Recently in Habeas Corpus Category

Habeas corpus is the correct procedure for persons who claim they are wrongly imprisoned.  For any other civil rights claim in federal court by a state prisoner, the correct procedure is a suit under the civil rights law, 42 U.S.C. §1983.  The line between the two is not always clear.

Today the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting sort of en banc, decided Nettles v. Grounds, No. 12-16935:

Damous Nettles, a prisoner serving a life sentence in California prison, appeals the district court's dismissal of his habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction. The petition challenged a disciplinary violation on constitutional grounds and claimed that the failure to expunge this violation from his record could affect his eligibility for parole. We conclude that because Nettles's claim does not fall within the "core of habeas corpus," Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487(1973), it must be brought, if at all, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Judge Ikuta wrote the opinion, joined in full by Judges Rawlinson, Clifton, Callahan, and Randy Smith.  Judge Hurwitz concurred in part.  Judge Berzon dissented, joined by Chief Judge Thomas and Judges Fletcher, Murguia, and Nguyen.

USCA9 Corrects DP Error En Banc

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It should not be news that a federal court of appeals sitting "en banc" has corrected an erroneous decision by a three-judge panel.  That's what the en banc process is supposed to do.  However, in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit it has long been rare that a rogue panel decision wrongly overturning a death sentence was even reviewed en banc, much less corrected.  At times, petitioning for such a rehearing has been considered such an exercise in futility that some AG offices would not even bother but would instead go straight the Supreme Court.  (The Supremes don't like that.)

Today we have the Arizona case of Eric Mann.  Mann baited two men to his house to sell them cocaine for $20,000, took the money, and then shot them both.
Judge Lawrence Waddington (L.A. Superior Court, Ret.) has this provocative essay at LinkedIn.  He goes through the well-known (to readers of this blog) misuse of habeas corpus jurisdiction by the Ninth Circuit and calls for an end to it.

The time has come for the Supreme Court to reinterpret federal habeas corpus law and remove the 9th Circuit from any further jurisdiction over state court decisions. Not only will removal reduce the endless appeals of 9th Circuit mandated retrials and the cost and interference with state sovereignty, the record would confirm finality of state court judgments and stop the endless reversals resulting in injustice. No reason justifies two jurisdictions trying the same case twice.
I agree that federal habeas review of state court judgments is doing more harm than good in California and in some other places.  I don't think the Supreme Court has the authority to make the call any more, though.  During the period from Reconstruction through the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court did expand the use of habeas corpus to make it a mechanism to collaterally attack in federal court the judgments of state courts of general jurisdiction.  That use of the writ was not permitted at common law or under the initial federal system, and contrary to myth it was not authorized by the 1867 act.  (That is a long story I have written about extensively elsewhere and won't repeat here.)  However, a lot of legislative water has passed under the bridge since then.  In 1996, Congress expressly considered the three-way choice of de novo review, no review, or deferential review and chose the latter.  I don't think it is up to the judiciary to alter that choice, particularly not on a state-by-state or circuit-by-circuit basis.

Politically, I don't think it would be wise to bring the matter up in Congress at all at this time.  The final product could easily move us in the wrong direction.
Without dissent, the United States Supreme Court has once again summarily reversed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  "Summarily" means the error was so obvious that the high court could reverse on the state's petition alone, without setting the case for full briefing and argument.

The rule in the federal courts and every state is that a criminal defendant who can make a claim on his initial appeal on the trial record must do so or lose it.  He can't wait for a subsequent "collateral" attack (habeas corpus or a substitute for it) to make such a claim.  The technical term for rules such as this is "procedural default," but it may be more easily understood as the "speak now or forever hold your peace rule."  There are generally exceptions to mitigate the harshness of these rules.  For example, a strong showing of actual innocence of the crime is an exception in both federal and California courts.

When a state prisoner has completed his state appeals and seeks relief in federal courts, Supreme Court precedent has long required the federal court to respect the state's procedural default rules.  For many years, the Ninth Circuit has evaded this requirement for California prisoners by blithely declaring the state's rules "inadequate."  In 2011, the Supreme Court reversed one such evasion in Walker v. Martin, a unanimous opinion by Justice Ginsburg.  The language was broad enough to fully restore California's rules and we thought that battle was won.  Astonishingly, the Ninth Circuit brushed Martin aside, held that it only applied to the kind of rule specifically at issue in that case, and declared that it did not apply to California's much more common default-on-appeal rule described in the previous paragraph. 

I thought that was a shocking -- and intentional -- evasion of controlling Supreme Court precedent by a lower court that simply did not like the result.

Today we learned that the Supreme Court thinks so, too.

Reversal in an Ugly Batson Case

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When cases with ugly facts reach the U.S. Supreme Court, they sometimes cause damage that lasts a very long time.  Foster v. Chatman, No. 14-8349, decided this morning, is a case with ugly facts.  How much damage it will do to states seeking to preserve their judgments in other cases where the defendant's collateral attack is much weaker remains to be seen.

