Recently in State Courts Category

Katie Meyer reports for WITF that nearly 3/4 of Pennsylvania voters approved that state's version of Marsy's Law, granting constitutional rights to crime victims. Incredibly, though, the Secretary of the Commonwealth was enjoined by a Commonwealth Court judge "from tabulating and certifying the votes in the November 2019 General Election relating to [this] ballot question ... until final disposition of the Petition for Review, including appeals." This preliminary injunction order was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a 4-3 vote.

    On a late January night in 2018, Joel Villela was pulled over for speeding.  The officer smelled alcohol on Villela's breath.  When Villela refused a roadside field sobriety test, the officer arrested him on suspicion of DUI.  Under Washington state law (RCW 46.55.360), Villela's car was impounded.  A subsequent inventory search of the vehicle revealed digital scales, sandwich bags, pipes, and a large amount of cash.  Cocaine was discovered on Villela after a search incident to arrest.  Villela was charged with DUI and possession with intent to deliver controlled substances.    Villela filed a motion to suppress the "fruits" (drug evidence) of the inventory search of his car claiming that the mandatory impoundment was an unlawful seizure under Washington Constitution Article I, section 7.  That section provides that "no person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."  Under Washington law, "authority of law" means a warrant or a long-standing exception to the warrant requirement. 

The California State Auditor has this report on the California Commission on Judicial Performance. Among the recommendations are to split the CJP into an investigative body to investigate and bring charges and an adjudicative body to determine the charges. That would require an amendment to the state constitution.

Senate Bill 54, authored by state Senate leader Kevin de León (D-Los Angeles), in many cases prohibits state and local police agencies from notifying federal officials about the impending release of immigrants in custody who may be deported.

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Crandall said SB54 infringes on local governments' authority to practice policies they know are appropriate for themselves. Cities have a "better view and better ability" to oversee their needs in certain areas, he added.

Though the state may have had good intentions, Crandall said, there are "constitutional protections" for cities from the "ever-extending tentacles" of state rule.

I've written about juveniles and Prop 57 a few times this year.  Here I discussed the case of People v Lara, in which the California Supreme Court ruled that Prop 57 applies retroactively to all non-final cases that had been directly filed in adult court.  In that post I wrote:  "Proposition 57 is retroactive to all non-final cases.  What does this mean?  It means that the ramifications of Proposition 57 continue to get worse.  It also means that the court invited the opportunity for monsters like Daniel Marsh to seek a hearing in juvenile court because his case is 'not final.'"

Well, I was right.  On February 22nd, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District conditionally reversed Daniel Marsh's 2013 double murder conviction.  He is to be returned to Yolo County and a transfer hearing will be set in the juvenile court. If, however, the juvenile court finds that Marsh is more suitable for adult court, his original conviction and sentence will be reinstated.

This morning, the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Superior Court (Lara) (S241231).  The issue was whether Proposition 57 applies retroactively to juvenile cases that had been directly filed in adult court prior to it being passed in the November 2016 election.  In addition to permitting the release of inmates who commit "non-violent" offenses, Proposition 57 mandates that all allegations of criminal conduct against a minor (individuals under age 18) must be initiated in juvenile court.  In other words, a delinquent minor can no longer have charges directly filed against him or her in adult court.  All cases, regardless of the severity of the crime, must be initiated in juvenile court.  If a minor (age 14+) commits certain enumerated crimes (such as murder or certain sex offenses), a prosecutor can file a motion for a "transfer hearing" which requires the juvenile court to evaluate factors such as the minor's maturity level, degree of criminal sophistication, prior delinquent history, and whether the minor is capable of rehabilitation.  If, based on those factors, the juvenile court concludes that the minor should be tried as an adult, the case can be transferred to adult court and all proceedings from that point on occur as if the minor is an adult.

Prior to Proposition 57, minors age 14 or older who committed certain serious crimes could be tried in adult court in one of three ways: (1) statutory waiver - mandatory direct file in adult court; (2) prosecutorial waiver - discretionary direct file by the District Attorney; or (3) judicial waiver - upon motion, juvenile court had authority to transfer the case to adult court after holding a "fitness hearing."  Proposition 57 eliminated statutory and prosecutorial waiver.  

On August 24, the California Supreme Court upheld the death penalty reform initiative, Proposition 66, rejecting every one of the attacks made on it.  See this post.  However, the opponents filed a petition for rehearing, and the court gave itself 60 days to consider it.  See this post.

Today, the court denied rehearing, making only trivial modifications to the opinion.

This is a major victory, even if a delayed one.  The issues are nearly all of state law.  The only federal question was a bogus equal protection claim that the majority easily swatted down and the concurrences didn't even bother to mention.  There is no substantial basis for a certiorari petition to the U.S. Supreme Court.  This case is over.

So the effective date of Proposition 66 is today when it should have been almost a year ago, the day the voters enacted it.

At the time of the American Revolution, criminal law was a mixture of case law and statutes, with the elements of some crimes being established by courts and therefore changeable by them.  In some Eastern states that is still the case.  In Massachusetts, the basic felony-murder rule comes from case law, and today the Supreme Judicial Court abolished it, prospectively only, in Commonwealth v. Brown, SJC-11669.

