Last Thursday, in an opinion authored by Justice Werdegar, the California Supreme Court decided that its 1971 decision in People v. Burton, that a minor's request to speak with his parent invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence, was no longer good law in light of the United States Supreme Court decision in Fare v. Michael C.
In Burton, a 16-year-old-minor was convicted of murder based on the confession he made in police custody. He had asked to speak with his father, and police refused. The police also refused the father's request to speak with his son. The California Supreme Court reversed the conviction. It believed the 16-year-old's request satisfied Miranda v. Arizona's requirement that police cease interrogation "if the accused indicates in any manner that he wishes to remain silent or consult an attorney." The opinion, written by Justice Sullivan, reasoned that the minor's request for a parent was analogous to an adult's request for an attorney, and held that "when... a minor is taken into custody and is subject to interrogation, without the presence of an attorney, his request to see one of his parents,... must, in the evidence demanding a contrary conclusion, be construed to indicate that the minor desires to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege." Burton thereby created the presumption that a minor's request to see a parent invoked his right to remain silent.
The Supreme Court's decision in Fare v. Michael C. weakened the strength of Burton's presumption.
In Burton, a 16-year-old-minor was convicted of murder based on the confession he made in police custody. He had asked to speak with his father, and police refused. The police also refused the father's request to speak with his son. The California Supreme Court reversed the conviction. It believed the 16-year-old's request satisfied Miranda v. Arizona's requirement that police cease interrogation "if the accused indicates in any manner that he wishes to remain silent or consult an attorney." The opinion, written by Justice Sullivan, reasoned that the minor's request for a parent was analogous to an adult's request for an attorney, and held that "when... a minor is taken into custody and is subject to interrogation, without the presence of an attorney, his request to see one of his parents,... must, in the evidence demanding a contrary conclusion, be construed to indicate that the minor desires to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege." Burton thereby created the presumption that a minor's request to see a parent invoked his right to remain silent.
The Supreme Court's decision in Fare v. Michael C. weakened the strength of Burton's presumption.
In Fare, the Supreme Court addressed whether a request for a probation officer could be treated as an invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court reasoned that equating a minor's request for a probation officer with a request for an attorney "would impose the burdens associated with the rule of Miranda on the juvenile justice system and the police without serving the interests the rule was designed to protect." The Court decided that to determine whether a minor had waived his right to remain silent a court must examine the "totality of circumstances" surrounding a minor's interrogation. It concluded this was "adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even where the interrogation of juveniles is involved."
This "totality of circumstances" approach was fully adopted by the California Supreme Court as it reasoned in People v. Lessie that Fare disproved Burton's presumption that a request for a parent was an invocation of the right to remain silent. The court reasoned that Burton exceeded the constitutional requirements of Fare, and held that when a minor requests to speak to a parent a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine whether the defendant has invoked his right to remain silent. The court concluded that such an interpretation was consistent with the Truth-in-Evidence provision of California's Constitution. That provision was enacted in the 1982 Victims' Bill of Rights initiative. Its specific purpose was to overturn California Supreme Court decisions that had excluded evidence on "independent state grounds" when the U.S. Supreme Court had determined that nothing in the federal Bill of Rights precluded admission.
In the present case, 16-year-old Tony Lessie was tried and convicted for the second degree murder of Rusty Seau. Seau had been shot in the back during what appeared to be a gang-related confrontation in Oceanside, California. Witnesses identified Lessie as the shooter, and he was arrested in September 2005. Shortly after, he was taken into custody and given his Miranda warnings. When the officer asked Lessie if he would like to tell anyone that he was in custody, he indicated that he would like to call his father, and then continued to answer questions. He later confessed that he had participated in the shooting. Four months later, while Lessie was in custody at juvenile hall, Lessie again agreed to answer questions, repeated his confession, and provided more details about the shooting.
The California Supreme Court examined the totality of circumstances surrounding the interrogations and concluded that "[n]othing in the record suggests the defendant was unable to understand, or did not understand, the meaning of his right to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel, and the consequences of waiving those rights. The court reasoned that Lessie was 16-years-old, had been arrested twice before, and had affirmatively confirmed that he understood each right that was read to him. The court relied on the trial court's finding that there was no connection between Lessie's request to speak with his father and his decision to waive his rights. It found that although he did not expressly waive his rights, "he did so implicitly by willingly answering questions after acknowledging that he understood those rights." An implicit waiver question similar to the latter point is presently before the U.S. Supreme Court in Berghuis v. Thompson. Stay tuned.
This "totality of circumstances" approach was fully adopted by the California Supreme Court as it reasoned in People v. Lessie that Fare disproved Burton's presumption that a request for a parent was an invocation of the right to remain silent. The court reasoned that Burton exceeded the constitutional requirements of Fare, and held that when a minor requests to speak to a parent a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine whether the defendant has invoked his right to remain silent. The court concluded that such an interpretation was consistent with the Truth-in-Evidence provision of California's Constitution. That provision was enacted in the 1982 Victims' Bill of Rights initiative. Its specific purpose was to overturn California Supreme Court decisions that had excluded evidence on "independent state grounds" when the U.S. Supreme Court had determined that nothing in the federal Bill of Rights precluded admission.
In the present case, 16-year-old Tony Lessie was tried and convicted for the second degree murder of Rusty Seau. Seau had been shot in the back during what appeared to be a gang-related confrontation in Oceanside, California. Witnesses identified Lessie as the shooter, and he was arrested in September 2005. Shortly after, he was taken into custody and given his Miranda warnings. When the officer asked Lessie if he would like to tell anyone that he was in custody, he indicated that he would like to call his father, and then continued to answer questions. He later confessed that he had participated in the shooting. Four months later, while Lessie was in custody at juvenile hall, Lessie again agreed to answer questions, repeated his confession, and provided more details about the shooting.
The California Supreme Court examined the totality of circumstances surrounding the interrogations and concluded that "[n]othing in the record suggests the defendant was unable to understand, or did not understand, the meaning of his right to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel, and the consequences of waiving those rights. The court reasoned that Lessie was 16-years-old, had been arrested twice before, and had affirmatively confirmed that he understood each right that was read to him. The court relied on the trial court's finding that there was no connection between Lessie's request to speak with his father and his decision to waive his rights. It found that although he did not expressly waive his rights, "he did so implicitly by willingly answering questions after acknowledging that he understood those rights." An implicit waiver question similar to the latter point is presently before the U.S. Supreme Court in Berghuis v. Thompson. Stay tuned.
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