Recently in Juveniles Category

Tomorrow the U.S. Supreme Court will hear the case of the younger of the D.C. Sniper pair, Lee Boyd Malvo. The case is Mathena v. Malvo, No. 18-217.CJLF's amicus brief in the case is here. Our press release is here.

Proposition 57, passed by California voters in November 2016, mandated that all allegations of criminal conduct against a minor (under age 18) must be initiated in juvenile court.  Pre-Proposition 57, minors ages 14+ could be tried in adult court in 1 of 3 ways: (1) statutory waiver; (2) prosecutorial waiver; or (3) judicial waiver.  Proposition 57 eliminated options 1 and 2.  In early 2018, the California Supreme Court held that Proposition 57 applied retroactively to all cases that were not final at the time of its enactment.  (See my post here for more details).

Alexander Cervantes was 14 years old when he was directly charged as an adult for committing horrific sex crimes against a 13-year-old girl.  Cervantes was convicted by a jury and his case was pending on appeal when Proposition 57 passed.  (CJLF filed a brief in his case arguing that Prop 57 should not be applied retroactively).  He benefited from the Proposition's retroactivity and his case was sent back to the juvenile court so that a judge could decide if his case should stay there or be transferred to adult court.  However, while his transfer hearing was pending, former California Governor Jerry Brown signed SB 1391.  SB 1391 "repeal[ed] the authority of a District Attorney to make a motion to transfer" 14- and 15-year-old offenders from juvenile court to adult court.  There is an odd exception in the law for 14- and 15-year-olds who "were not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction."  SB 1391 went into effect on 1/1/19.  In a nutshell, 14- and 15-year-old criminals must stay and be tried in juvenile court and in no way can a judge decide if he or she should be transferred to adult court.  This is true regardless of the crime committed.    

In California, 14- and 15-year-old psychopathic killers will no longer be "punished" as adults, condemned death row inmates will not be put to death, and sanctuary city policies prevent local law enforcement agencies from working with ICE to prohibit the release of violent criminal illegal aliens back into the communities. Did California law makers secretly convene and vote to make California the location of a reality show adaptation of the "Purge" movies?  (Quick movie summary: Once a year, Americans are given a 12-hour window in which anyone can commit any crime without facing any criminal charges.)

Daniel Marsh, who openly expressed his desire to kill, was 15 years old when he viciously stabbed and mutilated a randomly selected elderly couple as they slept in their Davis, California, home.  "By his own admission his main objective was to remain undetected and to become a serial Killer."  SB 1391, signed by former Governor Jerry Brown on Sept. 30, 2018, became law on January 1, 2019.  Under this new law, no 14 or 15 year old can ever be tried as an adult.  All crimes, including first-degree murder, committed by a 14 or 15 year old must be adjudicated in juvenile court.  The California juvenile justice system is designed to "rehabilitate" minors, not punish them.  The sanctions imposed upon a minor do not "include retribution."  (W&I Code §202(e)).  In fact, according to California law makers, "When the minor is no longer a ward of the juvenile court, the guidance he or she received should enable him or her to be a law-abiding and productive member of his or her family and the community." (W&I Code §202(b)). 

Note how the calls for individualized consideration switch on and off depending on which way the default rule falls. In capital sentencing, sentencing of juveniles, and transfer of juveniles to adult court, we are first told that consideration of individual circumstances is essential to justice -- when the alternative is the harsher option -- and then we are told that a bright-line rule is essential when that line is drawn on the more lenient side.

Scientific studies show that adolescent brains are in flux, still building themselves well into adulthood, right?  That certainly is the story we have heard over and over again.  And it is true that existing studies show that the fatty coating of neurons changes during childhood and adolescence (never mind that the relevance of that is unclear when it comes to ascriptions of legal or moral responsibility).  But what is scientific fact today may not be the fact of tomorrow. 

A new study in the journal Nature strongly suggests that the formation of new neurons does not occur in adulthood and probably ends in childhood:

New neurons continue to be generated in the subgranular zone of the dentate gyrus of the adult mammalian hippocampus. This process has been linked to learning and memory, stress and exercise, and is thought to be altered in neurological disease. In humans, some studies have suggested that hundreds of new neurons are added to the adult dentate gyrus every day, whereas other studies find many fewer putative new neurons. Despite these discrepancies, it is generally believed that the adult human hippocampus continues to generate new neurons. Here we show that a defined population of progenitor cells does not coalesce in the subgranular zone during human fetal or postnatal development. We also find that the number of proliferating progenitors and young neurons in the dentate gyrus declines sharply during the first year of life and only a few isolated young neurons are observed by 7 and 13 years of age...

