Today, the U.S. Supreme Court announced three opinions for cases argued this term: Johnson v. United States (08-6925); Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick (08-103); and Mac's Shell Service, Inc. v. Shell Oil Products Company; Shell Oil Products Company v. Mac's Shell Service (08-240; 08-372). At SCOTUSblog, Erin Miller posts brief descriptions of each of the opinions.
Reed Elsevier and Mac's Shell address areas copyright and franchise law, but today's decision in Johnson held that in the context of the Armed Career Criminal Act's definition of "violent felony," the phrase "physical force" means violent force. This means that in order to qualify for enhanced sentencing under "violent felony" section of the Armed Career Criminal Act, a person must have engaged in "force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person." The individual could not be sentenced for a violent felony if the person had been convicted for "unwanted touching."
In 2007, Curtis Johnson pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing ammunition after having been convicted of a felony. This violated 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1). Based on its determination that Mr. Johnson had three earlier convictions for violent felonies, the district court sentenced him to 185 months in prison. Mr. Johnson appealed the court's determination with respect to his 2003 conviction for "unwanted touching," which had been elevated from simple battery to felony status because of a prior battery conviction.
In today's 7-2 decision, Justice Scalia wrote that Johnson's 2003 "conviction was a predicate conviction for a 'violent felony' under the Armed Career Criminal Act only if '[a]ctually and intentionally touch[ing]' another person constitutes 'physical force' within the meaning of §924(e)(2)(B)(i)." When the Court ruled that it was not, it reversed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit, set aside Johnson's sentence, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Justice Alito wrote a dissent, which Justice Thomas joined.
Reed Elsevier and Mac's Shell address areas copyright and franchise law, but today's decision in Johnson held that in the context of the Armed Career Criminal Act's definition of "violent felony," the phrase "physical force" means violent force. This means that in order to qualify for enhanced sentencing under "violent felony" section of the Armed Career Criminal Act, a person must have engaged in "force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person." The individual could not be sentenced for a violent felony if the person had been convicted for "unwanted touching."
In 2007, Curtis Johnson pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing ammunition after having been convicted of a felony. This violated 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1). Based on its determination that Mr. Johnson had three earlier convictions for violent felonies, the district court sentenced him to 185 months in prison. Mr. Johnson appealed the court's determination with respect to his 2003 conviction for "unwanted touching," which had been elevated from simple battery to felony status because of a prior battery conviction.
In today's 7-2 decision, Justice Scalia wrote that Johnson's 2003 "conviction was a predicate conviction for a 'violent felony' under the Armed Career Criminal Act only if '[a]ctually and intentionally touch[ing]' another person constitutes 'physical force' within the meaning of §924(e)(2)(B)(i)." When the Court ruled that it was not, it reversed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit, set aside Johnson's sentence, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Justice Alito wrote a dissent, which Justice Thomas joined.
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