Recently in Evidence Category

Amy Marcus reports in the WSJ on the use of the popular DNA tests and online genealogy databases to solve crimes. With a crime-scene sample known to be from the perpetrator, it is sometimes possible to find relatives, focusing the investigation. The best known success of this technique was the capture of the Golden State Killer here in Sacramento, California. Solving that crime brought enormous relief to many people who had been so sadistically victimized by this monster.

¶2 Gerald Mitchell was convicted of operating while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol concentration, based on the test of blood drawn without a warrant while he was unconscious, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(b) (2013-14). Mitchell contends that the blood draw was a search conducted in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

¶3 We conclude that Mitchell voluntarily consented to a blood draw by his conduct of driving on Wisconsin's roads and drinking to a point evidencing probable cause of intoxication. Further, through drinking to the point of unconsciousness, Mitchell forfeited all opportunity, including the statutory opportunity under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4), to withdraw his consent previously given; and therefore, § 343.305(3)(b) applied, which under the totality of circumstances herein presented reasonably permitted drawing Mitchell's blood. Accordingly, we affirm Mitchell's convictions.

Jonathan Turley of GWU Law has this article in The Hill on Nellie Ohr's invocation of the spousal privilege and the implications of a broad interpretation of that privilege.

Juaquin Garcia Soto was drunk and high on methamphetamine when he kicked in Israel Ramirez's apartment door and stabbed him to death in front of his girlfriend and young son.  Soto was charged with first degree murder and first degree burglary.

In California, a murder conviction requires a finding of express or implied malice.  Express malice requires intent to kill "unlawfully," while implied does not.  California Penal Code section 29.4 permits evidence of voluntary intoxication on the issue of whether a defendant "harbored express malice."

At trial, Soto claimed "imperfect" self-defense, which is the actual, but unreasonable, belief that acting in self-defense was necessary.  A successful imperfect self-defense claim will result in voluntary manslaughter because "one who holds an honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury does not harbor malice and commits no greater offense than manslaughter."

One controversial use of DNA databases created by law enforcement involves searching the database for people's whose DNA is close to that of an unknown sample, indicating that they might be close relatives of a perpetrator who is not in the database.

The notorious East Area Rapist case in California was cracked by a new twist on that strategy.  Rather than law enforcement databases, the leads came from family members who voluntarily sent their DNA in to commercial testing organizations for genealogical purposes.  These matches were only leads to identify a possible suspect.  The suspect was actually nailed through DNA-bearing material he discarded.  Sam Stanton has this story for the Sacramento Bee.

So far the suspect has only been charged with murders, not rapes.  There is a statute of limitations problem.  See this story by Ryan Lillis in the SacBee.

Rory Little has this post at SCOTUSblog on yesterday's argument in City of Hays v. Vogt.  The case involves the use at a preliminary proceeding, not a trial, of a statement a former police officer was required to make.  Is that a Fifth Amendment violation for which he can sue the city?

But there are complications that make the case a problematic "vehicle" to address that question.  One thing just coming out now is that Vogt may not have made any objection to the introduction of the evidence.  That is important.  Generally, any objection to evidence not made at the time of introduction is forfeited.

Today the U.S. Supreme Court announced the short list of cases it decided to take up during its end-of-summer Long Conference on Monday.  The long list of cases not taken up (meaning the lower court decision stands) will be announced when the Court opens its new term on the First Monday in October.

Criminal cases include several Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims, one on the "plain error" standard of review on appeal, and one on military commissions.

Today's theme out of the United States Supreme Court is materiality.  If you describe what happened in a case and people look puzzled and ask "So what?" you have a materiality issue.

Maslenjak v. United States, No. 16-309, involves the crime of lying in the naturalization process.  It is error to instruct the jury that they can convict on finding a false statement without also finding that the falsity somehow contributed to the decision.

Turner v. United States, 15-1503, involves the rule of Brady v. Maryland that prosecutors must turn over to the defense any material exculpatory evidence in their possession.  "Material" in this context means a reasonable probability it would have made a difference in the result.  The Court holds 6-2 that the evidence in this case was not material.

Weaver v. Massachusetts, No. 16-240, involves a claim that the defendant's trial lawyer was ineffective for failure to object to the exclusion of the public (including the defendant's mother) from an overcrowded courtroom during jury selection.  Violation of the public trial right is a "structural error," reversible without any showing that it mattered, but that claim was forfeited by failure to object.  Ineffective assistance of counsel is reversible only upon a showing of "prejudice" which means the same thing as "materiality" in the Brady context, i.e., a reasonable probability it made a difference.  The Court held that the prejudice requirement continues to apply even when the underlying error is "structural," or at least this particular subspecies of structural errors, and no prejudice has been shown here.

Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court.  Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion.  Justice Alito wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment.  Justice Gorsuch joined all three.  Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Kagan.  CJLF filed an amicus brief in this case, written by Kym Stapleton.

This morning, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case of Carpenter v. United States (16-402).  The issue is whether the warrantless search and seizure of cell phone records that detail the location and movement of the cell phone user over a period of time is permitted by the Fourth Amendment.

