As expected, the Supreme Court this morning overruled Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), in Montejo v. Louisiana, No. 07-1529. The vote was 5-4, with Justice Scalia writing the opinion and Justice Stevens writing the main dissent.
The notion that the police deprive a person of his right to counsel simply by talking with him has always been odd. Coerced statements are, of course, unconstitutional, but that comes under the Fifth Amendment, not the Sixth. The Jackson rule took an already strained concept and stretched it a step further, presuming that a waiver of the dubious right was presumed involuntary without a valid basis for such a presumption.
Today's decision shows that a majority of the Court, albeit a slim one, is willing to drop old rules that never had a valid basis and that cause continuing problems. In particular, rules that exclude evidence for reasons with little or no bearing on the reliability of that evidence are contrary to justice and will be closely examined by this Court. Stay tuned for Maryland v. Shatzer, next term.
The notion that the police deprive a person of his right to counsel simply by talking with him has always been odd. Coerced statements are, of course, unconstitutional, but that comes under the Fifth Amendment, not the Sixth. The Jackson rule took an already strained concept and stretched it a step further, presuming that a waiver of the dubious right was presumed involuntary without a valid basis for such a presumption.
Today's decision shows that a majority of the Court, albeit a slim one, is willing to drop old rules that never had a valid basis and that cause continuing problems. In particular, rules that exclude evidence for reasons with little or no bearing on the reliability of that evidence are contrary to justice and will be closely examined by this Court. Stay tuned for Maryland v. Shatzer, next term.
There is a rather sharp exchange between Justice Alito, concurring, and Justice Stevens, dissenting. Alito implies that Stevens turns respect for precedent on and off like a light switch, depending on whether he agrees with the precedent. He is still ticked about Arizona v. Gant, last month.
Stevens responds with a strange footnote that Breyer opts out of, and it touches on one of my pet peeves.
The notion that a court is more faithful to stare decisis by giving its own precedent a strained interpretation rather than overruling it outright is both odd and dangerous. The old case is still precedent, coexisting with the new one, and it may be difficult to figure out what of precedential force is left.
The example I am most familiar with is the habeas corpus case of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). By 1977, the Court had pretty much gutted it, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), but it did not deliver the coup de grâce until 1991, in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722.
The purpose of stare decisis is consistency and predictability in the law. Strained interpretations of precedents do not serve this purpose better than forthright overruling. Pounding square pegs into round holes is not good. Scrap the round hole and get a square one, if you have determined that the square peg must be driven.
Stevens responds with a strange footnote that Breyer opts out of, and it touches on one of my pet peeves.
I do not agree with his characterization of our opinion in Gant. Contrary to his representation, the Court did not overrule our precedent in New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981). Rather, we affirmed the narrow interpretation of Belton's holding adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court, rejecting the broader interpretation adopted by other lower courts that had been roundly criticized by judges and scholars alike. By contrast, in this case the Court flatly overrules Jackson--a rule that has drawn virtually no criticism--on its own initiative.That "broader interpretation," though, was simply a straightforward reading of Belton, a decision that was not really susceptible to the "narrow" interpretation.
The notion that a court is more faithful to stare decisis by giving its own precedent a strained interpretation rather than overruling it outright is both odd and dangerous. The old case is still precedent, coexisting with the new one, and it may be difficult to figure out what of precedential force is left.
The example I am most familiar with is the habeas corpus case of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). By 1977, the Court had pretty much gutted it, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), but it did not deliver the coup de grâce until 1991, in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722.
The purpose of stare decisis is consistency and predictability in the law. Strained interpretations of precedents do not serve this purpose better than forthright overruling. Pounding square pegs into round holes is not good. Scrap the round hole and get a square one, if you have determined that the square peg must be driven.
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