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Irrespective of the debates about culpability and psychopathy, the noted traits of the psychopath - the glibness, lack of remorse, irresponsibility - speak volumes about the type of folks given the psychopathic label. And while merely reading a court opinion in no way makes a diagnosis, the case of O'Kelly v. State (#S08PO916) provides a chilling account of someone likely deserving of that label:

From the Ninth Circuit today, Humphries v. LA Co., No. 05-56467:

Appellants Craig and Wendy Humphries ..., [a]ccused of abuse by a rebellious child, ... were arrested, and had their other children taken away from them....

Notwithstanding the findings of two California courts that the Humphries were “factully innocent” and the charges “not true,” the Humphries were identified as “substantiated” child abusers and placed on California’s Child Abuse Central Index (“the CACI”), a database of known or suspected child abusers. As the Humphries quickly learned, California offers no procedure to remove their listing on the database as suspected child abusers, and thus no opportunity to clear their names.

This case presents the question of whether California’s maintenance of the CACI violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because identified individuals are not given a fair opportunity to challenge the allegations against them. We hold that it does.

The opinion is by Judge Bybee with Judge Milan Smith and District Judge Richard Mills concurring.

Today, Cal. Supreme decided In re Charlisse C., S152822. This is a dependency case, but it has implications for criminal cases, such as a case where the public defender represents the defendant and has previously represented a witness for the prosecution. The court discusses the difference between concurrent and successive representation of conflicting interests. It also discusses the agency's division of itself into separate units and when the units are separate enough to avoid the problem.

A little over a year ago, we noted the case of Jesus Jihad, formerly Jesse Crisp, who committed murder in 1973, was let out, committed rape in 1993, got out, and then killed again. He stabbed his wife to death and also wounded her 15-year-old son and her sister. Today in Oakland, California, he was sentenced to life without parole, reports Henry Lee of the SF Chron. That will sharply limit the targets of any more crimes of violence, but not eliminate the possibility altogether.

On Monday, the California Supreme Court will announce its decision in the case of People v. Concepcion, S146288:

This case presents the following issues: (1) Is a defendant who escapes from custody after trial commences voluntarily absent from trial, permitting trial to continue in his absence once he is rearrested and held in custody? (2) If such flight and rearrest does not constitute voluntary absence, is proceeding with trial in such circumstances subject to harmless error analysis, or is it a structural error requiring reversal?

The Court of Appeal opinion is here. The defendant had fled far enough before he was recaptured that he could not be brought back to attend without delaying the trial.

Update 10/27. The Cal. Supreme opinion (6-1-0) is here.

A divided Court of Appeal reversed, reasoning that “[defendant’s] absence ceased to be voluntary once he was returned to custody.”

To the contrary, we hold that an escapee’s voluntary absence includes the time reasonably required to return him to court after apprehension.

The U.S. Supreme Court has asked for additional briefing on the rehearing petition in the capital child rape case decided in June, Kennedy v. Louisiana. This is most unusual. Rehearing petitions in cases decided after full briefing and argument are usually exercises in futility. But this is an unusual case. Jess Bravin has this story in the WSJ. Lyle Denniston has this post at SCOTUSblog.

I expect that after the supplemental briefing we will see an order denying rehearing and explaining that the previously overlooked military statute does not change the Court's conclusion as to the Louisiana law. It will be interesting to see what they say about whether their decision applies to the military. As noted earlier on this blog, the Court has never expressly said whether the whole Furman line, of which Kennedy is a part, applies to the military at all.

The Ninth Circuit en banc today decided Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival, No. 05-15725:

We must decide whether guests at the Gilroy Garlic Festival can hold the City of Gilroy in California and the Gilroy Garlic Festival Association liable in a civil rights action when they are escorted from the event by a City police officer for violating the Festival’s dress code.

The dress code was a prohibition of “gang colors or other demonstrative insignia, including motorcycle club insignia,” deemed to be violated by the Top Hatters' “image of a skull with wings and a top hat.”

The answer to the question posed above is no, because (1) the Gilroy Garlic Festival Association is a private entity, not a state actor, and they can have a dress code if they like, and (2) the city did not violate the Constitution by having one of its police officers escort people off the grounds, thereby enforcing a private entity's right to have its dress code.

Fortunately, the Garlic case does not involve the overbreath doctrine.