The U.S. Supreme Court today decided a case under the federal Speedy Trial Act, Bloate v. United States, No. 08-728. This is a statutory interpretation case applicable only to federal prosecutions. The Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause is not mentioned.
The lineup is unusual, with Justices Alito and Breyer in the dissent and the other seven in the majority. Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate concurrence to emphasize that the defendant does not necessarily get the windfall of dismissal for delays that are mostly of his own doing. More needs to be decided on remand.
Most interesting to me is that the Court reads that statute in a straightforward manner and is not willing to bend it to achieve the result that I suspect most of the Justices think is right. In this case, there are other paths to that result as noted by both the majority and the concurrence, but that doesn't seem to be the decisive point for them. The statute says what it says, and the time automatically excluded for pretrial motions is only from motion to decision under the paragraph specifically addressing that issue, 18 U.S.C. ยง3161(h)(1)(D), not the more general language of other paragraphs. "Had Congress wished courts to exclude pretrial motions preparation time automatically, it could have said so." (n. 13)
This is a hint, though no more than that, of a favorable disposition toward the prosecution's argument in the AEDPA statute of limitations case, Holland v. Florida. That argument is also based on a straightforward reading of the statute, with a premise that Congress prescribed in detail the exceptions to the general rule and implicitly decided not to allow courts to make up additional exceptions. CJLF's brief is here.
The lineup is unusual, with Justices Alito and Breyer in the dissent and the other seven in the majority. Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate concurrence to emphasize that the defendant does not necessarily get the windfall of dismissal for delays that are mostly of his own doing. More needs to be decided on remand.
Most interesting to me is that the Court reads that statute in a straightforward manner and is not willing to bend it to achieve the result that I suspect most of the Justices think is right. In this case, there are other paths to that result as noted by both the majority and the concurrence, but that doesn't seem to be the decisive point for them. The statute says what it says, and the time automatically excluded for pretrial motions is only from motion to decision under the paragraph specifically addressing that issue, 18 U.S.C. ยง3161(h)(1)(D), not the more general language of other paragraphs. "Had Congress wished courts to exclude pretrial motions preparation time automatically, it could have said so." (n. 13)
This is a hint, though no more than that, of a favorable disposition toward the prosecution's argument in the AEDPA statute of limitations case, Holland v. Florida. That argument is also based on a straightforward reading of the statute, with a premise that Congress prescribed in detail the exceptions to the general rule and implicitly decided not to allow courts to make up additional exceptions. CJLF's brief is here.
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