Today the U.S. Supreme Court declined to take up the case of Tyler v. Louisiana, No. 15-8814. Tyler's complaint is that his lawyers ignored his direction to focus on the guilt aspect of the case and instead focused solely on penalty, effectively conceding his guilt.
I have more sympathy with Tyler's claim than I do with most ineffective assistance claims. There is a fundamental principle in the attorney-client relationship that the client chooses the goals and the attorney uses his professional judgment regarding the best way to achieve the client-chosen goals. I have letters from death row complaining that, on appeal, the client has chosen a "give me liberty or give me death" goal, directing the lawyer to focus solely on the guilt verdict, and the lawyer has ignored the direction.
In the Tyler case, though, some of the reporting is leading people to believe that the guilt case against Tyler was thin and his lawyers effectively conceded the guilt of a person who might well be innocent. After the break, I will quote a portion of the state's brief in opposition on the actual state of the evidence.
I have more sympathy with Tyler's claim than I do with most ineffective assistance claims. There is a fundamental principle in the attorney-client relationship that the client chooses the goals and the attorney uses his professional judgment regarding the best way to achieve the client-chosen goals. I have letters from death row complaining that, on appeal, the client has chosen a "give me liberty or give me death" goal, directing the lawyer to focus solely on the guilt verdict, and the lawyer has ignored the direction.
In the Tyler case, though, some of the reporting is leading people to believe that the guilt case against Tyler was thin and his lawyers effectively conceded the guilt of a person who might well be innocent. After the break, I will quote a portion of the state's brief in opposition on the actual state of the evidence.
On May 29, 1995, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Jock Efferson, Denise Washington, and Rahsaan Roberson were working in a Pizza Hut located in the 3900 block of Greenwood Road in Shreveport, Louisiana, when Petitioner, James E. Tyler, III, walked up to the drive·through window to inquire Efferson about purchasing a pizza. He later entered the restaurant through the back door carrying a handgun in one hand and a ski mask in the other (Vol. 16, pp. 3443, 3455). He ordered Efferson to open the cash register, and then forced all three employees into the cooler freezer, where he ordered them to lie on the floor. He shot each of them in the head (Vol. 16, p. 3511). Washington and Roberson survived their injuries; Efferson died as a result of his gunshot wounds the following day (Vol. 16, p. 3511).In an appropriate case, I think the Supreme Court should clarify that a mentally competent criminal defendant has the right to choose the goals of representation in capital cases just like any other case. This case, however, is not the one to make that rule given the Strickland v. Washington prejudice requirement, which is probably why the court turned it down.
The next evening, Sharlot Tedder, a prostitute, phoned a detective to report that she had stayed with a black male, later identified as Petitioner, at the Palomar Hotel across the street from the Pizza Hut. Tedder reported that on May 29, 1995, Petitioner left the hotel room at around 9:30, saying, "He had to do something." She also stated that he possessed a .22 caliber revolver. When Tedder saw the emergency vehicles at the Pizza Hut at approximately 10 p.m., she asked Petitioner if he "did that across the street." He replied, "Yes." Petitioner had a large sum of money in his possession. When Petitioner learned of Efferson's death from the local television news, he stated "one down, two to go.'' He later told Tedder that he "got three ... what's one more?" (Vol. 16, pp. 3601·3602) Teddar also reported that later that night, she witnessed Petitioner in the yard of the body shop next door. Petitioner told her he was looking for his gun that he thought he had dropped there (Vol. 16, pp. 3549-3552).
The owner of the body shop located next door to the Palomar Hotel testified that Petitioner came looking for a ski mask and a roll of duct tape he had left in the yard of the body shop. Petitioner also inquired about purchasing a gun (Vol. 16, pp. 3549-3552). Police were able to recover a dark-colored mask and a key ring tag for Room #39 of the Palomar Hotel in the yard of the body shop. The key ring tag was on the key ring when the Petitioner checked in, but was missing when he checked out (Vol. 1, pp. 85-86, Vol. 16, pp. 3495-3496). Petitioner also wrote a letter in which he confessed to the murder (Vol. 6, pp. 1364-1365).
On June 20, 1995, Petitioner was indicted by the grand jury for first degree murder (R. p. 13). Petitioner was identified by one victim, Washington, before trial, and by both surviving victims at trial (Vol. 8, p. 1825, Vol. 16, p. 3453-3454). On August 28, 1996, a jury found Petitioner guilty of first degree murder. On August 31, 1996, the same jury unanimously sentenced him to death.* * *
As we established in Petitioner's first claim, the evidence was overwhelming. Petitioner was identified by one victim, Washington, before trial, and by both surviving victims at trial (Vol. 8, p. 1825, Vol. 16, p. 3453-3454). Petitioner made several inculpatory statements to Tedder detailing the crime he committed and his specific intent to kill, and even made comments about the offense while watching the related news reports (Vol. 16, pp. 3598-3606). The details of the offense that Petitioner shared with Tedder corroborated the surviving victims' versions of what transpired (Vol. 7, pp. 1639-1641, Vol. 16, pp. 3434-3451, 3617-3618). Additionally, Petitioner wrote a letter to his friend, Elijah Clark, admitting his guilt (Vol. 6, pp. 1364-1365; Vol. 18, pp. 3961-3964).
Nevertheless, trial counsel diligently represented Petitioner, filing numerous pre-trial motions, including but not limited to several motions to suppress. Trial counsel also filed a motion for a bill of particulars and sought the witnesses' pretrial statements (Vol. 2, pp. 511, 515, Vol. 3, p. 744). A full preliminary examination and hearings for the 404B evidence and motions to suppress were conducted.
-- Response to D. Berman --
Justice Lee Johnson, Kansas Supreme Court:
“Given my view that the death penalty is categorically unconstitutional
for every person convicted of murder in this state, I see no reason
for a detailed discussion of all the other holdings by the majority
with which I disagree,” he wrote.
Prof. Berman:
Consider for whom you vote, and for what you vote.
If you vote to elect those who grant clemencies with or without
parole board agreement at the gubernatorial level, and those judges
who are a priori and thereby unprofessionally opposed to capital punishment,
(or those who appoint them) then you have precious little credibility in decrying
the failure to execute the mass murderer of the Green River.
Do you pretend to believe that either I, Scheidegger, or Otis would not do
anything we could to mete-out proportional justice to a Loughner, or a Dan White?
Who advances youth or deficiency of any kind as a mitigator against execution?
Surely not I any more than did Washington or Adams.
So you tell me how to accomplish this.
Since the American public prefer it, why do you not turn your effort in a "benign" direction, that being the speedy execution of aggravated murderers?