In Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the civil commitment of a sexually violent predator requires some proof that a person subject to commitment has a serious difficulty in controlling his or her behavior in addition to a mental abnormality.  But does that volitional requirement apply to people adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity?  According to the 2nd Circuit's opinion in Richard S. v. Carpinello  (Docket No. 08-4197-pr., December 15, 2009) the answer is yes:

Petitioner-Appellant Richard S. appeals the July 22, 2008 denial of his petition for habeas corpus by the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Hurd, J.). Richard S. argues that the state courts unreasonably refused to apply the United States Supreme Court holding in Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002), to his case. For the reasons that follow, we hold that Crane's involuntary commitment standard applies to insanity acquittees, but that the New York courts did not unreasonably conclude that Richard S.'s continued involuntary confinement meets the requirements of the due process clause. The denial of Richard S.'s 28 petition for a writ of habeas corpus is therefore affirmed