Once the statute of limitations for an offense expires without the commencement of prosecution, prosecution for that offense is forever time-barred. (Stogner v. California (2003) 539 U.S. 607, 615-616.) As relevant here, a prosecution for an offense commences when an arrest warrant is issued and "names or describes the defendant with the same degree of particularity required for [a] complaint." ([Cal. Penal Code]§ 804, subd. (d), italics added.)  The charging and arrest provisions permit the use of a fictitious name. (§§ 959, par. (4), 815.) However, "[i]f a fictitious name is used the warrant should also contain sufficient descriptive material to indicate with reasonable particularity the identification of the person whose arrest is ordered [citation]."

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We granted review to decide (1) whether the issuance of a "John Doe" complaint or arrest warrant may timely commence a criminal action and thereby satisfy section 800's limitation period; (2) whether an unknown suspect's DNA profile satisfies the "particularity" requirement for an arrest warrant; and (3) what remedy exists, if any, for the unlawful collection of genetic material under the 1998 version of the Act.

For the reasons stated below, we conclude that, in cases in which the warrant identifies the perpetrator by his or her unique DNA profile only, the statute of limitations is satisfied if the prosecution is commenced by the filing of the "John Doe" arrest warrant within the limitations period. In reaching this conclusion, we find that an unknown suspect's unique DNA profile satisfies the "particularity" requirement for an arrest warrant. (§ 804, subd. (d).) Although defendant's blood was mistakenly collected under the Act, we conclude that the law enforcement personnel errors in this case do not trigger the exclusionary rule. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeal's judgment.