This Article presents the results of a survey of jurors in federal and state court on their use of social media during their jury service. We began surveying federal jurors in 2011 and reported preliminary results in 2012; since then, we have surveyed several hundred more jurors, including state jurors, for a more complete picture of juror attitudes toward social media. Our results support the growing consensus that jury instructions are the most effective tool to mitigate the risk of juror misconduct through social media. We conclude with a set of recommended best practices for using a social-media instruction.The introduction section (footnotes omitted) follows the break.
Recently in Criminal Procedure Category
A federal statute, 21 U. S. C. §853(e), authorizes a court to freeze an indicted defendant's assets prior to trial if they would be subject to forfeiture upon conviction. In United States v. Monsanto, 491 U. S. 600, 615 (1989), we approved the constitutionality of such an order so long as it is "based on a finding of probable cause to believe that the property will ultimately be proved forfeitable." And we held that standard to apply even when a defendant seeks to use the disputed property to pay for a lawyer.Unusual lineup on this one. Opinion by Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Alito. Dissent by Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor.
In this case, two indicted defendants wishing to hire an attorney challenged a pre-trial restraint on their property.The trial court convened a hearing to consider the seizure's legality under Monsanto. The question presented is whether criminal defendants are constitutionally entitled at such a hearing to contest a grand jury's prior determination of probable cause to believe they committed the crimes charged. We hold that they have no right to relitigate that finding.
The argument spent less time on the AEDPA standard than I would have liked. On page 31 the Chief Justice says, "No one's talked about the standard yet." Then they talk about it.
No clear winner emerges from the argument. If the underlying issue were before the Court on direct appeal, it actually would be a close call. As I've said before, though, when the underlying issue is close, the AEDPA issue is easy. At least it should be, if judges would apply §2254(d) the way it is written and the way it was intended. Stay tuned.
I don't have the actual ruling, but from the story it appears that the judge might believe that litigating the method of execution is the new normal, a permanent additional phase to capital litigation, and every inmate has to be allowed that challenge. It shouldn't be. A single-drug execution with pentobarbital is so far from the risk of extreme pain required under Baze that there normally should not be any basis for a stay.
[Editor's Note: Orders are here and here. No dissent noted. Scalia recused.]
His attorneys told ABC News that it's a common maneuver to get the legal ball rolling, and that they planned on changing the plea to guilty immediately....Judge Lynch said that Cordle's attorneys are trying to game the system. Under Ohio law, entering a guilty plea locks in the judge -- in this case Lynch. She said that she believes Cordle's team got spooked after she told them she didn't know how she'd sentence Cordle, who faces anywhere from two to eight and a half years in prison.
ABC News Chief Legal Affairs Anchor Dan Abrams said that these factors can all make a difference in sentencing. "It seems pretty clear he's going to plead guilty," Abrams said. "Once you commit to pleading guilty, there are only one a few questions left: What's going to be the sentence? And who determines that? The judge -- and which judge you get -- can make a big difference."
Since the April post, the case has been on the Supreme Court's conference list seven more times without action by the Court. That often (but not always) means a summary reversal is being prepared but the Court is having difficulty coming to agreement on the opinion.
Other cases decided today are civil, including the much-awaited gene patenting case. Isolated, naturally occurring genes are not patentable.
I would like more information as to who determined that the proceedings [in a hospital involving the magistrate judge who Mirandized Rogers] would occur at that time and place while [FBI] questioning was still ongoing. I have received information suggesting that the Magistrate Judge may have appeared sua sponte to conduct the proceeding in a way that may have not been fully coordinated with the intelligence needs of the FBI. My understanding is that the normal practice places the duty to take the defendant to court (and accordingly discretion as to timing consistent with the rules) on law enforcement, and not the court.
[A]re judges supposed to read suspects their Miranda rights while they are in police custody? I wouldn't have thought so, and not just because I haven't seen it done on TV. As Bill Otis reminds us, Miranda restricts the government's ability to use evidence collected absent the warning. But it's the government's call as to whether it wants to run the risk of having evidence excluded in order to obtain potentially valuable evidence from a suspect.*****************I can't help but that suspect that it was the Obama administration that decided Tsarnaev should receive the Miranda warning. After all, wasn't it the prosecutor who brought the judge to Tsarnaev's hospital room in the first place? And isn't it almost certain that the local prosecutor, an assistant U.S. attorney, acted on instructions from the highest level of the Justice Department? Line prosecutors don't make decisions about how to treat terrorists in high profile cases when there is time to consult the DOJ.
The end of the FBI's ability to obtain information from Tsarnaev is only the latest consequence of the left's exaltation of undue process over considerations of national security and public safety. For congressional lawmakers who are demanding an explanation for the handling of the Tsarnaev interrogat[ion], there it is.
Former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani said it was "ridiculous" that a judge stopped the questioning while the 19-year-old was talking to FBI agents.
And House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers called the decision to intervene a "God-awful policy."Lawmakers are demanding to know why Tsarnaev, who has confessed to being involved in the planting of two bombs near the Boston Marathon finish line, was read his Miranda rights in the middle of his interrogation."That's just mind-boggling," Giuliani said in an interview with Fox News' Greta Van Susteren."This guy is kind of telling you about how he's coming to New York and do a bombing, a judge walks in and we cut off the questioning?" Giuliani said. "What are we, crazy?"
Great question. And how much did the higher-up's at DOJ know about this?
[I]n a case such as this one, where it seems likely both that the government will have overwhelming evidence to convict (without relying on any post-arrest statements) and that Tsarnaev may be in possession of valuable information that implicates national security, the rationale behind the government's choice emerges: Even if the public-safety exception is determined to have been wrongfully invoked, this would not threaten the government's case in a meaningful way. One may certainly contest whether the Court's shifting on Miranda is correct or whether the government's choice not to Mirandize Tsarnaev is desirable as a policy matter. Nor have the media been wrong to question the government's broad interpretation of the public-safety exception. But it is misleading to paint the decision not to Mirandize as trampling Tsarnaev's constitutional rights as an American citizen.