In Crawford v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant's right to confront those "who 'bear testimony' " against him. The holding rendered inadmissible a witness's testimony against a defendant unless the witness appeared at trial, or the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Holding to this bright-line rule, today's decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, includes a lab analyst's report in the category of witnesses that must be subject to cross-examination under the Confrontation Clause.
For the majority of the Court, the "certificates" used to show the results of a forensic analysis of the cocaine recovered after Melendez-Diaz's arrest, were the same type of formalized testimonial affidavits that a defendant had the right to confront after Crawford. The Court reasoned that because the certificates gave the precise testimony the analyst would have given at trial, "[t]he 'certificates' are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony doing 'precisely what a witness does on direct examination.' " Relevant to the Court's decision was the fact that under Massachusetts law, the "sole purpose" of the affidavits was to provide "prima facie evidence of the composition, quality and net weight" of the substance. The fact that a "certificate" would be used to establish one fact that could result in a conviction was sufficient to hold that the analyst preparing the report must be subject to confrontation.
For the majority of the Court, the "certificates" used to show the results of a forensic analysis of the cocaine recovered after Melendez-Diaz's arrest, were the same type of formalized testimonial affidavits that a defendant had the right to confront after Crawford. The Court reasoned that because the certificates gave the precise testimony the analyst would have given at trial, "[t]he 'certificates' are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony doing 'precisely what a witness does on direct examination.' " Relevant to the Court's decision was the fact that under Massachusetts law, the "sole purpose" of the affidavits was to provide "prima facie evidence of the composition, quality and net weight" of the substance. The fact that a "certificate" would be used to establish one fact that could result in a conviction was sufficient to hold that the analyst preparing the report must be subject to confrontation.
In defining the scope of the confrontation clause it did not matter that there might be better ways to challenge the results of a forensic test. The Court believes that it does "not have license to suspend the Confrontation Clause when a preferable strategy is available." While protection of the right to confrontation is required, the right does not necessarily bind the Court to past interpretations of the Clause that did not include, or anticipate, the facts surrounding Melendez-Diaz's crime and prosecution.
Justice Kennedy points this out in his dissent. Frustrated by the Court's "wooden" interpretation of the confrontation clause, Justice Kennedy criticizes the Court for relying on Crawford and Davis to define the bounds of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when "...Crawford and Davis do not say - indeed, could not have said, because the facts were not before the Court - that anyone who makes a testimonial statement is a witness for purposes of the Confrontation Clause...." For the dissenters, Crawford and Davis, which involved typical human witnesses, should have been limited to those people who had witnessed the crime and relayed personal knowledge of the event in their testimony. Crawford's and Davis's logic should not have been expanded to include the "certificate" used in Melendez-Diaz's prosecution. This was particularly true in this case, as common sense, and previous trial experience, did not require the Court to "formalistic[ly]" apply the confrontation clause. The dissenters argued, for example, that little could be gained from an analysts report when he performed "hundreds if not thousands of tests each year" and "claimed no personal knowledge of the defendant's guilt."
The decision appeared to hinge on who the framers intended to subject to cross-examination when they guaranteed a defendant the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." For Justice Scalia, and the majority, "witnesses against" would include anything (including a lab report) that provides a form of testimony against the defendant and can prove "one fact necessary for his conviction." For the dissenters, "witnesses against" can only include a kind of person, and not a laboratory analyst that did not perceive an event that gave him personal knowledge of some aspect of the defendant's guilt.
Justice Kennedy points this out in his dissent. Frustrated by the Court's "wooden" interpretation of the confrontation clause, Justice Kennedy criticizes the Court for relying on Crawford and Davis to define the bounds of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when "...Crawford and Davis do not say - indeed, could not have said, because the facts were not before the Court - that anyone who makes a testimonial statement is a witness for purposes of the Confrontation Clause...." For the dissenters, Crawford and Davis, which involved typical human witnesses, should have been limited to those people who had witnessed the crime and relayed personal knowledge of the event in their testimony. Crawford's and Davis's logic should not have been expanded to include the "certificate" used in Melendez-Diaz's prosecution. This was particularly true in this case, as common sense, and previous trial experience, did not require the Court to "formalistic[ly]" apply the confrontation clause. The dissenters argued, for example, that little could be gained from an analysts report when he performed "hundreds if not thousands of tests each year" and "claimed no personal knowledge of the defendant's guilt."
The decision appeared to hinge on who the framers intended to subject to cross-examination when they guaranteed a defendant the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." For Justice Scalia, and the majority, "witnesses against" would include anything (including a lab report) that provides a form of testimony against the defendant and can prove "one fact necessary for his conviction." For the dissenters, "witnesses against" can only include a kind of person, and not a laboratory analyst that did not perceive an event that gave him personal knowledge of some aspect of the defendant's guilt.
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