At the root of this case is a horrible crime, with no real doubt that Foster committed it.  Not only did he confess, but the victim's possessions were recovered from his home and from the homes of his sisters, to whom he had doled out some of the loot.

Until 1986, there was no constitutional prohibition against the prosecution taking race into account in exercising its peremptory challenges in jury selection in individual cases, although a pattern of such use that had the effect of excluding black veniremen from jury service overall was actionable.  That changed when the Supreme Court decided Batson v. Kentucky.  The Foster case was tried only four months later.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided six cases today.  Only one summary disposition involves criminal law.

Kernan v. Hinojas, No. 15-833, is a Ninth Circuit habeas corpus case involving that court's failure to give deference to the California Supreme Court's summary denial of an original petition in that court.  This is an area the high court has gotten into several times, and to some extent it is specific to California's odd system of original habeas petitions in reviewing courts, so I won't go into detail here.

In the "curious incident of non-barking dogs" department, the certiorari petition in Johnson v. Lee, No. 15-789 was on the conference list Thursday but was absent from today's orders list.  The online docket now shows it to be on the list for this coming Thursday, the fourth conference for this case.

The case involves the Ninth Circuit's brushing aside of California's rule (similar to those nearly all states and the federal courts) that a claim that could have been made on appeal and wasn't is forfeited.  This number of "relists" is a possible indication that the Supreme Court is going to reverse summarily, and it is trying to agree on an opinion.  A certain notorious wascally wabbit suggested that course of action would be appropriate in this case.
The U.S. Supreme Court issued two criminal law decisions this week, neither of which is surprising or particularly controversial.

Monday, the Court decided Welch v. United States, No. 15-6418:

Last Term, this Court decided Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. ___ (2015). Johnson considered the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court held that provision void for vagueness. The present case asks whether Johnson is a substantive decision that is retroactive in cases on collateral review.
Answer: Yes.

Today, the Court decided Molina-Martinez v. United States, No. 14-8913, regarding what to do on appeal when the trial court messes up on the often complex Federal Sentencing Guidelines and nobody notices until the appeal.  The Court disapproved the Fifth Circuit's requirement that the defendant "must identify 'additional evidence' to show that the use of the incorrect Guidelines range did in fact affect his sentence."

USCA6 Summarily Reversed Yet Again

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The "massive resistance" of some federal judges (particularly in circuits divisible by 3) continues, and today the U.S. Supreme Court found it necessary once again to summarily reverse a decision of Sixth Circuit for brazenly exceeding the limits Congress has placed on its authority.

In 1996, Congress decided that the opinion of the lower federal courts on disputed questions of federal law was really not more reliable than the opinions of the state courts.  Too many correct judgments were being wrongly overturned, and the Supreme Court could not correct all the errors.  Yet Congress was not willing to let go of the safety valve of federal habeas corpus review of state convictions altogether.  The compromise was that federal courts could overturn a state conviction based on a claim rejected on the merits by the state courts if the state court decision was clearly wrong, beyond the bounds of reasonable disagreement.  If the issue is arguable, the state court decision stands.

Many federal judges are unwilling to let go of their prerogative to substitute their opinions for those of state judges on close questions, and they regularly violate the law governing the limits of their authority in order to "correct" what they see as violations of other rules of law.  The highest-profile incidents tend to be in capital cases, but it occurs in noncapital cases as well, and that brings us to today's Supreme Court decision in Woods v. Etherton, No. 15-723.
This morning we won a major victory in the fight to have capital cases concluded within a reasonable time.  In Habeas Corpus Resource Center v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, No. 14-16928, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated an injunction issued by U.S. District Judge Claudia Wilken and put the "fast track" process back on track.
Two months ago, I denounced an NYT hatchet job misrepresenting one of the cases Cruz handled in the Supreme Court when he was Texas Solicitor General.  Now we have this article by Jonathan Mahler. 

This time the focus is on the case of José Medellín, one of the perpetrators of one of the most horrific gang-rape murders in the history of Houston.  I know a lot about this case.  I wrote three briefs in it before we finally delivered this scum-of-the-earth his just deserts.  Cruz rightly touts his role in this effort as a major accomplishment, but Mahler views it through the Times's partisan, polarized "all the news that fits our agenda" lens.

As with the previous post, let me note that CJLF takes no position in the Republican primary and endorses no candidate.  We care about the truth.  It is painfully evident that Mahler and the NYT do not. 
The U.S. Supreme Court today made Miller v. Alabama fully retroactive to all cases, no matter how old.  States that had mandatory life-without-parole for 17-year-old murderers must now either hold new sentencing hearings or make them eligible for parole, the Court said in Montgomery v. Louisiana.  It characterized the Miller rule as a "substantive" rule for retroactivity purposes.  Families of victims of juvenile murderers who adamantly oppose release therefore receive life sentences of appearing at parole hearings and reliving their tragedies. That result is disappointing but not unexpected.  CJLF's brief is here.

