Today, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion in the case Michigan v. Fisher (09-91). Justices Stevens and Sotomayor dissented. Fisher asked the Court to decide whether the Michigan Court of Appeals correctly applied the Fourth Amendment when it held that officers had not acted reasonably in entering Fisher's home without a warrant. There was some question as to whether entry might have been justified under the "emergency aid" exception to the Fourth Amendment.
On October 31, 2002, two officers arrived at Jeremy Fisher's home and found him "going crazy" inside. Fisher was screaming inside the house, throwing things, and officers found blood on the doors of the home and on the hood of the pickup outside. The officers knocked, and saw that Fisher had blood on his hand. They asked if he wanted medical attention and Fisher did not respond. Instead, Fisher swore at the officers and told them to get a search warrant. One officer decided to enter the house without the warrant. He pushed the door open and saw Fisher pointing a gun at him. He then withdrew. Fisher was subsequently charged with assault of a dangerous weapon and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
On October 31, 2002, two officers arrived at Jeremy Fisher's home and found him "going crazy" inside. Fisher was screaming inside the house, throwing things, and officers found blood on the doors of the home and on the hood of the pickup outside. The officers knocked, and saw that Fisher had blood on his hand. They asked if he wanted medical attention and Fisher did not respond. Instead, Fisher swore at the officers and told them to get a search warrant. One officer decided to enter the house without the warrant. He pushed the door open and saw Fisher pointing a gun at him. He then withdrew. Fisher was subsequently charged with assault of a dangerous weapon and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
The trial court suppressed the officer's statement that Fisher had pointed a gun at him. It concluded that the officer had violated the Fourth Amendment, and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. The Michigan Supreme Court did not disturb the lower courts findings.
Today, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that it was reasonable for the officers to enter Fisher's home, and that the Michigan courts were incorrect to find a Fourth Amendment violation. Relying on the exigency exception to the warrant rule, and Brigham City v. Stuart's recognition that "the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened..." can justify a warrantless entry, the Court found it reasonable for the officers to enter Fisher's home. It reasoned that "Officers do not need ironclad proof of 'a serious, life-threatening' injury to invoke the emergency aid exception."
Justice Stevens dissented on grounds that the state had not met its burden of proving that the officers needed to enter Fisher's home "to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury." Stevens would have deferred to the findings of the trial judge, who, after hearing one officer's testimony was "even more convinced" that entry was unlawful. Stevens' dissent faults the Court for deciding the "trial judge got it wrong" without hearing the officer's testimony. He calls this micromanaging and writes, "it is hard to see how the court is justified in micromanaging the day-to-day business of state tribunals making fact-intensive decisions of this kind." Justice Stevens was the swing vote during the period in which the Supreme Court established its micromanagement of capital sentencing decisions.
Today, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that it was reasonable for the officers to enter Fisher's home, and that the Michigan courts were incorrect to find a Fourth Amendment violation. Relying on the exigency exception to the warrant rule, and Brigham City v. Stuart's recognition that "the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened..." can justify a warrantless entry, the Court found it reasonable for the officers to enter Fisher's home. It reasoned that "Officers do not need ironclad proof of 'a serious, life-threatening' injury to invoke the emergency aid exception."
Justice Stevens dissented on grounds that the state had not met its burden of proving that the officers needed to enter Fisher's home "to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury." Stevens would have deferred to the findings of the trial judge, who, after hearing one officer's testimony was "even more convinced" that entry was unlawful. Stevens' dissent faults the Court for deciding the "trial judge got it wrong" without hearing the officer's testimony. He calls this micromanaging and writes, "it is hard to see how the court is justified in micromanaging the day-to-day business of state tribunals making fact-intensive decisions of this kind." Justice Stevens was the swing vote during the period in which the Supreme Court established its micromanagement of capital sentencing decisions.
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