On Monday, April 27th, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Bobby v. Bies (08-598), a case which addresses whether holding a state-post conviction hearing to determine the mental capacity of a defendant whose death sentence was affirmed before Atkins v. Virginia (2002), violated the Double Jeopardy clause.
As Kent wrote back in January, the Double Jeopardy clause comes into play only if a person is "for the same offence ... twice put in jeopardy of life or limb..." Bies has only been tried for murder once.
As Kent wrote back in January, the Double Jeopardy clause comes into play only if a person is "for the same offence ... twice put in jeopardy of life or limb..." Bies has only been tried for murder once.
In May 1992, 10 year-old Aaron Raines was found dead in the basement of
a Cincinnati building. His autopsy suggested he had been severely
beaten with a piece of concrete and a metal pipe, strangled with twine
and kicked. Bies eventually admitted involvement and was convicted for
Aaron's murder. During the penalty phase of the trial, Bies presented
the testimony of a clinical psychologist as mitigating evidence. The
psychologist testified that Bies IQ placed him in the range of being
"mildly to borderline mentally retarded." She also testified that she
believed Bies knew the difference between right and wrong at the time
of Aaron's murder. Bies was sentenced to death.
On his first appeal in 1996, the Ohio Supreme Court reviewed Bies' death sentence and concluded that his mental capacity "merit[ed] some weight" under Ohio's sentencing law, but ultimately affirmed his death sentence. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed his death sentence because the aggravating evidence outweighed the mitigating evidence.
While Bies was exhausting his state appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia and found it unconstitutional to execute a mentally retarded person. This led to litigation in Ohio courts as to whether Bies was mentally retarded for Atkins purposes. Before this issue was settled Bies filed a federal habeas corpus petition.
The federal magistrate judge concluded that Bies' Atkins claim was unexhausted, but also held that Bies had exhausted his Double Jeopardy argument and that collateral estoppel prevented the state from re-litigating the issue of mental retardation. The magistrate recomended that a writ of habeas corpus issue, and the district court agreed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.
The Sixth Circuit held that collateral estoppel of the Double Jeopardy clause comes into play "whenever a judge or jury enters findings sufficient to establish a legal entitlement to a life sentence." For the Sixth Circuit, this occurred when the Ohio Supreme Court determined Bies' mental capacity "merit[ed] some weight."
"[M]erit[ing] some weight" and findings sufficient to establish legal entitlement are not the same. The state courts had never fully resolved the issue of Bies' mental capacity. It was something they were trying to do when the district court issued the writ. It had also never been resolved pre-Atkins, because the clinical psychologist's testimony "evaluated Bies's I.Q. as being in the range of mildly to borderline mentally retarded." This does not solve anything for Atkins purposes.
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit's decision was a misuse of the Double Jeopardy clause. The Double Jeopardy clause does not apply when the state seeks to enforce a judgement that has only been entered once has not been overturned. In order for Bies to have a Double Jeopardy claim he would have to be acquitted of Raines' murder, or "twice [been] put in jeopardy." Bies was not "twice put in jeopardy" by the state. Rather, the state had affirmed his death sentence, and determined that his "mild to borderline mental retardation merit[ed] some weight in mitigation" without holding the trial-like sentencing phase necessary for acquittal under Sattazhan v. Pennsylvania (2003). The Ohio court had never concluded that the state had failed to prove its case for capital punishment.
In response to the State's appeal of the Sixth Circuit decision, Bies argues that acquittal is not necessary for collateral estoppel or Double Jeopardy to apply. He argues that collateral estoppel applies if the court concludes that "an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid final judgment." If that happens then the issue cannot be re-litigated between the same parties.
Here, Bies is arguing that Ohio courts have made multiple findings that he is mentally retarded, and therefore not death penalty eligible. He also argues that it does not matter that the findings were made before Atkins was decided. Bies downplays the fact that he was found "mild to borderline mentally retarded" before Atkins, at a time when the distinction carried little legal significance.
