The California Supreme Court yesterday clarified a looming question regarding the appropriate next step for when an inmate is denied parole, appeals the denial, and wins. In the case In re Prather, the court held that the appropriate remedy is a new hearing by the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) - not, as some appellate courts have held, an order that the Board release the inmate absent new evidence of the inmate's dangerousness emerging after the parole-suitability hearing.
In 2008, the California Supreme Court in In re Lawrence held that for the Board to deny an eligible inmate parole, due process requires the Board to provide "some evidence" of the inmate's current threat to society. Absent such a finding, California's statutory scheme mandates the Board to set an early release date for the inmate. Notably, in making the determination of the inmate's current threat to society, the underlying facts of the commitment offense - e.g. the heinousness of the crime - are not alone sufficient to prove the inmate's current level of dangerousness. In other words, although the inmate's underlying offense could be considered, to constitutionally deny parole, the Board is required to somehow link the facts of the underlying offense to the inmate's present threat to society.
Where an inmate successfully appeals to a court that the Board's decision (or the decision of the Governor, who has veto power over the Board) was erroneous - via a state petition for habeas corpus - the question remained as to what happens next. Before today, the California Supreme Court provided little guidance, instructing only that, "the court should grant the prisoner's petition for writ of habeas corpus and should order the Board to vacate its decision denying parole and thereafter to proceed in accordance with due process of law." (In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616, 658 (2002).) Some courts threw the case back to the Board, ordering them to conduct a new hearing. Others gave the case back to the Board with strict limitations, requiring them to release the inmate unless it could point to some new evidence, related to the inmate's conduct in prison since the parole-suitability hearing, that demonstrated the inmate's current dangerousness.
Fortunately, Prather today holds that the former approach is the right one. Were it otherwise, the courts would be permitted to significantly interfere with the executive branch's statutory authority to make parole-suitability decisions - a clear violation of the separation of powers. So now, in cases resubmitted to the Board, it will be able to make suitability determinations without its hands unnecessarily tied by the courts.
But the fight is not over. Eligible inmates denied parole still have a relatively good chance of convincing reviewing courts that the Board failed to meet its burden in showing "some evidence" of the inmate's current threat to society - especially in the cases where the Board grants parole but the Governor's vetoes it. Moreover, if the inmate loses at the state level, he can seek further review of the Board's decision in federal court through a federal petition for habeas corpus. As Ninth Circuit case law stands now (see Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d 606 (2010)), federal courts are required to conduct reviews of the Board's findings to ensure that this "some evidence" standard has been met, and some federal judges have shown no qualms about replacing the Board's or Governor's decision with their own evaluation of the evidence. (See, for example Dyer v. Clark, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75956; Nicholson v. Salazar, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6911.) It is anticipated that this issue will reach SCOTUS some time in the near future.
Where an inmate successfully appeals to a court that the Board's decision (or the decision of the Governor, who has veto power over the Board) was erroneous - via a state petition for habeas corpus - the question remained as to what happens next. Before today, the California Supreme Court provided little guidance, instructing only that, "the court should grant the prisoner's petition for writ of habeas corpus and should order the Board to vacate its decision denying parole and thereafter to proceed in accordance with due process of law." (In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616, 658 (2002).) Some courts threw the case back to the Board, ordering them to conduct a new hearing. Others gave the case back to the Board with strict limitations, requiring them to release the inmate unless it could point to some new evidence, related to the inmate's conduct in prison since the parole-suitability hearing, that demonstrated the inmate's current dangerousness.
Fortunately, Prather today holds that the former approach is the right one. Were it otherwise, the courts would be permitted to significantly interfere with the executive branch's statutory authority to make parole-suitability decisions - a clear violation of the separation of powers. So now, in cases resubmitted to the Board, it will be able to make suitability determinations without its hands unnecessarily tied by the courts.
But the fight is not over. Eligible inmates denied parole still have a relatively good chance of convincing reviewing courts that the Board failed to meet its burden in showing "some evidence" of the inmate's current threat to society - especially in the cases where the Board grants parole but the Governor's vetoes it. Moreover, if the inmate loses at the state level, he can seek further review of the Board's decision in federal court through a federal petition for habeas corpus. As Ninth Circuit case law stands now (see Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d 606 (2010)), federal courts are required to conduct reviews of the Board's findings to ensure that this "some evidence" standard has been met, and some federal judges have shown no qualms about replacing the Board's or Governor's decision with their own evaluation of the evidence. (See, for example Dyer v. Clark, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75956; Nicholson v. Salazar, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6911.) It is anticipated that this issue will reach SCOTUS some time in the near future.

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