Also, the Court said that it had jurisdiction to review a state collateral review decision for retroactivity.  In essence, the federal rule of Teague v. Lane provides a floor (Montgomery) but not a ceiling (Danforth v. Minnesota) on retroactivity in state collateral review proceedings.  I don't have a problem with that part and didn't brief the point.  This is one more reason for states to adopt Teague for their own systems.  No point giving convicts the "head I win, tails we take it over" that results from dual standards.

An NYT Hatchet Job on Ted Cruz

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David Brooks has this column in the NYT on Ted Cruz, and it can only be described as a hatchet job.  CJLF does not endorse candidates and takes no position on the Republican primary.*  However, I do think we should correct misrepresentations about the candidates when they fall within our area of expertise.
The U.S. Supreme Court today took up for full briefing and argument the case of Welch v. United States, No. 15-6418

This case began in the Southern District of Florida, where the defendant filed a motion to vacate (28 U.S.C. §2255) his conviction and his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act.  The District Court denied the motion and denied a certificate of appealability (COA).  Welch sought a COA from the Court of Appeals, arguing that his plea was involuntary because the government "reneged" on his 10-year deal, and he got 15 to life instead.  He also claimed his Florida priors were invalid.

In a supplemental application, he asked for the case to be held for the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, No. 13-7120.  The Eleventh Circuit did not hold it and denied Welch's application June 9, 2015.  The Supreme Court decided Johnson on June 26 and struck down the "residual clause" of the ACCA as unconstitutionally vague.

Curious that this is a grant for full briefing and argument and not a "vacate and remand for reconsideration in light of" Johnson.  The certiorari papers are not available online yet.

Does Johnson qualify for the "first Teague exception," making it retroactive on collateral review?  Yes, I think so.  The substantive statute was declared unconstitutional.  It is not a rule of procedure.

Update:  Lyle Denniston had this post yesterday at SCOTUSblog on another case presenting an issue of Johnson retroactivity, where the Solicitor General agreed that the Court should take the issue up.  If that is why the Court has taken Welch, then I can predict what will happen.  The Court will appoint an amicus to argue against retroactivity.  The amicus will get a footnote in the opinion praising his her efforts and a unanimous ruling against him her.

Update 2 (1/15):  Helgi C. Walker of Gibson Dunn has been "invited to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below."

Summary Reversal on Excusing Jurors

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The U.S. Supreme Court has once again summarily reversed a federal court of appeals for failure to obey Congress's landmark reform of habeas corpus law in 1996.  Once again, it is a capital case in a circuit divisible by 3.

Because juries in the penalty phase of capital cases must be unanimous, it is particularly important to remove from the jury those members of the venire who will not actually weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstance but instead will automatically vote against the death penalty no matter what.  This is particularly important in states which stupidly do not require the jury to deliberate to unanimity one way or the other but instead allow a single holdout juror to veto the decision of the other eleven.

People often do not state their views straightforwardly.  Sometimes they are dishonest, but more often they just haven't thought them all the way through themselves.  Determining which jurors are "Witherspoon/Witt" excludable therefore involves some judgment.  The trial judge, who sees the venire members live and in full context, is entitled to considerable deference in making this judgment.  However, anti-death-penalty judges who are just itching to overturn a death sentence regardless of how richly deserved it may be find jury selection to be a fertile source of excuses to nullify a law they disagree with.  To forbid such misuse of the law and limit the lower federal courts' power to overturn state decisions to cases of clear error, Congress enacted the "deference" provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.  Federal district and circuit judges who regard themselves as infinitely superior to state supreme court justices hate this law and regularly ignore its mandate.  This is particularly common in the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits.  Reversing them has become a significant part of the Supreme Court's workload.

In today's decision in White v. Wheeler, the Court includes the following admonition without dissent:

As a final matter, this Court again advises the Court of Appeals that the provisions of AEDPA apply with full force even when reviewing a conviction and sentence imposing the death penalty.
The fact that it is necessary for the high court to so admonish the federal appellate courts is a sad commentary on the state of our judiciary.  Judges who cannot or will not decide capital cases fairly should not sit on them.  They should be excludable just like the jurors.  If they will not recuse themselves, perhaps it is time to establish a challenge for cause.  How about a rule that a federal court of appeals judge who is three times reversed by the Supreme Court for failure to obey AEDPA in a capital case will sit on no more capital cases?

Jonathan Adler has this post at the Volokh Conspiracy.

Equitable Tolling

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The current argument session of the U.S. Supreme Court is pretty thin on criminal law.  There is one federal case involving some narrow issues, Musacchio v. United States, No. 14-1095, argued Monday.

Supreme Court decisions in civil cases may affect criminal and habeas cases, though.  That is particularly true of habeas, which is technically a civil case.  Yesterday the high court heard argument in a case involving equitable tolling of statutes of limitation, and the main precedent being discussed was Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010), a capital habeas case (and one of my losses).

Habeas practitioners may want to keep an eye out for the decision in Menominee Tribe of Wis. v. United States, No. 14-510.  Perhaps it will shed some light on "extraordinary circumstances."  SCOTUSblog's case page is here. Ronald Mann has this report on the oral argument and thinks it looks grim for the tribe (and, therefore, good for the government).

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