The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit's decision in the Alaska case of District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District, et al. v. Osborne, No. 08-6, regarding a § 1983 suit to get postconviction access to DNA evidence. The question presented is after the jump. SCOTUSblog has the pleadings here. The Ninth Circuit opinion is by Judge Brunetti, one of the steadier hands on a frequently erratic ship.
William Osborne was charged with kidnapping, sexual assault, and physical assault. He had the assistance of a competent lawyer who made a reasonable strategic decision to forgo independent DNA testing of the state’s biological evidence. He was convicted after an error-free trial. Now, years later, Osborne has filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking access to the biological evidence for purposes of new DNA testing. The questions presented are:
1. May Osborne use § 1983 as a discovery device for obtaining postconviction access to the state’s biological evidence when he has no pending substantive claim for which that evidence would be material?
2. Does Osborne have a right under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to obtain postconviction access to the state’s biological evidence when the claim he intends to assert - a freestanding claim of innocence - is not legally cognizable?
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