The rule of Martinez v. Ryan, allowing ineffective assistance of collateral-review counsel as "cause" for not raising IAC of the trial lawyer in the first state collateral review, only applies in states that have a rule against ever raising IAC on direct appeal. In all other states, Coleman v. Thompson is still the law, and Martinez v. Ryan changes nothing. I noted this limitation in this post the day Martinez came down. Today the Fifth Circuit agreed, albeit in a divided decision, in Ibarra v. Thaler, No. 11-70031.
In short, Texas procedures do not mandate that ineffectiveness claims be heard in the first instance in habeas proceedings, and they do not by law deprive Texas defendants of counsel-and court-driven guidance in pursuing ineffectiveness claims.See also, Dansby v. Norris, 8th Cir., June 21, 2012:
Accordingly, Ibarra is not entitled to the benefit of Martinez for his ineffectiveness claims, as Texas procedures entitled him to review through counselled motions for new trial and direct appeal.
Martinez does not apply here, because Arkansas does not bar a defendant from raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. Arkansas law permitted Dansby to raise a claim of ineffective assistance in a motion for new trial and on direct appeal. [Citations.]Thanks to Ed Marshall for the tip.
The Supreme Court in Martinez was clear that its "narrow exception" to Coleman was limited to the situation in which the State barred the defendant from raising a claim of ineffective assistance on direct appeal. 132 S. Ct. at 1316. The Court was not silent about a possible extension of Martinez to a State that does not impose such a bar. The Court did not expressly reserve judgment, as it sometimes does when a question is debatable. The Court was explicit about the finite scope of its decision: "The rule of Coleman governs in all but the limited circumstances recognized here." Id. at 1320.