Recently in Federalism Category
H.R. 4760, the Blue Lives Matter Act of 2016," is a sweeping bill to make assaults on police officers a federal offense, adding to the list of federal "hate crimes."
Of course it is true that blue lives matter. It is also true that the police are under attack and need the support of the law-abiding people of this country. It is also true that the road to hell is paved with good intentions.
Crimes against persons are generally matters of state law. At times it has been necessary to stretch the boundaries of federal jurisdiction when states were failing in their constitutional obligation to provide equal protection of the laws, such as the murders of civil rights workers over half a century ago.
Those dark times are long behind us. State governments are perfectly capable of prosecuting crimes against police officers. Federalizing the issue will not help.
The lines between state and federal jurisdiction are there for good reasons. We should be restoring and fortifying them, not punching new holes in them.
The full list of cases taken up for the next term so far is here. Not a single "CFH" on the list. There are two "CSH" cases, where the Supreme Court has taken a habeas corpus (or equivalent) case directly from the state courts. There are four "CSY" cases, straight criminal appeals from state courts. (Two of these arise from the same case, and a third presents a common question with the two. CJLF has filed a single brief in all three.) There are three "CFY" cases, federal criminal appeals.
Federal habeas for state prisoners lies at the crossroads of federalism, criminal law, and protection of individual rights, and that intersection has been the site of many collisions. It has occupied a disproportionate amount of the Supreme Court's docket for many years. Maybe not this year.
There are, of course, many more cases to be added. Daniels v. Webster, discussed in this post by Ian Sonego, is a federal-prisoner habeas case that is highly likely to be added to the docket.
In addition to argued cases, there are summary dispositions, and chastising federal courts that just can't stand the fact that Congress took them down a peg in 1996 will doubtless be among those. Even so, this could be the lightest term for state-prisoner federal habeas in some time.
As Rory notes, the reason for the Supreme Court to take criminal and habeas cases directly from the state courts is to get straight to the underlying issue without dealing with the limitations placed on the federal habeas remedy by Congress or the Supreme Court itself. Perhaps the Court believes that the major questions of habeas procedure and limitations have largely been addressed and wishes to devote more attention to the underlying criminal law and procedure questions.
The fatal shooting of a woman in San Francisco last week, allegedly by an illegal immigrant man convicted of seven felonies and previously deported to Mexico, has sparked a debate about the extent to which local law enforcement and federal immigration authorities should cooperate.
At issue is the Department of Homeland Security's practice of seeking to identify potentially deportable individuals in jails or prisons nationwide by issuing a "detainer," a request rather than an order to extend the individual's detention.
Kathryn Steinle, 32 years old, was walking with her father along Pier 14 on the evening of July 1 when she was shot in her upper torso, police said. She later died at a hospital.
* * *
On March 26, [the suspect, Francisco] Sanchez was booked into the San Francisco County Jail on a local drug-related warrant after serving a federal prison term, the city's sheriff's office said. The next day, Mr. Sanchez appeared in San Francisco Superior Court and the drug charges were dismissed.
State. No question in my mind.Events are moving right along. Valerie Bauerlein reports in the WSJ:
Unlike the Boston Marathon, this was not a national and international event but rather a local church. Also, there is no reason, at this point, to believe this murderer's attack was any kind of terrorist attack on the United States as a nation, as Tsarnaev's was.
There is no state action here, and any effect on interstate commerce is very tenuous. There was a time, half a century ago, when federal criminal law needed to be stretched to cover local cases of violence by individuals with no state action involved because state and local government was unable or unwilling to deliver justice and thus people were denied equal protection of the laws. Those days are long behind us.
The "pattern or practice" investigation into the Baltimore Police Department will center on police officers' use of force, stops, searches and arrests, as well as allegations of discriminatory policing practices. If the DOJ finds a pattern of civil rights abuses, it will pursue a legally binding settlement to secure systemic reform.
To translate: DOJ plans to wring a consent decree out of the Baltimore PD in which the feds will henceforth run the Department.
Federal agents on Thursday arrested powerful New York Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver (D) on federal corruption charges, stemming from payments he received from two New York City law firms.
Jennifer Queliz, a spokeswoman for the U.S. Attorney's office in the Southern District of New York, confirmed Silver was in custody Thursday morning. U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara will hold a press conference Thursday afternoon to announce the charges.There is an interesting federalism question on the constitutional basis for federal prosecution of corrupt state officials. It generally hinges on some tenuous connection with mail or interstate commerce. In my view, a corrupt official denies the honest people of the state equal protection of the laws. The bribe-payor gets special treatment that the honest people do not. That is, of course, why he pays the bribe. I haven't gotten any takers for my view yet.
Whatever the basis, prosecuting corrupt state officials is one of the most important functions of federal law enforcement. Some valiant prosecutors do go after crooks who hold their purse strings, but we cannot expect that as a matter of course.
My first impression was that such a suit would be meritless, bordering on frivolous. Of course a state is within its constitutional authority to not prohibit something. After skimming quickly through the complaint, though, it is more nuanced than that. The gist of the claim is that the Colorado law involves its government in affirmatively promoting a trafficking in marijuana that violates federal law. I will have to study it more carefully to form an opinion on the merits of the complaint.
Procedurally, there is some inside baseball on the peculiarities of Supreme Court jurisdiction.
When a state prisoner seeks federal habeas relief on the ground that a state court, in adjudicating a claim on the merits, misapplied federal law, a federal court may grant relief only if the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). We have emphasized, time and again, that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat.1214, prohibits the federal courts of appeals from relying on their own precedent to conclude that a particular constitutional principle is "clearly established." See, e.g., Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U. S. __, __ (2013) (per curiam) (slip op. at 6). Because the Ninth Circuit failed to comply with this rule, we reverse its decision granting habeas relief to respondent Marvin Smith.The case is Lopez v. Smith, No. 13-346.
There is a broad spectrum of viewpoints on the Supreme Court today, but when there is not a single justice who thinks the court of appeals' decision is correct, when the error is so obvious that it doesn't even require full briefing and argument, and when the same pattern recurs "time and again," there is something gravely wrong with some of our courts of appeals (mostly those divisible by 3).
The continuing violation of this provision by some of the lower federal courts is the largest-scale defiance of federal law since the "massive resistance" campaign in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Except this time federal courts are perpetrators of the violations instead of enforcers of the law.
Jean-Claude Toviave, an immigrant from Togo in 2001, illegally brought four young relatives - a younger sister, two cousins, and a nephew - to live with him in 2006. After they arrived, Toviave made the children cook, clean, and do the laundry. He also occasionally made the children babysit for his girlfriend and relatives. Toviave would often beat the children if they misbehaved, didn't follow his rules, or failed to perform assigned chores. He was apparently quick to beat the children and did so with a myriad of objects as well as has fists.
After school personnel became worried about abuse in the home, they contacted local authorities and an investigation ensued. The Department of Homeland Security became involved once it became clear that the children had come into the country illegally. Toviave was charged with visa fraud, mail fraud, forced labor, and human trafficking. He pled guilty to visa and mail fraud, the trafficking charge was dropped, and he proceeded to trial on the forced labor charge. He was convicted of four counts of forced labor, one for each child.
While complicated by the fact that Toviave was neither the children's biological father nor their legal guardian, the Sixth Circuit found unanimously that while the abuse the children suffered was reprehensible and cruel, Toviave had not violated 18 U.S.C. § 1589.