Trying Terrorists: Two articles in yesterday's New York Times provide arguments in defense of what is currently reported as Attorney General Holder's decision in prosecute most suspected terrorists in civilian courts. One, presented as a news story by Times reporter Scott Shane reports on some of the political skirmishes the decision has caused, particularly with regard to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Christmas Day (or underwear) bomber. Shane notes that the Bush Administration prosecuted most of its terrorist cases in the civilian justice system and chides former Vice President Dick Cheney for his current criticism of the new administration's decision to do the same. He does note that during the Bush years only three suspected terrorists were tried by military commissions "largely because the tribunals drew countless legal challenges." In an op-ed piece, former FBI agent Ali H. Soufan also utilizes the Bush-did-it-first argument to justify the new administration's decision, and characterizes much of the criticism as intended to "smear the law enforcement community." He closes writing that "for al Qaeda terrorists caught on the battlefield who....killed American civilians abroad, military commissions are appropriate." That sounds like Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, captured in Pakistan for blowing up U.S. embassies in East Africa, and being tried in New York Federal Court at the behest of the Obama administration. Christi Parsons also reports for the Los Angeles Times that the Obama administration, and Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr., have "declined to rule out the possibility that the trial
could be shifted from federal court to a military commission." Parsons reports that Holder did indicate "that that was not his preference."
Former AG Mukasey has this op-ed in the WaPo:
Former AG Mukasey has this op-ed in the WaPo:
There was thus no legal or policy compulsion to treat Abdulmutallab as a criminal defendant, at least initially, and every reason to treat him as an intelligence asset to be exploited promptly. The way to do that was not simply to have locally available field agents question him but, rather, to get in the room people who knew about al-Qaeda in Yemen, people who could obtain information, check that information against other available data and perhaps get feedback from others in the field before going back to Abdulmutallab to follow up where necessary, all the while keeping secret the fact of his cooperation. Once his former cohorts know he is providing information, they can act to make that information useless.
Nor is it an answer to say that Abdulmutallab resumed his cooperation even after he was warned of his rights. He did that after five weeks, when his family was flown here from Nigeria. The time was lost, and with it possibly useful information. Disclosing that he had resumed talking only compounded the problem by letting his former cohorts know that they had better cover their tracks
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