In California, a murder conviction requires a finding of express or implied malice. Express malice requires intent to kill "unlawfully," while implied does not. California Penal Code section 29.4 permits evidence of voluntary intoxication on the issue of whether a defendant "harbored express malice."
At trial, Soto claimed "imperfect" self-defense, which is the actual, but unreasonable, belief that acting in self-defense was necessary. A successful imperfect self-defense claim will result in voluntary manslaughter because "one who holds an honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury does not harbor malice and commits no greater offense than manslaughter."
At trial, the court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 625
as follows:
"You may consider evidence, if any, of the defendant's voluntary intoxication only in a limited way. You may consider that evidence only in deciding whether the defendant acted with an intent to kill, or the defendant acted with deliberation and premeditation, or the defendant was unconscious when he acted. Voluntary intoxication can only negate express malice, not implied malice. You may not consider evidence of voluntary intoxication for any other purposes."
The jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder. On appeal, Soto
argued that the trial court erred when it "prohibited the jury from considering
evidence or voluntary intoxication on the question of whether he believed he
needed to act in self-defense." The
California Supreme Court disagreed with Soto and held on Monday in People v.
Soto (S236164) that evidence of voluntary intoxication is not admissible on
that issue. It held that "CALCRIM No. 625 correctly permits the jury to
consider evidence of voluntary intoxication on the question of whether
defendant intended to kill but not on the question of whether he believed he
needed to act in self-defense."
In so holding, the Court examined the legislative history and
intent of Penal Code 29.4
"It is clear what the Legislature intended to achieve when it amended [P.C. 29.4): to prohibit voluntary intoxication from being an excuse for poor judgment when someone kills . . . 'If you voluntarily choose to become intoxicated and then kill someone, you may not claim that you were so intoxicated you were unaware your victim posed no threat to you when you killed, although you may claim you were too intoxicated to intend to kill or premeditate or have the specific intent to commit some other felony."
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