Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts Revisited at Supreme Court: New York Times writer Adam Liptak reports on arguments heard Monday regarding a new narrowly divided decision stating that crime lab reports may not be used against criminal defendants at trial unless the analyst responsible for them testify.  The Court's membership has changed since the 5-4 June decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, which said that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, which gives a criminal defendant the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him, does not allow the mere presentation of a lab report to prove, that white powder found on the defendant was cocaine.  The four dissenters in Melendez-Diaz warned that the decision would subject the nation's criminal justice system to a terrible burden, with analysts pointlessly forced to attend trials rather than tend to their forensic responsibilities.  Yesterday's case, Briscoe v. Virginia, involved two prosecutions.  In one, prosecutors offered proof that the "white, rock-like substance" that the police found in Mark A. Briscoe's kitchen and shorts was cocaine by submitting "certificates of analysis" from a forensic scientist who did not testify.  In Sheldon A. Cypress' trial, prosecutors submitted a certificate without testimony as well.  The immediate issue in the consolidated cases is whether the prosecutors were permitted to do something short of calling the analysts as witnesses during the trial.  Other posts on Briscoe are available here and here.

Sixth Circuit Reversal Reversed:  Sentencing Law and Policy writer Douglas A. Berman reports on the Supreme Court's reversal of the reversal of a death sentence for a notorious murderer.  In Smith v. Spisak, the Court considered whether the Sixth Circuit exceeded the limitations of AEDPA when it concluded that the Ohio Supreme Court had incorrectly rejected Spisak's jury instruction and ineffective assistance of counsel claims.The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) provides that a federal court may grant a state prisoner's habeas petition if the state court adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law."  Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court states,"Thus, we conclude that there is not a reasonable probability that a more adequate closing argument would have changed the result, and that the Ohio Supreme Court's rejection of Spisak's claim was not 'contrary to, or . . . an unreasonable application of'" Strickland v. Washington.  The Court was unanimous in the result and the conclusion that the deficiencies Spisak complained of were very unlikely to have changed the outcome. Justice Stevens disagreed with part of the analysis and wrote a separate opinion.  Kent's post on the decision is available here.