Byron Tau reports for the WSJ:

Former national security adviser Mike Flynn will decline to cooperate with a Senate subpoena, invoking his constitutional right against self incrimination and setting off a legal showdown with Congress over a key witness in its investigation of alleged Russian interference in the 2016 election.

According to a person close to him, Mr. Flynn planed to tell the Senate Intelligence Committee later on Monday that he won't comply with the panel's request for documents, citing the Fifth Amendment's protections against self incrimination. Mr. Flynn is expected to inform the committee of his decision in a letter, through a representative.

In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Supreme Court held that breath tests, but not blood tests, may be administered without a warrant as a search incident to lawful arrest for drunk driving.  The Court also held that motorists may not be criminally punished for refusing to submit to a blood test on the basis of legally implied consent.  In Missouri v. McNeely, a plurality of the Court held that the natural dissipation of alcohol in a motorist's blood stream alone does not create a per se exigency that would justify a non-consensual blood draw without a warrant.

Criminal Justice Legal Foundation filed a brief in a companion case to Birchfield arguing that a motorist's statutorily implied consent to submit to a search of his or her breath, blood, or urine after lawful arrest for suspicion of DUI falls within the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.  We argued that requiring all law enforcement officers to secure a warrant after lawful arrest is impractical due to the vast differences in resources in some jurisdictions.  We also argued that it was reasonable for a state to mandate consent as an alternative to a warrant as a condition of using its public roadways.  The public's interest in protecting innocent people and keeping drunkards off the roads is significant in comparison to the privacy interests of an arrested motorist who made the choice to drink and drive.

Last week, the high Court's jurisprudence tied the hands of law enforcement and hindered prosecutors from obtaining probative evidence of blood alcohol concentration levels in at least two incidences.

You know it will be a bad day when you are arguing for the defendant in the Supreme Court and the Chief Justice quotes Professor Wayne LaFave on point against your argument.  LaFave is the author of three leading treatises on criminal law and is consistently pro-defendant on virtually all debatable questions.  So when the CJ cited him in the argument in McWilliams v. Dunn this morning, advocate Stephen Bright could do little more than stammer out a response of the "even Homer nods" variety.  See p. 13.

The underlying question is whether a defendant with a mental claim is entitled to an appointed, state-paid expert who is a partisan member of the defense team or whether a court's appointment of a neutral expert to examine the defendant and report to both sides meets the requirement of the high court's 1985 precedent in Ake v. Oklahoma.* 

Further, because this case was decided on the merits by the state courts and is now on federal habeas corpus review, the threshold question is whether the answer to the above question was "clearly established" in the defendant's favor back when the Oklahoma court decided it.  That is an easier question.  No.

The State of Texas seized $201,100 that Lisa Leonard said was from the sale of her home and the State said was drug money.  The trial court found the latter by the preponderance of the evidence, and the State kept the money.

Is preponderance good enough?  Forfeiture exists in the twilight zone between civil and criminal law, and an argument can be made that a higher burden is required.  Justice Thomas discusses the question in his statement today in Leonard v. Texas, No. 16-122.  So does Justice Thomas think the Court should take this case up?  No:

Unfortunately, petitioner raises her due process arguments for the first time in this Court.  As a result, the Texas Court of Appeals lacked the opportunity to address them in the first instance. I therefore concur in the denial of certiorari. Whether this Court's treatment of the broad modern forfeiture practice can be justified by the narrow historical one is certainly worthy of consideration in greater detail.

So anyone defending a forfeiture action in a state with a preponderance standard needs to make the due process argument all the way up the ladder.

The U.S. Supreme Court held its conference today and took up 16 cases, 4 of which are criminal or habeas corpus cases.

Weaver v. Massachusetts, No. 16-240:  The defendant claims his lawyer was ineffective for failing to object to a closure of the courtroom during empanelment of the jury.  Violation of the right to a public trial, when considered directly, is a "structural" error that is reversible without a showing that it actually prejudiced the defendant, but an ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim requires a showing of prejudice under Strickland v. Washington.  Does IAC require a showing of prejudice when the underlying error is "structural"?  I believe Strickland is clear enough that the answer is "yes," but there is enough of a circuit split for the high court to take it up.

Maslenjak v. United States, No. 16-309, involves a question of whether revocation of naturalized citizenship in a criminal proceeding for a false statement during naturalization requires a showing of materiality.

McWilliams v. Dunn, No. 16-5294, involves a question regarding the degree of independence needed for appointed mental health experts under Ake v. Oklahoma.

Davila v. Davis, No. 16-6219, involves the continuing fallout from Martinez v. Ryan and Trevino v. Thaler.  In Coleman v. Thompson in1992, the Supreme Court limited the damage from ineffective assistance claims to prevent a never-ending spiral of every lawyer to take up a case claiming that he should be allowed to raise a new issue because the previous lawyer was ineffective in not raising it.  Coleman drew the line at direct appeal.  Ineffective assistance at trial or on direct appeal could be "cause" for raising an issue defaulted in those proceedings, but from state collateral review onward a claim would be defaulted if not raised in the proper proceeding regardless of counsel's performance.  As with other procedural default rules, a strong showing of actual innocence was an exception.