This is a federal civil suit by the "motorist" against the police officer who stopped him. The officer's motion for summary judgment, i.e., a decision in his favor without a trial, is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Under subdivision (c), the motion is granted if the affidavits and other stuff "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

The rule is usually stated, as the 11th did here, that the facts are "[v]iewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant," in this case the plaintiff. See Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807, 810 (CA 11, 2005). So viewed, "The use of deadly force is not 'reasonable' in a high-speed chase based only on a speeding violation and traffic infractions where there was little, if any, actual threat to pedestrians or other motorists, as the roads were mostly empty...." Id., at 815.

There is just one minor problem. The videotape shows beyond reasonable question that the non-movant is a shameless, bald-faced liar. The road was far from empty.  There were many cars coming the other direction, and this reckless fool passed multiple cars going his direction under conditions that would be illegal and dangerous even at normal speeds in broad daylight, not to mention at high speed at night. Today's opinion holds that such assertions, blatantly contradicting irrefutable evidence, do not raise a genuine issue of fact for the purpose of Rule 56(c). Robert Barnes has this story on the case in the Washington Post.

This case illustrates the value of video recording in police work. With video recording equipment vastly cheaper and more compact than in the past, the resources spent putting cameras in the locations where disputed events are most likely to occur, including cars and interrogation rooms, are well invested.

In America, anyone can sue anyone for anything. Summary judgment is often the procedure for getting rid of baseless claims. One problem is that it is often not summary enough. The expense of litigating a case to the point where a judge will grant summary judgment can be crushing for an individual and a substantial expense for an organization or municipality. For civil rights cases, at least, it is high time to reconsider the asymmetric rule on awards of attorneys' fees. Although the law has special solicitude for victims of civil rights violations, not all civil rights plaintiffs are victims. At the very least, where the evidence shows clearly that the plaintiff has just flat-out lied to make his claim, judges should award attorneys' fees to falsely accused defendants every bit as readily as they do to plaintiffs with valid claims.