A Proposal to Reform Habeas Corpus: Yesterday, on Sentencing Law and Policy, Doug Berman posted a link to Lee Kovarsky's Cornell Law Review article, Death Ineligibility and Habeas Corpus. In his article, Kovarsky argues that the current habeas scheme limits the number of procedural claims a petitioner may litigate during habeas corpus, and is ineffective in addressing death-ineligibility claims as the Supreme Court declares categories of prisoners ineligible for the death penalty. He proposes that "in light of important distinctions between death-ineligibility challenges and the claims on which existing law is premised, the Supreme Court should reformulate habeas relief available to categories of offenders that may not be executed under the Eighth Amendment." But with current habeas procedure being partially responsive to rights established during the Warren Court, a judicially created remedy may not be the fix Kovarsky envisions. See also Kent's post on this.
Supreme Court Wants to See "Briefer Briefs": At Blog of Legal Times, Tony Mauro reports that when the new Supreme Court rules take effect on February 16, lawyers will have to keep their reply briefs at the merit stage to 6,000 words instead of the previously allowed 7,500. To explain the change, the clerk of the Court comments that the change reflects a return to the word limit allowed when the Court used page limits. Apparently, the extra words allowed lawyers to repeat previous arguments instead of addressing arguments made in the intervening briefs. Mauro cannot help himself from commenting, "In other words, lawyers have been padding their briefs."
"The Terrifying Right to Remain Silent": How Appealing's Howard Bashman links to an Associated Press news analysis by Matt Apuzzo discussing the Obama administration's decision to read Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab his Miranda rights. As with so many discussions, Apuzzo fails to cleanly distinguish between the right not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself in a criminal case, which is in the Constitution, and a "right to remain silent," which is a fabrication of the Miranda Court. The difference is important when it comes to interrogating a person for reasons other than criminal prosecution, such as learning what he knows about people whose mission is to kill every American they can anywhere in the world.
Justice Kennedy's Swing Vote in Race Cases: As a part of SCOTUSblog's Race and the Supreme Court program, Yale Law Professor Heather Gerken posts a piece on "Justice Kennedy's Emerging View on Race." Gerken's piece does not tackle the Justice's view on race and crime (it focuses on equal protection cases) but the piece does offer some insight into how Justice Kennedy approaches a race related issue. Gerken writes that when the Justice has had to address voting-rights claims, or desegregation cases, he focuses on "values he otherwise associates with each domain." For example, because "Kennedy has long thought of schools as institutions for teaching students to be citizens, ... now he sees that those lessons extend to interracial relations." Gerken has also recently commented on Citizens United v. FEC during testimony before the Senate Committee on Rules & Administration. According to this ACS post, Gerken believes the decision helped dismantle campaign finance rules designed to protect the democratic process and urged urged Congress to "protect U.S. elections from foreign influence."
Supreme Court Wants to See "Briefer Briefs": At Blog of Legal Times, Tony Mauro reports that when the new Supreme Court rules take effect on February 16, lawyers will have to keep their reply briefs at the merit stage to 6,000 words instead of the previously allowed 7,500. To explain the change, the clerk of the Court comments that the change reflects a return to the word limit allowed when the Court used page limits. Apparently, the extra words allowed lawyers to repeat previous arguments instead of addressing arguments made in the intervening briefs. Mauro cannot help himself from commenting, "In other words, lawyers have been padding their briefs."
"The Terrifying Right to Remain Silent": How Appealing's Howard Bashman links to an Associated Press news analysis by Matt Apuzzo discussing the Obama administration's decision to read Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab his Miranda rights. As with so many discussions, Apuzzo fails to cleanly distinguish between the right not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself in a criminal case, which is in the Constitution, and a "right to remain silent," which is a fabrication of the Miranda Court. The difference is important when it comes to interrogating a person for reasons other than criminal prosecution, such as learning what he knows about people whose mission is to kill every American they can anywhere in the world.
Justice Kennedy's Swing Vote in Race Cases: As a part of SCOTUSblog's Race and the Supreme Court program, Yale Law Professor Heather Gerken posts a piece on "Justice Kennedy's Emerging View on Race." Gerken's piece does not tackle the Justice's view on race and crime (it focuses on equal protection cases) but the piece does offer some insight into how Justice Kennedy approaches a race related issue. Gerken writes that when the Justice has had to address voting-rights claims, or desegregation cases, he focuses on "values he otherwise associates with each domain." For example, because "Kennedy has long thought of schools as institutions for teaching students to be citizens, ... now he sees that those lessons extend to interracial relations." Gerken has also recently commented on Citizens United v. FEC during testimony before the Senate Committee on Rules & Administration. According to this ACS post, Gerken believes the decision helped dismantle campaign finance rules designed to protect the democratic process and urged urged Congress to "protect U.S. elections from foreign influence."
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