The Sixth Circuit's opinion is a strong attempt to keep the state from determining whether Bies is "mildly mentally retarded," and not eligible for the death penalty under Atkins. This does not make much sense when a full hearing to determine his mental capacity would either legitimize his sentence or render him death penalty ineligible. As Kent quoted in an earlier post, "Differentiating Mild Mental Retardation from Borderline Intellectual Functioning requires careful consideration of all available information." DSM-IV-TR, p. 48. Given the high profile of death penalty cases it is unlikely the state would re-litigate the issue without the utmost care. Hopefully the Supreme Court will see the error Sixth Circuit's decision and remand the case to the state to determine Bies' mental capacity. If the Supreme Court upholds the decision, we run the risk of setting dangerous legal precedent for Double Jeopardy and collateral estoppel claims.
On his first appeal in 1996, the Ohio Supreme Court reviewed Bies' death sentence and concluded that his mental capacity "merit[ed] some weight" under Ohio's sentencing law, but ultimately affirmed his death sentence. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed his death sentence because the aggravating evidence outweighed the mitigating evidence.
While Bies was exhausting his state appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia and found it unconstitutional to execute a mentally retarded person. This led to litigation in Ohio courts as to whether Bies was mentally retarded for Atkins purposes. Before this issue was settled Bies filed a federal habeas corpus petition.
The federal magistrate judge concluded that Bies' Atkins claim was unexhausted, but also held that Bies had exhausted his Double Jeopardy argument and that collateral estoppel prevented the state from re-litigating the issue of mental retardation. The magistrate recomended that a writ of habeas corpus issue, and the district court agreed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.
The Sixth Circuit held that collateral estoppel of the Double Jeopardy clause comes into play "whenever a judge or jury enters findings sufficient to establish a legal entitlement to a life sentence." For the Sixth Circuit, this occurred when the Ohio Supreme Court determined Bies' mental capacity "merit[ed] some weight."
"[M]erit[ing] some weight" and findings sufficient to establish legal entitlement are not the same. The state courts had never fully resolved the issue of Bies' mental capacity. It was something they were trying to do when the district court issued the writ. It had also never been resolved pre-Atkins, because the clinical psychologist's testimony "evaluated Bies's I.Q. as being in the range of mildly to borderline mentally retarded." This does not solve anything for Atkins purposes.
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit's decision was a misuse of the Double Jeopardy clause. The Double Jeopardy clause does not apply when the state seeks to enforce a judgement that has only been entered once has not been overturned. In order for Bies to have a Double Jeopardy claim he would have to be acquitted of Raines' murder, or "twice [been] put in jeopardy." Bies was not "twice put in jeopardy" by the state. Rather, the state had affirmed his death sentence, and determined that his "mild to borderline mental retardation merit[ed] some weight in mitigation" without holding the trial-like sentencing phase necessary for acquittal under Sattazhan v. Pennsylvania (2003). The Ohio court had never concluded that the state had failed to prove its case for capital punishment.
In response to the State's appeal of the Sixth Circuit decision, Bies argues that acquittal is not necessary for collateral estoppel or Double Jeopardy to apply. He argues that collateral estoppel applies if the court concludes that "an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid final judgment." If that happens then the issue cannot be re-litigated between the same parties.
Here, Bies is arguing that Ohio courts have made multiple findings that he is mentally retarded, and therefore not death penalty eligible. He also argues that it does not matter that the findings were made before Atkins was decided. Bies downplays the fact that he was found "mild to borderline mentally retarded" before Atkins, at a time when the distinction carried little legal significance.
The Sixth Circuit's opinion is a strong attempt to keep the state from determining whether Bies is "mildly mentally retarded," and not eligible for the death penalty under Atkins. This does not make much sense when a full hearing to determine his mental capacity would either legitimize his sentence or render him death penalty ineligible. As Kent quoted in an earlier post, "Differentiating Mild Mental Retardation from Borderline Intellectual Functioning requires careful consideration of all available information." DSM-IV-TR, p. 48. Given the high profile of death penalty cases it is unlikely the state would re-litigate the issue without the utmost care. Hopefully the Supreme Court will see the error Sixth Circuit's decision and remand the case to the state to determine Bies' mental capacity. If the Supreme Court upholds the decision, we run the risk of setting dangerous legal precedent for Double Jeopardy and collateral estoppel claims.
Leave a comment