The prosecution has rested in the penalty phase of the trial of Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.  If he does not testify in the penalty phase, as I expect he will not, can that silence be used against him as indicating a lack of remorse?  I don't know.

In White v. Woodall, decided one year ago today, the Supreme Court reviewed its precedent in Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 328 (1999):

"The Government retains," we said, "the burden of proving facts relevant to the crime . . . and cannot enlist the defendant in this process at the expense of the self-incrimination privilege." Id., at 330 (emphasis added). And Mitchell included an express reservation of direct relevance here: "Whether silence bears upon the determination of a lack of remorse, or upon acceptance of responsibility for purposes of the downward adjustment provided in §3E1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (1998), is a separate question. It is not before us, and we express no view on it." Ibid.

A footnote at that point notes a division in the Courts of Appeals.  No First Circuit cases are noted there or in the certiorari petition.

Woodall did not resolve the question.  It was a state case being reviewed on federal habeas corpus, and the unsettledness of the underlying question was enough to require the federal court to respect the state court's decision under the controlling act of Congress.  CJLF's brief in that case is here.  My post on the case is here.

Prosecutors would be well advised to avoid mentioning the defendant's silence until the issue is resolved.  It isn't worth risking a reversal.  Long-term, though, I think the Griffin no-comment rule should be limited to the extent expressly held in Supreme Court precedent and not extended by a fraction of an inch.  I wouldn't mind seeing it overruled, but I don't think that is a realistic possibility.