Generally, murder is distinguished from manslaughter by the mental element of "malice."  Definitions of "malice" vary among the states.  Under the felony-murder rule, the intent to commit certain dangerous felonies (e.g., robbery) supplies the mental element so that every participant in the robbery is guilty of murder if someone is killed.  In its most extreme form, one robber can be guilty of the murder of the other if the other is justifiably killed by the robbery victim.  Even I think that's going way too far.

I have only skimmed the opinion so far, so I won't be commenting on it at this time.  Thanks to former CJLF Fellow Christine Dowling for the tip.

The California Supreme Court today upheld the death penalty reform initiative, Proposition 66, rejecting the attacks on the initiative nearly across the board.  The court was unanimous in rejecting the attacks that would have invalidated the initiative in its entirely.  It divided 5-2 on the interpretation of the five-year limit and on the provision that allows superior court decisions in habeas corpus cases to be appealed to the intermediate courts of appeal rather than the state supreme court.

The case is Briggs v. Brown, S238309.

CJLF has this press release.

We have press coverage from Maura Dolan in the L.A. Times; Cheryl Miller in The Recorder; Sudhin Thanawala and Brian Melley for AP.

KOVR, CBS-13 in Sacramento has this report with me and archival footage of opponent Ron Briggs.

The video of the June 6 oral argument in California's Proposition 66 case, Briggs v. Brown, is now available.  The court's argument archive page is here.  The argument is preceded by a tribute to Justice Werdegar, who is retiring this summer.  It begins 27 minutes into the video.  My 10 minutes begin at the 1:11 mark.  My day-after post on the argument is here.

Yesterday the California Supreme Court heard oral argument in Briggs v. Brown, the case challenging Proposition 66, "the Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016."  The petitioner, Ron Briggs, who is challenging the initiative, was represented by Christina Von der Ahe Rayburn.  The named respondents are Governor Brown, Attorney General Xavier Becerra, and the Judicial Council, represented by DAG Jose Zelidon-Zepeda.  The Proposition 66 campaign committee, Californians to Mend, Not End, the Death Penalty, successfully moved to intervene in the case, and I represented the committee at the argument.  The hour was divided 30-20-10.

The argument was streamed live.  For those who didn't catch it, a link to the archived video should be posted within a week is now available on this page.

The petitioner's challenge is a scattershot attack, challenging many provisions of the initiative in an effort to bring the whole enactment down.  Press accounts of the argument focused on the issue that was discussed at length, the requirement that the direct appeal and initial habeas corpus petition be completed within 5 years.  In my view, the more important indication from the argument is which issues did not produce any questions for our side from the justices.

It is always dicey to predict from oral argument, but from what does not seem to be seriously at issue, it appears unlikely that the court will invalidate the initiative as a whole or any a substantial portion of it.

In People v. Martinez (S219970), the defendant's vehicle collided with a 12-year old boy riding on a scooter.  The defendant got out of his truck to check on the boy.  When the boy's mother rushed to the scene, the defendant got back into his truck and left.  The boy sustained multiple broken bones and a traumatic brain injury.  The defendant was uninsured, unlicensed, and on felony probation.  The defendant was soon located and voluntarily came forward admitting his involvement in the accident.

The defendant was charged with one felony count of leaving the scene of an accident (Calif. Vehicle Code 20001(a)).  He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 3-years imprisonment.  At sentencing, the boy's mother stated that her son hit the defendant's truck and that it was an accident.  The defendant stated that the boy failed to stop his scooter and ran into his truck.  No findings were made regarding the defendant's responsibility for the accident.

The trial court later ordered the defendant to pay $425,654.63 in restitution to the victim's family for medical costs the boy incurred as a result of the accident.  On appeal, the defendant argued, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that
 

because defendant was not convicted for any offense involving responsibility for the actual accident and no factual determination of his responsibility for the collision or the victim's injuries has been made, the court erred in ordering restitution to the victim for treatment of the injuries he received as a result of the accident. 

Today the California Supreme Court also agreed with the defendant holding:

Where, as here, a criminal defendant is convicted and sentenced to state prison, section 1202.4 of the Penal Code (section 1202.4) provides that the defendant must pay restitution directly to the victim for losses incurred "as a result of the commission of a crime" (§1202.4, subd. (a)(1); see People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 651-52 ("Giordano").)  "To the extent possible," direct victim restitution is to be ordered in an amount "sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct." (§1202.4, subd. (f)(3).)  Application of these provisions depends on the relationship between the victim's loss and the defendant's crime. Here, defendant's crime was not being involved in a traffic accident, nor does his conviction imply that he was at fault in the accident.  Defendant's crime, rather, was leaving the scene of the accident without presenting identification or rendering aid.  Thus, under section 1202.4, the trial court was authorized to order restitution for those injuries that were caused or exacerbated by defendant's criminal flight from the scene of the accident, but it was not authorized to award restitution for injuries resulting from the accident itself.