I've written about juveniles and Prop 57 a few times this year.  Here I discussed the case of People v Lara, in which the California Supreme Court ruled that Prop 57 applies retroactively to all non-final cases that had been directly filed in adult court.  In that post I wrote:  "Proposition 57 is retroactive to all non-final cases.  What does this mean?  It means that the ramifications of Proposition 57 continue to get worse.  It also means that the court invited the opportunity for monsters like Daniel Marsh to seek a hearing in juvenile court because his case is 'not final.'"

Well, I was right.  On February 22nd, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District conditionally reversed Daniel Marsh's 2013 double murder conviction.  He is to be returned to Yolo County and a transfer hearing will be set in the juvenile court. If, however, the juvenile court finds that Marsh is more suitable for adult court, his original conviction and sentence will be reinstated.

This morning, the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Superior Court (Lara) (S241231).  The issue was whether Proposition 57 applies retroactively to juvenile cases that had been directly filed in adult court prior to it being passed in the November 2016 election.  In addition to permitting the release of inmates who commit "non-violent" offenses, Proposition 57 mandates that all allegations of criminal conduct against a minor (individuals under age 18) must be initiated in juvenile court.  In other words, a delinquent minor can no longer have charges directly filed against him or her in adult court.  All cases, regardless of the severity of the crime, must be initiated in juvenile court.  If a minor (age 14+) commits certain enumerated crimes (such as murder or certain sex offenses), a prosecutor can file a motion for a "transfer hearing" which requires the juvenile court to evaluate factors such as the minor's maturity level, degree of criminal sophistication, prior delinquent history, and whether the minor is capable of rehabilitation.  If, based on those factors, the juvenile court concludes that the minor should be tried as an adult, the case can be transferred to adult court and all proceedings from that point on occur as if the minor is an adult.

Prior to Proposition 57, minors age 14 or older who committed certain serious crimes could be tried in adult court in one of three ways: (1) statutory waiver - mandatory direct file in adult court; (2) prosecutorial waiver - discretionary direct file by the District Attorney; or (3) judicial waiver - upon motion, juvenile court had authority to transfer the case to adult court after holding a "fitness hearing."  Proposition 57 eliminated statutory and prosecutorial waiver.  

When the U.S. Supreme Court struck down capital punishment for 17-year-old murderers, it assured the country that the penalty of life in prison without possibility of parole would remain available.  It did not take too long for the high court to default on that promise, casting doubt on existing sentences of LWOP and making it much too difficult to impose new LWOP sentences for crimes that really warrant death.

To say that a life sentence is constantly subject to reexamination is effectively sentencing the victims' families to life of opposing the reduction, constantly having to reopen the old wounds.  It is cruel in the extreme.

If there is one murderer in the whole country who was 17 at the time of crime and who definitely does not deserve reconsideration, it is Lee Boyd Malvo, the triggerman in the horrible D.C. Sniper shootings that terrorized the capital region in 2002.  Incredibly, a federal court has ruled that he is entitled to resentencing.

Yesterday the Washington Supreme Court decided In the Matter of the Detention of Troy Belcher, No. 93900-4:

In 2011, at the age of 26, Troy Belcher was civilly committed as a sexually violent predator. In 2015, the superior court ordered that he continue to be indefinitely committed. It based its decision on two sexually violent crimes he perpetrated as a juvenile, a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder with high levels of psychopathy, and a finding that he was more likely than not to recommit if released.

As noted by Doug Berman at SL&P, yesterday the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided the case of Pennsylvania v. Batts, No. 45 MAP 2016 (Pa. June 26, 2017). The court held that under the precepts of Miller v. Alabama and the Supreme Court's evolving Eighth Amendment juvenile jurisprudence, adolescents convicted of murder are entitled to a presumption of a sentence that includes parole. 

The Batts case is interesting reading on a number of fronts.  The court construes the Miller rule of permanent incorrigibility to be a finding that "there is no possibility that the offender could be rehabilitated at any point later in his life, no matter how much time he spends in prison and regardless of the amount of therapeutic interventions he receives, and that the crime committed reflects the juvenile's true and unchangeable personality and character."  If the rule is going to be the sky's the limit on possible interventions and the state must show no possibility of change whatsoever during a defendant's life, then this is a ruling that proscribes juvenile LWOP sentences outright.   It is also interesting to think of a sentencing decision based largely on a defendant's personality rather than his conduct (even more so given the Supreme Court's recent cert denial in Loomis v. Wisconsin).