural errors, and no prejudice has been shown here.

Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court.  Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion.  Justice Alito wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment.  Justice Gorsuch joined all three.  Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Kagan.  CJLF filed an amicus brief in this case, written by Kym Stapleton.

Zealous Defense Counsel

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We've often heard, including among the comments on this blog, that defense counsel is not merely entitled but obligated to be all in for the client.  It's the natural outcropping of our adversarial system, we are told.  Against the massive power of the state, the Champion of Liberty should be able to pull out all the stops.  If this entails pushing the envelope of truthfulness  --  as defense deceit is euphemistically called  -- well, this is the price we pay.  Get over it. 

One crime victim did not get over it, and instead went to the cops when the Champion of Liberty approached her in a particular way.  The Washington Post, whose crime reporting is as good as its editorial policy is bad, has the story.
Andrew Hamm at SCOTUSblog reports on a panel discussion at the Supreme Court Historical Society and the reminiscence of Timothy Dyk, who in 1962 was a law clerk to Chief Justice Earl Warren.

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