In today's orders list, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari to Edward Jerome Harbison, a Tennessee inmate challenging state implementation of its lethal injection protocol. In his petition in Harbison v. Little (09-7777), Harbison asked the Court to rule that lower courts should not uphold the state's lethal injection procedures by declaring that the state's lethal injection protocol was "substantially similar" to the protocol approved by the Supreme Court in Baze v. Rees. If the Court had granted certiorari and ruled for Harbison, lower courts would be forced to conduct detailed examination of a state's injection protocol in order to
determine whether the procedure causes unnecessary pain before death occurs.
In 1983, Harbison broke into the home of Edith Russell, and when she came home unexpectedly he beat her to death with a heavy, marble vase. He stole various items of value belonging to her. A jury convicted him of first-degree murder, second-degree burglary, and grand larceny, and sentenced him to death for the murder. Last April, the Supreme Court ruled on his claim for appointment of federal counsel during clemency proceedings, and last July, the Sixth Circuit ruled on Harbison's lethal injection claims.
The three-judge panel for the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment that Tennessee's lethal injection protocol violated the Eighth Amendment. The district court had found Tennessee's lethal injection protocol inadequate for four reasons. First, it found the protocol deficient because it did not provide a proper procedure for ensuring that the inmate was unconscious before administering the second drug. Second, it believed the protocol did not provide for the adequate training of officer. Third, it did not believe the protocol adequately monitored the administration of drugs. The district court also faulted Tennessee for failing to adopt a "one-drug" protocol or alternative procedures.
The Sixth Circuit relied on Baze -- which upheld Kentucky's protocol and held that a substantially similar protocol would not violate the Eighth Amendment -- and concluded that Tennessee's "substantially similar" three-drug protocol also did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The same four complaints raised by the district court had been addressed by the Supreme Court in Baze, and each time, the Court concluded that the alleged risks rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Baze's discussion and ultimate rejection of these concerns allowed the Sixth Circuit to uphold Tennessee's protocol.
A dissent, written by Judge Clay, would have remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to allow the district court to rule on whether Harbison can meet the Baze standard, but the majority declined to fashion such a remedy when neither party had requested it at oral argument.
Lyle Denniston also has a post on SCOTUSblog discussing the Supreme Court's denial.
In 1983, Harbison broke into the home of Edith Russell, and when she came home unexpectedly he beat her to death with a heavy, marble vase. He stole various items of value belonging to her. A jury convicted him of first-degree murder, second-degree burglary, and grand larceny, and sentenced him to death for the murder. Last April, the Supreme Court ruled on his claim for appointment of federal counsel during clemency proceedings, and last July, the Sixth Circuit ruled on Harbison's lethal injection claims.
The three-judge panel for the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment that Tennessee's lethal injection protocol violated the Eighth Amendment. The district court had found Tennessee's lethal injection protocol inadequate for four reasons. First, it found the protocol deficient because it did not provide a proper procedure for ensuring that the inmate was unconscious before administering the second drug. Second, it believed the protocol did not provide for the adequate training of officer. Third, it did not believe the protocol adequately monitored the administration of drugs. The district court also faulted Tennessee for failing to adopt a "one-drug" protocol or alternative procedures.
The Sixth Circuit relied on Baze -- which upheld Kentucky's protocol and held that a substantially similar protocol would not violate the Eighth Amendment -- and concluded that Tennessee's "substantially similar" three-drug protocol also did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The same four complaints raised by the district court had been addressed by the Supreme Court in Baze, and each time, the Court concluded that the alleged risks rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Baze's discussion and ultimate rejection of these concerns allowed the Sixth Circuit to uphold Tennessee's protocol.
A dissent, written by Judge Clay, would have remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to allow the district court to rule on whether Harbison can meet the Baze standard, but the majority declined to fashion such a remedy when neither party had requested it at oral argument.
Lyle Denniston also has a post on SCOTUSblog discussing the Supreme Court's denial.
Leave a comment