Some people may be surprised to learn that the State of Kansas has a state supreme court that tilts very heavily in favor of criminals, especially murderers in capital cases. This is a result of the state's judicial selection process, which unwisely gave the state bar the keys to the initial entry gate to the bench, naively believing that this would result in selection of judges according to merit. In reality, so-called "merit selection" only substitutes bar politics for general politics, a big step down.
Today the U.S. Supreme Court took up the highly controversial cases of the Carr brothers, both titled Kansas v. Carr, Nos. 14-449 (Jonathan) and 14-450 (Reginald), along with Kansas v. Gleason, No. 14-452.
Update: Questions presented follow the break.
Today the U.S. Supreme Court took up the highly controversial cases of the Carr brothers, both titled Kansas v. Carr, Nos. 14-449 (Jonathan) and 14-450 (Reginald), along with Kansas v. Gleason, No. 14-452.
Update: Questions presented follow the break.
All three cases present this question:
The Carr cases additionally present this question:
Also in the Carr cases, the Court declined Kansas's request to take up this question:
Whether the Eighth Amendment requires that a capital-sentencing jury be affirmatively instructed that mitigating circumstances "need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt," as the Kansas Supreme Court held here, or instead whether the Eighth Amendment is satisfied by instructions that, in context, make clear that each juror must individually assess and weigh any mitigating circumstances?
The Carr cases additionally present this question:
Whether the trial court's decision not to sever the sentencing phase of the co-defendant brothers' trial here-a decision that comports with the traditional approach preferring joinder in circumstances like this-violated an Eighth Amendment right to an "individualized sentencing" determination and was not harmless in any event?
Also in the Carr cases, the Court declined Kansas's request to take up this question:
Whether the Confrontation Clause, as interpreted in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), applies to the "selection" phase of capital sentencing proceedings, as the Kansas Supreme Court held here, i.e., after a defendant has been convicted of capital murder and proof of eligibility for the death penalty has been presented in the guilt phase subject to full confrontation, or does not apply to such purely sentencing evidence, as at least three Circuits have held?
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