Today, after multiple relistings, the U.S. Supreme Court summarily decided Mullenix v. Luna, No. 14-1143.
Under Supreme Court precedent, police officers are immune from suit so long as the law is not clearly established that their acts are illegal under the circumstances. In immunity cases, as in habeas corpus cases, lower federal courts regularly try to avoid the rule by defining the "clearly established" law at an excessive level of generality. Summary reversal of such decisions has taken up an inordinate portion of the Supreme Court's docket for some years now. This one is reversed with only one dissent, by Justice Sotomayor.
On the night of March 23, 2010, Sergeant Randy Baker of the Tulia, Texas Police Department followed Israel Leija, Jr., to a drive-in restaurant, with a warrant for his arrest. 773 F. 3d 712, 715-716 (CA5 2014). When Baker approached Leija's car and informed him that he was under arrest, Leija sped off, headed for Interstate 27. 2013 WL 4017124, *1 (ND Tex., Aug. 7, 2013). Baker gave chase and was quickly joined by Trooper Gabriel Rodriguez of the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS). 773So when the natural consequences of Leija's voluntary choices follow in due course, what does his widow do? Sue the police officer, of course. The person actually at fault is dead, and she has his estate anyway, such as it is.
F. 3d, at 716.
Leija entered the interstate and led the officers on an 18-minute chase at speeds between 85 and 110 miles per hour. Ibid. Twice during the chase, Leija called the Tulia Police dispatcher, claiming to have a gun and threatening to shoot at police officers if they did not abandon their pursuit. The dispatcher relayed Leija's threats, together with a report that Leija might be intoxicated, to all concerned officers.
Under Supreme Court precedent, police officers are immune from suit so long as the law is not clearly established that their acts are illegal under the circumstances. In immunity cases, as in habeas corpus cases, lower federal courts regularly try to avoid the rule by defining the "clearly established" law at an excessive level of generality. Summary reversal of such decisions has taken up an inordinate portion of the Supreme Court's docket for some years now. This one is reversed with only one dissent, by Justice Sotomayor.
▼ Easy fixes to reduce risk of being shot ▼
DO NOT
1. Speed off upon arrest !
2. Brag to police that you have a gun ...
—— and will shoot at LEOs if chase not aborted •
"When Mullenix confronted his superior officer after the shooting, his first words were, “How’s that for proactive?” Ibid. (Mullenix was apparently referencing an earlier counseling session in which Byrd suggested that he was not enterprising enough. Ibid.) The glib comment does not impact our legal analysis; an officer’s actual intentions are irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment’s “objectively reasonable” inquiry. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 397 (1989). But the comment seems to me revealing of the culture this Court’s decision supports when it calls it reasonable—or even reasonably reasonable—to use deadly force for no discernible gain and over a supervisor’s express order to “stand by.” By sanctioning a “shoot first, think later” approach to policing, the Court renders the protections of the Fourth Amendment hollow."
This is just obnoxious. As an aside--she throws in an irrelevant comment and then accuses the rest of the Court of supporting a "shoot first, think later" culture.
By the by--Sotomayor once again, with a dissent probably pushes the law in a direction she'd rather not. I could see an appellate court dealing with a situation where some cop follows orders saying: "And police officer friendly got the clearance from his supervisors." See Mullenix v. Luna (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).