Today's decision in Schriro v. Landrigan notes, correctly in my view, that the habeas reforms of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 must be interpreted bearing in mind the purpose of Congress to shorten the very lengthy reviews of capital cases. One of the most important issues to decide in the early stages of federal habeas review is whether a redetermination of facts is required. If the state court has already found the facts and the federal court need only decide if the application of law to those facts is "reasonable," the proceeding can be considerably streamlined. Today's decision says, "Because the deferential standards prescribed by §2254 control whether to grant habeas relief, a federal court must take into account those standards in deciding whether an evidentiary hearing is appropriate."
If the case was decided on the merits by the state court and neither the factual findings nor the application of the law to those facts was unreasonable or contrary to Supreme Court precedent, the federal case is over. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d). So, what should a district court do when the state court has made a factual finding that absolutely negates the petitioner's claim? "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Proceeding with a hearing in such a case would defeat the purpose of the reform.
This principle accords with AEDPA’s acknowledged purpose of “reduc[ing] delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences.” [Citations] If district courts were required to allow federal habeas applicants to develop even the most insubstantial factual allegations in evidentiary hearings, district courts would be forced to reopen factual disputes that were conclusively resolved in the state courts. With these standards in mind, we turn to the facts of this case.
The finding by the state habeas judge (who was the original trial judge) that Landrigan waived all mitigating evidence was a stone-cold claim killer. "If Landrigan issued such an instruction [not to offer any mitigating evidence], counsel’s failure to investigate further could not have been prejudicial under Strickland." The Ninth Circuit brushed this aside with the astonishing claim that the judge had taken out of context the colloquy she had personally conducted.
If the finding of fact in this case does not preclude relitigation on federal habeas, it is hard to imagine one that would. Limiting relitigation is what AEDPA was all about.
It is disappointing that the dissent got four votes in this case. Apparently, four Justices were actually impressed with Landrigan's far-fetched psychological argument. There are enough psychologists and psychiatrists in America who are viscerally opposed to the death penalty that it is likely every inmate on death row can find one who will swear he has some kind of serious mental problem. If that were enough to brush aside all the limits Congress has placed on relitigation, then it would never be possible to have an effective death penalty. That is, of course, exactly what the opponents want. All their other arguments having failed with the American people, they seek to convince the people that reform is hopeless, and that capital punishment will forever be bogged down in endless appeals. The New Jersey Legislature might actually buy this argument. Hopefully, reforms will bear fruit in enough states to disprove the claim before any other state legislatures do.
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